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Regional Variation of Crime in Germany
Abstract
This work explores which spatial patterns of crime exist in Germany and what their socio-
economic determinants are. This is done using the PKS crime statistic for six types of crime
on the county level for the years 2003-2014. To the authors knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
time crime in Germany has been studied with such granular data on such a broad scale.
Due to the granularity of the data set, spatial dependencies of crime and its covariates
became very apparent, which made it necessary to use a random eﬀects spatial durbin
model (SDM) to model regional variation of crime. With this, I was able to show that
the factors explaining crime in one county also spill-over and aﬀect crime in a neighboring
one. To my knowledge, this hasn't been done before either for Germany. Also, I was able
to conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings that the Becker-Ehrlich model works well explaining property
crime in Germany and the social disorganization theory explaining violent and drug crime,
with the routine activity mostly working in both cases. Also as a ﬁrst for Germany, there
is some evidence that the broken-window theory applies and that disorder can drive crime
to an extend.
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1 Introduction
It is the consensus among most economists that physical safety and the safety of one's
property are necessary conditions for a prospering society. Therefore, studying how crime
can be prevented and fought in an eﬀective manner is also a question of economics. How-
ever, crime is simultaneously also the result of economic processes. As will be shown, many
types of crime are causally linked to economic variables such as unemployment, household
income or the human capital stock. Since this is the case, a study like this obviously bene-
ﬁts from granular data with as little aggregation as possible, so that these relationships do
not get "averaged away". Unfortunately, due to lacking data availability, crime in Germany
was until now mostly studied on the level of its 16 states, most importantly by Entorf and
Spengler (2000) and (2002). Recently, there have been some exceptions, like the work by
Messner, Teske, et al. (2013), that do look at crime on the county level, but only for a
few types of crime, covering a short time-span, and sometimes only in a speciﬁc part of
Germany. Since better data is available now, I will instead study crime on the level of
all 402 counties (as of 2014, equivalent to NUTS3 by EU-classiﬁcation) and over 11 years,
which to the best of my knowledge hasn't been done before for Germany. This, however,
comes with the necessity to account for spatial dependencies, i.e. one county inﬂuencing
the development in another.
That crime exhibits spatial dependencies on this granular a scale is not very surprising.
As the often cited ﬁrst law of geography by Tobler (1970, p. 236) states, "everything is
related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things". It is also
long understood that the location of a crime is not arbitrary, but rather causally linked
to victim, perpetrator and motive. For example, the best known sociological theories of
crime explicitly look at the ecological context a crime takes place in, see Cohen and Felson
(1979) or Shaw and McKay (1942) for example. At the same time, studies of crime which
take the space-dimension into account are all fairly recent.
This is also partially due to the fact that much of spatial econometrics wasn't developed
until the eighties, see Cliﬀ and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988) for some of the early work.
But today, not accounting for spatial dependencies is not acceptable when studying crime
and using data with even some degree of granularity. As will be shown, this will give rise to
biased, ineﬃcient and diﬃcult to interpret parameter estimators, see also LeSage and Pace
(2009). Yet, even some of the current economic research often chooses to ignore this source
of endogeneity, while usually making big eﬀorts to account for temporal autocorrelation.
Besides simply controlling for these spatial interactions, using spatial techniques also comes
with a great chance to study what kind of spill-over eﬀects exist with crime and what kind
of clustering they result in. This is especially relevant from a policy perspective. For one,
seemingly eﬀective crime-ﬁghting strategies might not actually stop crime but just change
where it takes place (Weisburd et al. 2006). And, as with all externalities, these types of
1
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spatial spill-overs can give rise to ineﬃciencies in the crime ﬁghting policies, as a county
will likely choose its policy in a way that beneﬁts them without regard to what the eﬀect on
its neighbors might be. To my knowledge, until now no study has looked at these spillover
and clustering eﬀects for Germany.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. After this introduction, I will give a brief overview
over the relevant theories regarding crime on a societal level and previous research results,
resulting in a set of hypothesis to be tested and veriﬁed in the remainder of this thesis.
Next, I will introduce the methods used to test these hypothesis and discuss possible
problems and pitfalls that come with them. In the fourth chapter, I will give an overview
of the data I intend to use for testing these hypothesis and shortly discuss how the data-set
was assembled. In the ﬁfth chapter, I will present the results. The sixth and last chapter
discusses the policy implications of these ﬁndings, their limitations and ﬁnally draws a
conclusion.
2 Theoretical Background
Throughout the more than 200-year long history of research on crime on a societal level,
two main lines of inquiry emerged. These can be categorized into those which looked at
crime in a descriptive manner and those which are interested in cause and eﬀect. While
descriptive studies were always concerned with the geography and clustering of crime,
and therefore especially done by geographers, these was for the longest time ignored by
researches interested in causes of crime, i.e. economists and sociologists. For example, the
relatively recent meta-studies by Weatherburn and Schnepel (2015) or Pratt and Cullen
(2005) barely mention spatial eﬀects of crime and include no paper which looks at these in
a systematic manner. Only recently these two lines of inquiry have merged, resulting in the
research outlined at the end of this section. First, however, I will give an overview over the
non-spatial empirical and theoretical work relevant for the development of my hypothesis.
Much of this work stems from the eighties and nineties, likely because the record crime
numbers in most western countries made this ﬁeld especially interesting during these years,
with interest waning as crime numbers fell.
2.1 The Becker-Ehrlich Deterrence Model
The best known and most used economic model of crime is the deterrence model ﬁrst
proposed by Becker (1968) and reﬁned and extended by Ehrlich (1973). Here, a rational
agent maximizes his or her expected utility when deciding whether to commit a certain
crime. This results in an aggregate "supply-function" of this speciﬁc type of crime, similar
to a Cobb-Douglas production function. In the econometric speciﬁcation by Ehrlich (1973,
2
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p. 537), the model takes the following form:
Q = PαF βY γ1Y γ2l U
δ
l V
ρZ · exp{µ},
⇔ q = αp+ βf + γ1y + γ2yl + δul + ρv + z + µ.
(2.1.1)
HereQ denotes the crime rate per inhabitant, P the perceived probability of getting caught,
F the monetary value of the punishment given when caught, Y the income from the crime
and Yl the income from legal activities. Ul denotes the unemployment rate, or, within the
rationale of this model, the average probability of being unemployed in the current period.
V is a vector containing other explanatory variables not part of the theoretical model, Z is
a constant which sums up individual psychological eﬀects and µ is a white-noise error term.
The lower-case letters denote the natural logarithm of the upper-case denoted variables.
The interpretation of this model is quite straightforward and intuitive. Since the individ-
ual has the choice between legal work or criminal activity, it compares the utility of the
expected income generated by both activities. Since committing crimes comes with the
chance of being caught, their expected income from crime is Y − PF . At the same time,
legal employment comes with the chance of becoming unemployed, so here the expected
income is (1 − Ul)Yl. The individual then makes a utility maximizing choice whether to
commit a crime or pursue legal employment. Therefore, we would expect γ1 and δ to have
positive signs and α, β and γ2 to have negative signs, i.e. we would expect higher unem-
ployment and better illegal income opportunities to increase crime, while we would expect
higher wages, a higher chance of getting caught and more severe punishments to decrease
crime. These last two elements are the reason why this model is called the "deterrence
model", as the clear policy implication is that reducing crime can be achieved by more
police, an eﬃcient justice system and more severe punishments.
This has largely been conﬁrmed by empirical research, for example by Ehrlich (1973),
Wolpin (1978) and for Germany by Entorf and Spengler (2000). Therefore, this model
serves as a good baseline for the questions I am trying to answer. However, empirical
research often struggled with ﬁnding a good proxy for illegal income opportunities, and
disentangling these from legal ones. Entorf and Spengler (2000) used median household
income and unemployment as a proxy for legal income opportunities and per capita GDP
for illegal ones, arguing that a high GDP per capita represents a target rich environment
for criminals, especially regarding property crimes. Draca et al. (2015) show that order
statistics of wages tend to perform better than the unemployment rates as a proxy for
legal income opportunities. Therefore, they use median wages as a proxy for legal income
opportunities, and various price indices as a proxy for illegal income opportunities arguing
that the prices for diﬀerent metals or for electronics motivates theft and burglaries of
these items. However, Fougère et al. (2009) and Grönqvist (2013)) also found (youth)-
unemployment to have explanatory power.
3
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Another issue encountered by researchers using this model is that the (subjective) proba-
bility of getting caught is impossible to measure. To remedy this, they have used various
proxies such as clearance-rate (i.e. the proportions of crimes solved), imprisonment-rate,
or number of policemen per capita. All these variables, but especially the last one, come
with the potential problem of simultaneity. Wilson and Boland (1978) for example found
only low and sometimes negative correlations between police and crime, which is likely
due to police being deployed in high crime areas, thereby creating simultaneity. To deal
with this problem, Levitt (1995) uses a dummy for whether it is a local election year as an
instrument for deterrence. He argues that in election years the number of police deployed
and the number of arrests increase for political reasons, and therefore for reasons indepen-
dent of crime rates. Doing so, he indeed found that in gubernatorial and mayoral election
years the number of policemen increases and crime drops, thereby conﬁrming his intuition.
With regards to other possible explanatory variables exogenous to the model, i.e. those
incorporated in the vector V , I will give an tabular overview at the end of this chapter
(Table 1). One obvious candidate however is education, or the human capital stock if you
will. Machin et al. (2011) for instance found that one more year of compulsory eduction
drastically lowers crime rates, a ﬁnding generally conﬁrmed by Åslund et al. (2015). In the
end it should also be mentioned that there exist various extensions of the Becker model,
where the Ehrlich model is only the most widely used version. One such extension of note
is the dynamic version of the Becker-Ehrlich model ﬁrst proposed by Sah (1991). He argues
that, since we are dealing with expectations, the individual has to makes his or her decision
whether to commit a crime based on the facts known from the previous period. This simple
assumption, and the fact that law enforcement in turn reacts to changes in crime rates,
gives rise to a complex dynamic system with several possible equilibria. Therefore it is of
some interest, whether these assumptions hold true in Germany.
2.2 Social Disorganization Theory
While the Becker model and its extension is the most popular in economic studies of crime,
there are several sociological theories which are also of interest. First, let us consider the
so-called "social disorganization theory", ﬁrst formulated by Shaw and McKay (1942).
They propose that crime is largely the result of a society with little "organization", or,
as an economist might call it, institutions. As causes for this they suggest a lack of
social cohesion, i.e. weak friendship networks, low participation rates in clubs and weak
supervision of teenagers. The core idea of this theory is that it is not just a lack of legal
income opportunities, but rather, a failure of local societies "to realize the common values of
its residents and maintain eﬀective social controls", as Sampson and Groves (1989, p. 780)
put it. How well the community works together to exercise social control of course correlates
with access to resources, but goes further than that. Sampson and Groves argue that this
4
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also includes the disruption of families, ethnic diversity and the turn-over of residents, i.e.
how long they stay in a region. The authors used survey-data to test this theory, and found
that especially urbanization, family disruption and organizational participation had much
explanatory power regarding crime, while ethnic heterogeneity, strength of the friendship
network and residential mobility did not for most types of crime and only a little for the
others. This was conﬁrmed by Lowenkamp et al. (2003) and Miethe et al. (1991), who
also showed that the number of people living in a single room had a positive impact on
crime, even when income was controlled for. See also Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) for
the eﬀect of urbanization on crime. That access to resources also plays an important role
in this theory is emphasized by Zhang (1997), who showed that various welfare programs,
like housing or cash dispersion, can signiﬁcantly lower crime. The same was shown more
recently by Mesters et al. (2016). The eﬀect of marital status on crime has also been
conﬁrmed (Kposowa et al. 1994, Sampson, Raudenbush, et al. 1997). Barnes et al. (2014)
however found that there exists some simultaneity in this relationship, i.e. that criminal
oﬀenders are also a lot less likely to get married, so that the real eﬀect marriage has is much
lower than previously estimated. In theory, marital status also matters, as two people can
share the responsibility of looking after children and earning a living, leading not only
to higher household incomes, but also more social control of children. This is why many
authors like Kposowa et al. (1994), Miethe et al. (1991) or Sampson and Groves (1989) also
include female labor-force participation rates as an exogenous variable in their estimations,
since the tasks of looking after the children traditionally falls on women. In this context,
the controversial article by Donohue and Levitt (2001) should also be mentioned. They
argue that the falling crime numbers in the US during the late nineties are largely due to
the legalization of abortions two decades earlier; an hypothesis that unfortunately can't
be tested with the data-set at hand due to its time-frame.
As the social disorganization theory is well-studied and usually has a lot of explanatory
power, it seems like a natural extension of the basic Becker-Ehrlich model presented before,
especially as I see no reason why these two theories should be mutually exclusive. The
obvious problem of using social organizational theory in empirical research is that it relies
entirely on latent variables, for which proxies have to be found. This is the reason why
most of the work presented up to now relied on survey data. However, Entorf and Spengler
(2002) used administrative data to test this theory for various European countries, and
found it largely conﬁrmed. They didn't explicitly control for variables of "social cohesion",
i.e. strength of social networks and participation in clubs etc., arguing that this was in
turn determined by the socio-economic and demographic variables they did control for.
More recently, Birkel (2015) used a similar set-up and found similar results for Germany.
One interesting diﬀerence between these European studies and those using US data is that
in the US, authors tend to use racial heterogeneity as a proxy for ethnic diversity, while
in Europe most authors use the share of foreign nationals living in the area. This is likely
due to data availability, but possibly also because of the diﬀerent histories of migration in
5
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
the two regions. The eﬀect of migration on crime in Germany was also recently studied
by Piopiunik and Ruhose (2017), whose results would suggest that migration does indeed
causes an increase in crime. They found this by exploiting the natural experiment of the
migration of Germanic Russians ("Russlanddeutsche") in the 1990's. However , similar
studies by Bianchi et al. (2012) for Italy or Bell, Fasani, et al. (2013) for the U.K. found
no or only weak eﬀects on crime caused by migration.
Closely related to this theory is the concept of "social capital" aﬀecting crime, an idea
introduced by Knack and Keefer (1997). Here, social capital means civic norms, general
trust and social networks, and it is easy to see how these might lower crime. This is
especially well studied for violent crime ( Rosenfeld et al. 2001, Fajnzylber et al. 2002
etc.), where social capital is measured by various proxies such as charitable giving or
participation. Buonanno et al. (2009) obtained good results using among others voter-
turn-out during referenda as a proxy for this when ﬁtting their spatial model.
2.3 Routine Activity Theory
Another well-known sociological theory of crime in places is the so-called "routine activity
theory", ﬁrst laid-out by Cohen and Felson (1979). It is based on the simple premise that,
for a crime to take place, three components need to come together at the same place and
time: First, a person willing to commit a crime for some reason, second, a victim this
crime can be successfully committed against, and thirdly a lack of oversight from third
parties, like the police or the community. With regards to the last component, there is
obviously some overlap with the "social disorganization theory" mentioned above. Cohen
and Felson argue that the co-occurrence of these conditions would depend largely on the
daily routines of the people in that area. To test this, Messner and Blau (1987) used the
amount of time people spent watching TV in an area as a proxy for how much of their
leisure time was spent at home. The idea is that people were less likely to become vic-
tims to various crimes that depend on the victim not being at home, like theft, robbery,
burglary etc. Other variables they use for measuring how much of people's leisure-time
is spent outside are attendance at cinemas, sport-events, church and clubs. This poses
an obvious problem when trying to incorporate both this and the social disorganization
theory into a single model, as both use attendance at clubs etc. as proxies, but want to
measure diﬀerent things and expecting opposite signs of the coeﬃcient. Therefore, other
authors have used diﬀerent variables to measure the crime opportunities, such as bar atten-
dance (Liu and Zhu 2017) or tourist activity (Tarling and Dennis 2016 among many others).
For the other components of this model, i.e. willingness to commit a crime and supervision
by "guardians", Messner and Blau, and many authors after them, use the socio-economic
variables we have seen before, like unemployment, GDP, racial heterogeneity, age-structure
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of the area etc. Within this context, Cantor and Land (1985) argue that unemployment
has a two-fold eﬀect. For one, since people in a high-unemployment neighborhood are
poorer, there are less viable victims of property crimes, and since they are usually home
more, there is also more supervision. On the other hand, unemployed people also have
more incentives and time to commit a crime themselves. Cantor and Land further argue,
that these two eﬀects diﬀer in the time they take place to manifest, i.e. that the increased
supervision happens instantly, while the higher motivation to commit a crime is delayed.
Therefore, by the inclusion of a lag term, the two eﬀects could be diﬀerentiated. This
theory was recently tested by Ha and Andresen (2017) and largely conﬁrmed, which could
also explain, why many other studies have found only insigniﬁcant relationships between
crime and unemployment (see Entorf 2008 for example).
As we could see, the real practical diﬀerence stemming from this model is that it also looks
at the victim of a crime and the variables that led to this victimization. Other than the is-
sue regarding club-attendance etc., the routine activity and social disorganization theories
are surprisingly compatible. Therefore, I don't see a problem in incorporating them both
into my model. Especially, as both have been empirically tested many times. Recently,
the seminal study by Messner and Blau on routine activity was replicated by Miller (2013)
and their ﬁndings where largely conﬁrmed. Miethe et al. (1991) however found that the
social disorganization theory performed better in their data-set of crime in US-cities.
Closely related to the routine activity theory is the so-called "broken window" theory of
crime. This theory is interesting, as it is not as well studied by academics and yet very
inﬂuential in law enforcement, especially in the US. The name goes back to a news magazine
article by Wilson and Kelling (1982), where they argue, that on a community level "crime
and disorder are usually inextricably linked"(p.2). The idea is that small misdemeanors,
like smashing in a window, create an environment which breeds more serious crime. This
article was largely ignored by academia, but not by New York law enforcement, who
implemented a strategy based on this theory for their subway system. They focused on
restoring "order" in the subway, i.e. on removing graﬃti, litter and dirt. The resulting
drop in crimes like theft, robbery and even murder (Kelling and Coles 1997) got noticed
by many police departments in the US, who as a result often implemented their own
"broken window"-strategies. See also Kelling (2015) for a short history of this idea. In the
meantime, Keizer et al. (2008) conducted a series of controlled experiments in a now famous
study, where they showed graﬃti, litter and other signs of disorder to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on rule-violating and criminal behavior, ranging from not returning a shopping cart
to theft. So while there is a lot of quite robust evidence for this theory on a small scale,
this is often ignored on larger-scale studies. One exception is the paper by Liu and Zhu
(2017), who used the endogenous variables of vehicle theft and burglary, and found them
to be causally linked, even while not explicitly citing the broken window theory.
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2.4 Spatial Patterns of Crime
That spatial interaction eﬀects in fact exist with crime was shown many times for diﬀerent
units of observation and diﬀerent geographic areas. One early example is the paper by
Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997), who looked at crime rates in Chicago spanning two decades
and found spatial autocorrelation for homicide rates and poverty, resulting in clusters
of poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods, especially at the edges of the city. A little later,
Messner, Anselin, et al. (1999) also found spatial autocorrelation of homicide-rates in cities
by using exploratory pattern detection techniques. While these works showed convincingly
that there exist spatial eﬀects regarding crime, it is important to note here, that this
happens in a purely descriptive manner, i.e that these works only showed that crime rates
in one area have an eﬀect on the crime rates in neighboring ones.
Most research trying to explain these patterns relied on one or more of the theories men-
tioned above, either implicitly or explicitly. An early example is Morenoﬀ, Sampson, and
Raudenbush (2001), who try to predict murders in Chicago neighborhoods. They draw on
the social disorganization theory, but argue that it is not enough to look at social cohe-
sion inside arbitrary borders but that neighborhood are interdependent instead. To model
this, they include a spatial lag of the dependent variable (SAR-model), and use Bayesian
techniques to estimate it. As expected, they found the coeﬃcient corresponding to the
spatial-lag term to be highly signiﬁcant. In this vein, quite a lot of researchers looked at
crime in a speciﬁc city or even city-district to get very granular data while losing some gen-
erality. Andresen (2006) examined various types of crime in Vancouver with a spatial error
model (SEM), combining the social disorganization and routine activity theories. Here,
the spatial dependence of the endogenous variable is just controlled for and not explicitly
modeled, but their ﬁndings are overall as expected and conﬁrm previous research on the
matter. One surprising result, however, is a negative relationship between ethnic hetero-
geneity and both car thefts and violent crime. The authors explain this with the speciﬁcs
of immigrant settlement patterns in Vancouver and don't expect it to be generally true.
Other examples for such studies, which mostly found very similar results, are Kershaw and
Tseloni (2005), Breetzke (2008), Liu and Zhu (2017), Andresen and Malleson (2013) and
many others. In this context I should also mention the study by Weisburd et al. (2006),
who looked at crime in Jersey City (USA) to see whether a policing strategy focusing on
hot-spots actually lowered crime overall or simply displaced it into another part of the
city. If this were the case, we would expect a negative spatial autocorrelation of crime,
i.e. a decrease of crime in one area leading to an increase in a neighboring one. However,
Weisburd et.al. found no evidence for this.
A lot rarer are studies, which cover an entire country. This is largely due to a lack of
available data. Given that any data is available, usually this data is less granular. To the
authors knowledge, county level is the smallest unit of observation used by such studies.
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One early example is the work by Baller et al. (2001), who studied homicides in the US
over a long time-frame (1960-90). Not only did they discover signiﬁcant spatial dependence
in the data, they also found the model to be instable in both the time and the spatial
dimension. For example, they found diﬀerent signs for coeﬃcients when looking at diﬀerent
subsets of the data, for example the South compared to the northern parts of the US, or
diﬀerent decades. For Europe, noteworthy studies include the one by Cracolici and Uberti
(2009), who studied crime in Italy and the paper by Hooghe et al. (2010), studying crime in
Belgium. Both of which used a SAR-model and draw on the social disorganization theory
to explain regional variation of property and violent crimes. One interesting result by
Hooghe et.al. is the signiﬁcant negative relationship between inequality and both violent
and property crimes. In a similar fashion, Tarling and Dennis (2016) look at crime in
Great Britain. However, they use a non-spatial multilevel-model for this, arguing that this
is enough to account for spatial auto-regression, an assumption I ﬁnd questionable for the
reasons discussed in Chapter 3. Interestingly, they found that areas with a high degree of
transients, i.e. people working in an area in which they do not live, has a positive eﬀect
on both violent as well as property crimes. Torres-Preciado et al. (2015) use county-level
data from Mexico to explore the relationship between GDP and crime, which, as many
researchers before have found, is bi-directional (see Arvanites and Deﬁna 2006 and for
Germany Entorf and Spengler 2002). For this they use a spatial durbin model (SDM).
For Germany, I know of only three attempts of using spatial techniques to study crime.
One is the study by Oberwittler and Gerstner (2011), who look at crime in the state of
Baden-Württemberg from 2003-2007 in a mostly descriptive manner. They apply various
measures of spatial autocorrelation and cluster analysis to describe crime patterns and
patterns of its covariates. They also use regression analysis, but for some unexplained
reason use weighted OLS, which, given the spatial patterns they found, is sure to give
biased and ineﬃcient results, as will be shown in the next section. The second is the
study by Ceccato and Oberwittler (2008), who used robbery data for the city of Cologne
to compare it to Tallinn in Estonia, where they ﬁnd little structural diﬀerence, which
supports the possibility of a "generalizable" spatial theory. However, since they found
signiﬁcant spatial dependence only in Tallinn and not in Cologne, they use a non-spatial
OLS approach for this city. However, these ﬁndings might also be explained by their usage
of a diﬀerent kind of spatial weight matrix for each city. Non-the-less, this lack of spatial
dependency in Cologne goes contrary to those found by most researchers in other cities.
Lastly, the study by Messner, Teske, et al. (2013) comes closest to my own attempt to
study spatial patterns of crime. They also use county level panel-data and employ spatial
regression techniques to ﬁt a model based on a combination of routine activity theory.
However, they look at just two types of crime, robbery and assault, and over a relatively
small time-frame, 2005-2007. Their approach also diﬀers from mine, as they use a SEM
for their regressions. Here they control for spatial correlation in the error term, but fails
to actually explain it. As we will see, by using a SDM, we gain a lot more insight into the
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actual workings of spatial transmissions. Also, while having controlled for variables related
to social disorganization and routine activity theories, the authors do not incorporate the
rational choice theory by Becker-Ehrlich nor do they control for autocorrelation within
crime according to the broken window theory. Yet, while I would not call their results
deﬁnitive for these reason, they can serve as a comparison against the results of my own
study. Their study is also interesting, as it is one of the few I know of that includes
interaction eﬀects in their regressions.
2.5 Hypothesis
Variable Latent Variable Theory Source
GDP per capita Illegal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Entorf and Spengler (2000) etc.
CPI, other price indices Illegal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Draca et al. (2015)
Unemployment rate Legal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Entorf and Spengler (2000) etc.
Youth unemployment Legal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Grönqvist (2013) etc.
Median Wage Legal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Entorf and Spengler (2000) etc.
Gini-coeﬃcient Legal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Fajnzylber et al. (2002) etc.
Bankruptcies per capita Legal income opportunities Becker-Ehrlich Birkel (2015)
Clearance rates Probability of getting caught Becker-Ehrlich Draca et al. (2015)etc.
Number of police Probability of getting caught Becker-Ehrlich Wilson and Boland (1978) etc.
Electoral cycles Probability of getting caught Becker-Ehrlich Levitt (1995)
Conviction rates Probability of getting caught Becker-Ehrlich Entorf and Spengler (2000) etc.
Average Sentence Cost of getting caught (F ) Becker-Ehrlich Wolpin (1978) etc.
Prison Population Cost of getting caught (F ) Becker-Ehrlich Han et al. (2013)
Lag of deterrence vars. Cost of getting caught (F ) Becker-Ehrlich Sah (1991)
Population density Urbanization Social Disorganization Hooghe et al. (2010) etc.
Share of foreigners Ethnic diversity Social Disorganization Hooghe et al. (2010) etc.
Index for racial heterogeneity Ethnic diversity Social Disorganization Morenoﬀ and Sampson (1997)
Welfare spending Access to resources Social Disorganization Birkel (2015) etc.
Divorce rates Family disruption Social Disorganization Kposowa et al. (1994) etc.
Female labor force participation Lack of parental control Social Disorganization Kposowa et al. (1994)
People per room Family disruption Social Disorganization Miethe et al. (1991)
Voter turn-out Social capital Social Disorganization Buonanno et al. (2009) etc.
Unemployment Guardianship Routine activity Andresen (2006) etc.
Number of police Guardianship Routine activity Andresen (2006) etc.
Tourist activity Criminal Opportunity Routine activity Tarling and Dennis (2016) etc.
TV ratings & watch time Criminal Opportunity Routine activity Miller (2013) etc.
Bar attendance Criminal Opportunity Routine activity Liu and Zhu (2017) etc.
Lag of unemployment Motive Routine activity Ha and Andresen (2017)
Graﬃti & Litter Disorder Broken Window Theory Keizer et al. (2008) etc.
Years of schooling - - Åslund et al. (2015) etc.
Share of young people - - Hooghe et al. (2010) etc.
Share of male inhabitants - - Piopiunik and Ruhose (2017) etc.
Dummies for south and east Germany - - Messner, Teske, et al. (2013)
Dummies for border region - - Oberwittler and Gerstner (2011)
Table 1: Exogenous variables used in various studies, by theoretical background
Before formulating my hypothesis, I will give a short overview of what explanatory variables
I could use for my model, based on the research mentioned above (Table 1). This list is
not exhaustive, and will for example exclude those based on survey-data. In order to save
10
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
space, I also include only one source per variable, even though many are used by several
authors, a fact I indicate with "etc." It would be naive to just include all proposed variables
into a model, as this would likely lead to multi-collinearity, since many are measuring the
same thing. Therefore, a selection has to be made. Based on this previous research and
the data available for Germany (see Chapter 4), I would expect the following hypotheses
to hold true.
• H1: Following Becker (1968) and Entorf and Spengler (2000), I would expect the
clearance rates and eﬃciency of the judiciary to negatively impact crime rates while
unemployment and per capita GDP should have a positive impact. Inequality or
median wages should also have a positive impact. Also, these relationships should be
weak or non-existent for non-for-proﬁt crimes like assault, as they are almost always
irrational. If Sah (1991) is right, including a time lag of the deterrence variables
should increase the explanatory power of the model.
• H2: According to the social disorganization theory, I would expect population den-
sity, share of non-citizens and divorce rates to have a positive impact on crime rates.
Also, assuming that these variables don't entirely account for social cohesion, I will
use voter turn-out as a proxy for how close the ties to the community are. I would
expect this to negatively impact crime.
• H3: Due to the research on the routine activity theory, I would expect unemployment
to have a negative eﬀect on crime and lagged unemployment rates to have a positive
one. This is obviously not compatible with H1, so we will have to see which performs
better. Also, I would expect tourist activity to have a positive impact on crime, while
a proxy for the number police deployed should have a negative one.
• H4:From the broken-window theory, I would expect minor crimes, like damage to
property or drug oﬀenses, to cause more major crimes.
• H5:Lastly, I expect there to be spatial dependence of both the ex- as well as the
endogenous variables. Speciﬁcally, I expect there to be spatial autocorrelation for
all types of crime, as these are well known to exhibit such behavior. I would also
expect spatial dependencies among explanatory variables like unemployment, which
should be modeled explicitly. Since we can't expect spatial dependency to stop at the
national border, but our data-set is only for Germany, I've included border-dummies
as explanatory variables. This would also be in line with much anecdotal evidence,
which states that crime is higher in regions at the border, especially at the border to
eastern European countries. If this is the case, we would expect this eﬀect to trickle
down through the counties, which is why I've also included a spatial lag of these
dummies.
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These hypotheses lead to a model of the form:
Yt = ρWYt + βXt + γWZt + θAt−1 + ζWBt−1 + ut. (2.5.1)
Here, Yt denotes the vector of crime rates in the 402 counties at time t. W is a row-
standardized spatial weight matrix with a zero diagonal, which, if multiplied with a vector
or matrix of variables creates a spatial lag of these. Xt includes all explanatory variables
at point t, Zt those where I want to include a spatial lag, but not a temporal one. At−1
includes the temporally lagged variables, and Bt−1 those where I want both a temporal and
a spatial lag. This model is a variant of the spatial durbin model (SDM), the properties of
which I will examine in the next chapter. Since the Becker-Ehrlich model requires it and
to somewhat account for other non-linear behavior I will use logs of all variables except
for the dummies.
3 Methodology
Before a detailed discussion of the speciﬁcation and estimation of the SDM, I will give
a short overview of the exploratory spatial and non-spatial techniques I used to discover
patterns and to validate my model choice. I will also mention when I have used user-written
commands for STATA 13, the software utilized to obtain all of my results. The complete
code can also be found on the CD accompanying this thesis.
3.1 Spatial Weight Speciﬁcation
At the core of all spatial techniques must lie a deﬁnition of neighborhood. This determines
how the spatial weight matrix W is formed, and, more importantly, what question
exactly is answered by our model. In general, there are two diﬀerent approaches to deﬁne
neighborhood, either over some measure of distance or over political borders, i.e. conti-
guity. For an example of the diﬀerences, see Figure 1 and for a more complete overview
see Anselin (2002). Here, I will only focus on the most commonly used speciﬁcations,
ﬁrst-order contiguity, binary distance and inverse distance based weights.
The easiest way to deﬁne neighborhood, and therefore the often used default, is the ﬁrst-
order contiguity deﬁnition. This simply sets wij = 1 if i and j share a common border
and zero otherwise, i.e. also if i = j. The advantage of this deﬁnition is clearly it's
simplicity, but also that it doesn't create "islands", i.e. regions not neighboring any other
region, unless they are literal islands or exclaves. Another advantage is that it deﬁnes
neighborhood in a clear and unambiguous way, even though some variants like "rook" and
"queen" contiguity exist (see Figure 10 in the Appendix A). The disadvantage is that it
relies only on arbitrary and for the normal person mostly meaningless political borders,
which might not describe the reality accurately. Also, it might not be a good ﬁt when
looking at the policy implications of crime, as for example police districts often span over
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After Getis (2009), own representation
Figure 1: Diﬀerence between contiguity and distance based spatial weights
several counties. Another drawback is that it does not work well with geographic units of
very diﬀerent sizes and shapes, as can be seen in Figure 1.
In this example, a contiguity-based weighting matrix would look exactly the same in all
three instances, while a distance based weight matrix would look diﬀerent in each case, as
can be seen for instance below. This problem, also called "topological invariance" (Getis
2009, p. 405), makes contiguity based matrices a bad choice for regions of varying shape
or size.
A B C D

A 0 1 1 0
B 1 0 0 1
C 1 0 0 1
D 0 1 1 0
A B C D

A 0 1 0 0
B 1 0 0 1
C 0 0 0 0
D 0 1 0 0
A B C D

A 0 1 1 1
B 1 0 1 1
C 1 1 0 1
D 1 1 1 0
Contiguity weights, all cases Binary distance weights, case a) Binary distance weights, case c)
(3.1.1)
It would therefore be reasonable to assume, that distance based weights are strictly better
suited for my study. The most common speciﬁcation is setting wij = 1 if dij < r, i 6= j
and zero otherwise, which results in binary distance-cut-oﬀ based weights. This comes
with new challenges, however. For one, it has to be decided how the distance d is deﬁned
exactly. A logical starting point is to measure the euclidian distance from the geographical
center of each region. But as we can see in case a) from the example above, ﬁnding this
center of arbitrarily shaped region is not as simple as just taking the average of the x- and
y-coordinates of the border. Doing so could easily result in a point which is not part of
the region itself, which would for example be the case for region D in case a). Instead, one
could measure this distance from the center of mass or centroid of a region, i.e. the average
of all points of the plane. For this, I use the gencentroid option of the shp2dta STATA-
command by Crow (2015). The other drawback of binary distance based weights is that
they require a cut-oﬀ point r. Choosing too short a distance for this would result in many
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"islands", i.e. regions neighboring no-one else, while too long a distance would dilute the
deﬁnition of neighborhood, so that inference would be more diﬃcult. One popular solution
is to set the cut-oﬀ point by ﬁnding ﬁrst the minimum distance from each region j to all
other regions, and out of these the maximum, i.e:
r = max
i
{ min
j
{d12, ...d1j , ...d1n}, ... ,min
j
{di1, ...dij , ...din}, ...}, i 6= j. (3.1.2)
Deﬁning r in such a way ensures that each region has at least one neighbor without the
cut-oﬀ distance being too large in most cases, unless areas vary widely in size. But even
this can't remedy the problem of arbitrariness completely. An alternative would be to
use the inverse distance function as weights, i.e. set wij = 1d2ij
, similar to a gravity model
in trade economics. This would not require a cut-oﬀ point, as the weights approach
zero as the distance grows larger, but due to its exponential nature, this speciﬁcation is
sensitive to the unit of measurement. And since here W would contain (N − 1)x(N − 1)
non-zero weights, it is computationally more intensive and can lead to problems regarding
identiﬁcation, as it will likely result in models containing more than N parameters to be
estimated (Anselin 2002).
There is little formal guidance on how to choose "correct" spatial weights, as Anselin
(2002) points out. There are some cross-validation and goodness-of-ﬁt approaches (e.g.
Wang et al. 2013, Samper and Neuman 1989), and some that use data-driven techniques
to build a spatial weight matrix (e.g. Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler 2013, Getis and
Aldstadt 2010). However, since the speciﬁcations discussed above are only a fraction of
those proposed in literature, these procedures can also not be much more than a crutch.
LeSage and Pace (2014) argue, that as long as two weight matrices are similar enough, they
will lead to very similar result, something that has been validated in simulation studies, for
example by Stakhovych and Bijmolt (2009) or Wang et al. (2013). Theoretically, a wrong
speciﬁcation can lead to bias and ineﬃciency when estimating a model containing spatial
lags (but not when estimating a SEM). But LeSage and Pace ﬁnd both theoretically and
in simulations, that even grossly miss-specifying W changes the resulting estimates very
little. They therefore call model sensitivity to W a "myth", and attribute those ﬁndings
that would suggest otherwise to mis-interpretation of parameters instead. This of course
assumes that W and the true weights are at least somewhat similar. To check this, they
use the Bravais-Pearson correlation of the spatial lag of some randomly generated variable,
i.e. corr(uWa, uWb), where u is a randomly generated 1xN vector. I will follow this
approach trying the three most commonly used and simplest weight matrix speciﬁcation,
queen contiguity, distance cut-oﬀ and inverse distance squared as described above. If I
indeed ﬁnd the resulting matrices to be similar, I will use queen contiguity weights for
my estimations, as they are the simplest of them all. For comparability, and ease of
interpretation, I will in use the row-standardized versions in all three cases. Here, each
weight wij is divided by the row-sum of all weights,
∑n
j=1wij , so the weights associated
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with each region i will add up to one.
3.2 Measures of Spatial Autocorrelation
Having discussed a deﬁnition of neighborhood, and before proceeding with any estima-
tions, I should ﬁrst see whether spatial dependency actually exists in my data. From the
econometric perspective, spatial dependency is a kind of autocorrelation, as it describes a
situation where the value of some variable for region i correlates with that of it's neighbor
j in a systematic manner. From the economic perspective, this is an externality, as
decisions made in region i also eﬀect region j and the other way around. In some ways,
this resembles an autoregressive (AR) process in time-series econometrics, but with the
crucial diﬀerence, that it is bi-directional. With time-series, yt−1 can aﬀect yt, but for
logical reasons not the other way around. In the spatial context, we have to assume that
the relationship goes both ways, which in turn leads to feedback loops, as some event in
region i impacts region j which then in turn aﬀects region i again. And, assuming j is
a neighbor of region k, while i isn't, we also have higher order eﬀects, as some change
in i aﬀects j which then impacts both i and k which in turn again aﬀect j etc. For a
visulization of these feedback loops see Figure 12 in Appendix A. I will go into further
detail about how to estimate marginal eﬀects in the presence of these feedback loops
later in this chapter, for now I will focus on how this kind of autocorrelation can be detected.
Since I am using a SDM, I have to test for the presence oft spatial dependency of both
the endogenous as well as the spatially lagged explanatory variables. To do so, I will
employ three methods. First, I will visually check a map of the the quartiles for these
variables, to see what pattern emerges. If the patterns emerging from this are anything
but completely random, we can assume that some form of spatial dependence of either
the variable itself or some covariate exists, as the assumption of Cov(ui, uj) = 0 seems to
be violated for the case where i and j are neighbors and ui = yi − E(yi|xi). Secondly, I
will use two formal tests for spatial dependence, global and local Moran's I.
Moran's I, ﬁrst proposed by Moran (1950), is an indicator for the existence of global spatial
autocorrelation and is in fact quite similar to the conventional Bravais-Pearson correlation
measure. In the denotation by Getis (2010), it looks like this:
I =
N∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Wij
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Wij(yi − y¯)(yi − y¯)∑n
i=1(yi − y¯)2
, i 6= j. (3.2.1)
This is of course simply the (spatially) weighted Covariance of yi, yj , scaled by
N∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1Wij
[
1
V ar(yi)
]. (3.2.2)
to make it comparable. As shown by Moran, the expected value of this expression, given
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the H0 of spatial randomness, is E(I) = −1/(N −1). Given this, and since the Lindeberg-
Levy CLT applies, due to I relying purely on the ﬁrst and second moments of yi/j and
their linear transformations, we can easily derive a test of spatial auto-correlation from
this. Formally:
I − E(I)
[V ar(I)]
1
2
as.∼N(0, 1). (3.2.3)
And while this is quite straight-forward, ﬁnding the standard deviation of I is less
simple. The STATA-command I use for calculating Moran's I, spatgsa by Pisati (2001),
calculates the standard deviation under the "total randomization assumption", for details
see Cliﬀ and Ord (1981) or Sokal et al. (1998). The resulting statistic not only tells
us whether we have spatial autocorrelation, but also whether the correlation coeﬃcient
is positive or negative. This matters, since this determines the pattern resulting from
spatial autocorrelation. As can bee seen in from the stylized representation of Figure 11
in Appendix A, positive spatial autocorrelation leads to large geographic clusters of high-
or low values (associated with I − E(I) > 0) whereas negative spatial dependency leads
to a kind of chess-board pattern with high value areas right next to low value ones. In the
case of positive autocorrelation however, Moran's I doesn't say anything about what kind
of clusters exist, i.e. whether they are high or low value clusters, or both.
It is necessary for the estimation of a SDM that the sign of the correlation coeﬃcient is
the same for all regions. If it is not, our estimation will fail. Since I have panel data,
I therefore either look at these statistics for each year or use averages over all periods,
as appropriate. To check for stability of the spatial dependency and for outliers, I use a
Moran scatterplot and box-plots of the local Moran's I as proposed by Anselin (1995). The
main diﬀerence between the local Moran's I and the global variant is that here we look at
single observations and it's neighbors. As a result, we deal with rather small N , therefore
the asymptotics used for the test above don't work as well. To correct for this and the
multiple testing problem, I use Bonferroni-bounds when assessing signiﬁcance, as proposed
by Aldstadt (2010). Other than this, the two measures are identical in interpretation, as
can also be seen from the fact, that the global statistic is simply the average of all local
Moran's Is, since it is given by:
Ii =
yi − y¯
1
N
∑N
i=1(yi − y¯)2
N∑
j=1
Wij(yi − yj). (3.2.4)
3.3 Spatial Patterns and Clusters
As mentioned before, Moran's I does not tell us whether we have high or low value clusters.
For this, I use a second statistic, the local Getis-Ord G, ﬁrst proposed by Getis and Ord
(1992). This statistic does not tell us whether we have positive spatial autocorrelation, but
rather where we have it. In other words, Getis-Ord G is able to ﬁnd clusters of high and
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low values, also called hot- and cold-spots. It does so by comparing the average of some
variable within a neighborhood to the over-all average (or theirs sums, as 1N−1 obviously
cancels out):
Gi =
1
N−1
∑N
j=1wijyj
1
N−1
∑N
j=1 yj
, i 6= j. (3.3.1)
As E(Gi) = 1N−1
∑N
j=1wij , and with the same reasoning as before, we can again build
a test statistic, although with a diﬀerent set of hypotheses. While with Moran's I we
had a H0 of spatial randomness, here, we have a null-hypothesis of spatial randomness or
negative spatial dependencies. H1 is positive spatial autocorrelation with either high or
with low clusters, depending on the sign of the test-statistic, which is constructed like this:
Gi − E(Gi)
[V ar(Gi)]
1
2
as.∼N(0, 1). (3.3.2)
Since wij is the ij-element of the spatial weight matrix W , it is only not equal to zero if
i and j are neighbors. In the normal version, wij is also zero if i = j, like in any normal
spatial weight matrix. Getis and Ord (1992) however also include a second measure they
call G∗, where wij = 1 if i = j. The reasoning for this is that it would better detect
clusters, as it now includes the pivotal region i for which neighborhood is deﬁned. Since
I'm interested in this statistic only for cluster detection, this is the version I will use. As
this is a local statistic, it comes with the same issues as the local Moran's I, which is
why I will also use Bonferroni-bounds when making inferences (see Sokal et al. (1998)).
However, Getis-Ord G requires unstandardized weights, so I can't use the same W here I
use for the rest of my calculations.
Since Getis-Ord G allows me to ﬁnd crime hot- and cold-spots associated with positive
spatial autocorrelation, it would further be interesting to explore whether there exists
a relationship between crime hot-spots and clustering structurally similar counties. To
ﬁnd such clusters, I use non-spatial hierarchical cluster analysis using the non-deterrence
related explanatory variables, following Oberwittler and Gerstner (2011). I will then use
choropleth maps to compare the resulting pattern with the results from Getis-Ord's G.
As is likely understood by the reader, hierarchical cluster analysis is a way to ﬁnd, in an
exploratory manner, groups of observations that are in some way similar to each other
and dissimilar to those in other groups. It does so by means of an algorithm, where at
each step the two closest clusters are merged and then the distances re-calculated. The
diﬀerence of various algorithms is how the distance of two clusters is calculated. There
exist various approaches (see Rencher 2003), but I will focus on two methods, average
linkage and Ward. The Ward method is generally thought to be the most robust overall,
but is "space contracting", meaning that individual observations tend to join already
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existing clusters rather than forming a new one. This is also called "chaining" and can lead
to big clusters with quite dissimilar members. Therefore, I will compare those with the
results from a average-linkage procedure, which is also quite robust but "space-dilating".
Following the advice of Rencher (2003), I will accept the results if they are mostly similar.
The diﬃculty with all clustering techniques is deﬁning a stop rule, i.e. a rule where
the algorithm stops and presents the clusters found at that point. Otherwise, hierarchical
clustering algorithms will always end up with one cluster containing all observations, which
is obviously useless. There are many possibilities how to deﬁne such a rule, but again, I
will rely on two. For one I will use a dendrogram, which plots the measure dissimilarity for
each step of the algorithm. A natural stopping point is a large jump in dissimilarity. I will
compare the results of this graphical approach with the more formal one by Cali«ski and
Harabasz (1974). They calculate a so-called "pseudo F"-index which seeks to minimize
within-cluster sum of distance square while maximizing the between-cluster one. This is
done for each step of the algorithm. And since there is obviously a trade-oﬀ between these
two goals, the behavior of this pseudo-F is, in contrast to the measure of dissimilarity used
in the dendrogram, no longer monotonic with a decreasing number of clusters. This let's us
pick a good solution, which is associated with the lowest pseudo-F. But as this technique is
exploratory, and too large a number of clusters makes it impossible to interpret the results,
much of the decision where to stop is op to the researcher, with no clear "best" solution.
3.4 Regression Modeling
3.4.1 Panel SDM
As noted before, the equation 2.5.1 derived from my hypotheses is a spatial durbin model,
depicted cross-sectionally. The data-generating process associated with it can be found by
solving for yt (see Anselin 1988, who also coined the term "spatial durbin model"):
yt = ρWyt + βXt + θWZt + t, t
i.i.d.∼ (0, σ2IN ), (3.4.1)
⇔ yt = (IN − ρW )−1βXt + (IN − ρW )−1θWZt + (IN − ρW )−1t. (3.4.2)
For ease of notation, here the matrices Xt and Zt already include the temporally lagged
variables and Xt also a vector of ones for the constant terms. The distribution of the error
term is of course just an assumption, which will need to be tested (see Section 3.4.2). It
should also be obvious that, assuming equation 3.4.2 describes the true data-generating
process, estimating a naive model like yt = Xtβ + t would necessarily lead to omitted
variable bias, since Cov(Xt,WZt) 6= 0 is very likely. Also, when re-deﬁning the error term
as ut = (IN − ρW )−1t, it is apparent, that the OLS-assumption of Cov(uit, ujt) = 0 is vi-
olated, as uit = f(it, jt). OLS, given a SDM represents the true data generating process,
would therefore also lead to inconsistent estimates, as it implies E(X ′tt) 6= 0, which would
also mean that the estimate of the standard errors would be biased (Wooldridge 2010 and
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Anselin 1988). Therefore using a spatial model in the presence of spatial dependencies is
not a matter of choice, but rather of necessity.
But of course a SDM isn't the only possible choice when trying to control for these depen-
dencies. Another often used model is the spatial error model (SEM). It is speciﬁed like so
(LeSage and Pace 2009):
yt = Xtβ + ut, (3.4.3)
ut = λWut + t, t
i.i.d.∼ (0, σ2IN ), (3.4.4)
⇔ yt = Xtβ + (IN − λW )−1t. (3.4.5)
As we can see, the SDM actually incorporates the SEM, but also models spatial depen-
dency explicitly. The SEM has the great advantage that it does not need any assumptions
on what the spatial autocorrelation process looks like, while coming with the disadvantage
that it also doesn't tell us anything about it. However, as LeSage and Pace (2009) point
out, even if the true data-generating process is the one of a SAR or SEM, estimating a
SDM will result in ineﬃcient, but unbiased and consistent estimators. Furthermore, since
I have a fairly large number of observations, eﬃciency is less of a concern, as asymptotic
behavior sets in.
Until now, I've only been concerned with spatial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
However, since I'm using panel data, I also have to deal with the temporal dimension.
Because the cross-sectional dimension is more than an order of magnitude larger than the
time dimension, possible miss-speciﬁcations are less critical here, but should obviously still
be avoided. Since my model contains some time-invariant variables like dummies indicating
border regions, a ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) approach is not feasible, as the FE-term would soak-up
all time-invariant, region-speciﬁc eﬀects. Also, since the time dimension T is relatively
small, I could not rely on asymptotics when estimating these eﬀects (see Elhorst 2010).
Instead I will use a random eﬀects (RE) approach. Here, a random region-speciﬁc variable
ci is introduced and a distribution assumed, usually ci
i.i.d.∼N(0, σ2c ). The model now looks
like this (Bell and Jones 2015):
yit = β0 + ρ
N∑
j=1
wijyjt +
K∑
k=1
βk, xkit +
N∑
j=1
wij
Q∑
q=1
θqxqjt + ci + it. (3.4.6)
Here k ∈ K are all explanatory variables (including those lagged in time) and q ∈ Q are
those were we want to include a spatial lag, Q ⊆ K. This however comes with it's own set
of problematic assumptions. For one, I have to assume that Cov(xit, ci) = 0 ∀t ∈ T (see
Wooldridge 2010). This is quite a restrictive assumption, and is hard to justify only from
theory. Instead, I will use the well-known test proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) to
check whether this assumption is justiﬁed. As mentioned before, including time-invariant
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variables in an FE-estimation would result in multi-collinearity, therefore I will only use
time-variate variables when comparing FE and RE. As will be shown, the test strongly
rejects the H0, suggesting an RE approach would lead to omitted variable bias (OVB).
However, as discussed before, FE is not a valid alternative in my case. Therefore, I will
use an approach proposed by Debarsy (2012) and Bell and Jones (2015) to deal with the
issue of OVB. Here, the averages over time of each time-variant variable, calculated for
each region, are added as explanatory variables to soak up any bias. This goes back to an
idea of Mundlak (1978), who uses this for an auxiliary regression in a testing procedure.
To explain why this controls for the OVB arising from using a pure RE model, consider a
simpliﬁed version of my SDM with only one explanatory variable:
yi = ρ
N∑
j=1
wijyjt + β1xit + β2x¯i + θ1
N∑
j=1
wijxjt + θ2
N∑
j=1
wij x¯j + ci + it. (3.4.7)
By deﬁning β2 ≡ β3 − β1, θ2 ≡ θ3 − θ1, where β3, θ3 are some new coeﬃcients, and after
some rearrangement, we get:
yi = ρ
N∑
j=1
wijyjt + β1(xit − x¯i) + β3x¯i + θ1
N∑
j=1
wij(xjt − x¯j)
+ θ3
N∑
j=1
wij x¯j + ci + it.
(3.4.8)
In a sense, we have now divided the eﬀects of our variable into a between and a within
eﬀect. Here, the eﬀect variation of x within a region and its neighbors over time has,
is measured by β1, θ1 and the between-eﬀect by β3, θ3. A FE-model would only take the
within-variation into account, while all between-eﬀects would be soaked up by the FE-term.
With the same reasoning, this ensures that this model produces BLU estimations under
the same assumptions needed for the FE-model, as all between variation is controlled for,
leading to Cov(xit, ci) = 0 ∀t ∈ T . This also makes intuitive sense, as the only thing that
might correlate with the region-speciﬁc, but time-invariant term ci are the region-speciﬁc,
but time-invariant parts of xit, that we have now controlled for explicitly. For a formal
proof see Mundlak (1978). That the procedure deals with this problem eﬀectively has also
been conﬁrmed via simulations by Bell and Jones (2015). However, it does not exclude all
forms of OVB, as Cov(xit, it) 6= 0 is still possible if important explanatory variables are
excluded, but the same is true for a FE-model. An alternative to this approach would be
using a FE model and then decomposing the FE-term as proposed by Plümper and Troeger
(2007). But this has the disadvantage that it is much more computationally intensive and
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less easy to interpret. So, the model I will set forth to estimate looks like this:
yit = β0 + ρ
N∑
j=1
wijyjt +
K∑
k=1
β1k(xkit − x¯ki) +
K∑
k=1
β2kx¯ki
+
N∑
j=1
wij
Q∑
q=1
θ1q(xqjt − x¯qj) +
N∑
j=1
wij
Q∑
q=1
θ2qx¯qj + ci + it.
(3.4.9)
Another complication that comes with using RE is the region-speciﬁc eﬀect ci must be
assumed to be randomly distributed. This requires that the set of regions i ∈ N can be
treated as a random sample, the size of which could theoretically approach inﬁnity (Elhorst
2010). Of course, my observations do not necessarily have to stop at the German border,
it would be possible to include regions in other European countries, or in the whole world
for that matter. In that case, N → ∞ might be a reasonable approximation. But it
would still be questionable, whether my sample is representative of the entire population.
Unfortunately, there is not much one can do about this, but refer to the famous quote
by Box and Draper (1987, p. 74): "all models are wrong; the practical question is how
wrong do they have to be to not be useful". As we will see, my results are largely in line
with what other authors have found for other countries, so I would argue that treating
my selection of observations as a random sample is not too wrong to be useful. Another
question is, whether assuming a normal distribution of the RE-term is justiﬁed, which I
will discuss in the next section.
3.4.2 ML-Estimation
It should be obvious to the reader that the model in equation 3.4.9 can not be estimated
using a least squares technique like OLS or FGLS. This is the case for several reasons. To
mention just one, simply the inclusion ρWyt causes OLS-estimates to be biased. To show
this, consider a simple model that only includes this spatial lag, i.e:
y = ρWy + . (3.4.10)
The OLS-estimator would then be ρˆOLS = ([Wy]′Wy)−1[Wy]′y. By solving equation
3.4.10 for y we get (Anselin 1988):
ρˆols = ([Wy]
′[Wy])−1[Wy]′(ρWy + ),
⇔ ρˆols = ρ+ ([Wy]′[Wy])−1[Wy]′,
with E[([Wy]′[Wy])−1[Wy]′] 6= 0,
since E([Wy]′) = E([W (I − ρW )−1]′) 6= 0.
(3.4.11)
As the last term is not equal to zero unless ρ = 0, the estimator is biased. In contrast to the
AR(1) model in time series econometrics, ρˆols is also not consistent, since plim 1N [Wy]
′ 6= 0
(see Anselin (1988)). The same is true for FGLS, as the ﬁrst step, ﬁnding an estimator
21
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany 3 METHODOLOGY
for the variance-covariance matrix Ω, would require an unbiased and consistent estimator
for ρ, which isn't possible via OLS, as just shown. A 2SLS approach is also not an option,
as it would require ﬁnding an instrument for yt that doesn't exhibit spatial dependencies,
and I can't think of such an instrument in my case. Instead, as is usually done in spatial
econometrics, I will use a maximum-likelihood estimation for my estimations.
Of course, the ML approach requires us to deﬁne a conditional likelihood function of yit.
Let us assume it
i.i.d.∼N(0, σ2 ). With this, and since we have assumed ci i.i.d.∼N(0, σ2c ),
we can redeﬁne the error term as it + ci = uit, which will also be normally distributed
with mean zero. And, since we assume independence of the error terms, we know that
yit is conditionally normal distributed as well. From that we can construct a conditional
log-likelihood function as a joint normal distribution like below, see Elhorst (2003) for a
formal derivation :
lnL = −NT
2
ln(piσ2 ) +
N
2
lnθ2 + T
N∑
i=1
ln(1− ρ
N∑
j=1
wij)− 1
2σ2
T∑
t=1
e′tet,
with et = (INT − pWIT )yt − Ztδ, and θ2 = σ
2

Tσ2c + σ
2

.
(3.4.12)
Here Zt includes all exogenous variables (including spatial lags etc.) at point t and the
vector δ all corresponding coeﬃcients. For a detailed discussion on the properties of this
log-likelihood function see Lee and Yu (2016) or Bekti and Rahayu (2013). Of course
this assumes that the error term and the RE term are actually normally distributed.
There is no theoretical reason to believe this is the case, making my estimator technically
a quasi-maximum-likelihood estimator (see Wooldridge 2010). To check whether the
assumption of normality is not "too wrong to be useful", I will plot the residuals e and
use kernel density estimation (KDE) with an Epanechnikov kernel to see whether they are
roughly normally distributed. See Li and Racine (2007) for a detailed discussion of KDE
and the Epanechnikov kernel.
It is well understood that maximizing a conditional log-likelihood of this form must be
done numerically. The xsmle-command by Belotti et al. (2017) uses the built-in maximize-
function of STATA to do so. This utilizes by default a modiﬁed Newton-Raphson algorithm,
see Gould et al. (2010) for details. This kind of algorithm can easily get stuck in non-
concave areas. To prevent this, I also use the difficult-option of maximize. This changes
the size of deviation in each iteration, in the hope this will make it less likely to get
stuck. maximize also comes with its own procedure to ﬁnd starting values. However,
this approach did not work well in my case and tended to produce initial log-likelihoods
to small for STATA to handle. I therefore developed my own two-step algorithm to ﬁnd
initial values. First, I set all coeﬃcients to zero and the error- and RE-variances to 1. With
this, I estimate my model for only two years. I then use the results from this preliminary
22
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany 3 METHODOLOGY
estimation as initial values for the real estimation, which I found to work quite reliably. I
should also note here that the xsmle-command requires a perfectly balanced panel, which
is why I had to use some imputations, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.5 Direct, Indirect & Total Eﬀects
Having estimated the model, I would now turn to the interpretation of the results. This is a
bit tricky with SDMs however, as, since contrary to conventional linear models, βk =
δyit
δxkit
is no longer true. Therefore, the estimation results cannot be interpreted as the marginal
eﬀects anymore. The reason for this is the feedback mechanism I alluded to before. Since
I assume spillovers from one region to another which are bi-directional, a change in region
1 has an eﬀect on region 2 which in turn eﬀects both region 1 and 3 and so on. These
feedback-loops are inﬁnite in theory, although the size of the eﬀect decreases exponentially
with each iteration. For a visualization see Figure 12 in the Appendix A. As a result,
the marginal eﬀect of some variable is no longer a scalar, but a matrix. Here, each row
denotes all the diﬀerent eﬀects a marginal change of that variable has across all N regions.
Formally, this matrix is derived as follows, starting with the SDM model in matrix form
and neglecting the time-dimension for notational ease (LeSage and Pace 2009):
(IN − ρW )y = Xβ +WZθ +−→1 Nβ0 + u,
⇔ y = V
K∑
k=1
INβkxk + V
Q∑
q=1
INθqzq + V
−→
1 Nβ0 + V u.
(3.5.1)
Here V ≡ (IN − ρW )−1 and −→1 N represents a Nx1 vector of ones. By then deﬁning
Sk(W ) = V (INβkINxk +Wθk), θk = 0 if k /∈ Q , we can rewrite the model as:
y =
K∑
k=1

Sk(W )11 Sk(W )12 ... Sk(W )1N
| Sk(W )22 ... Sk(W )2N
| .. |
− − − Sk(W )NN


x1k
x2k
.
.
xnk
+ V
−→
1 Nβ0 + V u. (3.5.2)
And while I have neglected the time-dimension in the notation above, these results do not
change, as stacking the model above over all t ∈ T does not change the essential structure
of the model (see LeSage and Pace 2009, Elhorst 2003). Now we can easily see, that
δyit/δxkit = Sk(W )ii. This is the so-called direct eﬀect and now includes the eﬀect from
the feedback loop. But, other than in a normal linear model, δyit/δxkjt = Sk(W )ij 6= 0.
This is the so-called indirect eﬀect, i.e. the impact a change in region j has on i. This
eﬀect is non-zero even if i and j aren't neighbors due to the impact "trickling own" through
the regions. Note that these eﬀects include all higher order eﬀects (see Figure 12 in the
Appendix for a visualization of this process). As interpreting a NxN matrix is not very
pleasant or useful, the eﬀects are usually divided into direct eﬀects (the main diagonal of
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Sk(W )) and the indirect eﬀects (the oﬀ-diagonal elements). By then averaging these eﬀects
across all regions, we get a good idea on what spatial spillovers exist. LeSage and Pace
(2009) point out, that the indirect eﬀects can be interpreted as the indirect impact from
or to a region, since the Sk(W ) matrix is symmetric. Formally (LeSage and Pace 2009):
M¯direct = n
−1trace(Sk(W )), (3.5.3)
M¯total = n
−1−→1 ′NSk(W )
−→
1 N , (3.5.4)
M¯indirect = M¯total − M¯direct. (3.5.5)
Of course, calculating direct and indirect eﬀects in such a manner is not very practical and
computationally hard, as it would require ﬁnding KxN! solutions. Instead, the effects-
option of xsmle by Belotti et al. (2017) uses the Monte-Carlo approach laid out by LeSage
and Pace (2009). This solves the main problem of calculating trace(Sk(W ) and, as LeSage
and Pace show, results in very little loss compared to the analytical solution laid out above.
For details see also Barry and Pace (1999).
3.6 Further Speciﬁcation Issues
Having thus found a technique resulting in interpretable estimates, I will shortly discuss
further speciﬁcation issues before turning to a description of the data set.
One of the problems that any kind of spatial technique comes with is the "modiﬁable
area unit problem" (MAUP), also called "ecological fallacy". As mentioned before,
the geographic scale of my observations is essentially arbitrary and dictated by the
data available. I use county-level data, but there is no theoretical reason for not using
street-level data instead for example. Hence, the level of aggregation is not theoretically
determined and "modiﬁable" instead. As Openshaw and Taylor (1979), who also coined
the term MAUP, show, diﬀerent levels of aggregation of the same data can vastly change
correlation eﬃcients, as it can average away existing (co-)variance to diﬀerent degrees.
This obviously presents a problem, as it means that using a diﬀerent level of aggregation
can change the estimation results, i.e. introduce an "aggregation bias" (Haining 2010,
p. 214).
Unfortunately, there is not much one can do about this as long as there is no individual
data available and while still using regressions or other techniques relying on covariances.
King (1997) proposed a method on how to dis-aggregate data to solve this problem.
Unfortunately, this method is not applicable in my case, as it would require at least
some lower-level data. Besides this, it is also controversial whether this method actually
deals with MAUP eﬀectively (Wong 2009). But not only is there no real solution to this
problem, there is also no way of knowing whether this problem actually exists within my
data and how serious it is. As a defense for proceeding anyway, despite this unsatisfying
conclusion, I should note that the previous spatial studies on crime also had no solution
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for MAUP and mostly didn't even mention it.
Another source of miss-speciﬁcation is non-stationarity. Stationarity means that the joint
distribution of any subset of observations is identical, i.e that the data is homogenous
(Anselin 1988). To test for stationarity, I use the well-known unit-root test by Breitung
and Das (2005). This is a panel-data variant of the famous Dickey-Fuller test used in pure
time-series. It tests the null-hypothesis of all panels containing a unit-root versus the H1
of stationarity. For this, it essentially estimates the following equation and checks whether
γ is signiﬁcantly smaller than 1 (one-sided test):
yit = αit + γyit−1 + it. (3.6.1)
As this is done using robust standard errors, this test also works under serial correlation
of the error terms. Note that under H0, all yit have the same dependence on yit−1 across
all regions, i.e. γi = γj ≥ 1 ∀i 6= j. There are other tests, like the one by Im et al.
(2003), that don't need this assumption, i.e. allow for diﬀerent dependencies in diﬀerent
regions. This however requires a larger time-frame than I have available. The test by
Breitung is executed via the xtunitroot breitung-command built into STATA. As this
test will show, non-stationarity in time is not a concern with my data, likely due to the
relatively short time-frame.
Lastly, diﬀerent kinds of endogeneity may lead to biased or ineﬃcient estimates. One such
source of endogeneity might be auto-correlation in the error-term. As I have explicitly
modeled spatial autocorrelation, the only source of this could be serial correlation in
the time dimension. As is likely understood by the reader, serial correlation of the
error-term does not bias the results, but can make them ineﬃcient. To test for this, I use
a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2010). Here, a regression of the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
endogenous variables is estimated and it's residuals examined. As Wooldridge shows,
in the absence of serial correlation Cov(∆it,∆it−1) = −.5 This can be tested via a
simple t-test with the H0 of no serial correlation. Note that clustered standard errors
are used in these auxiliary regressions, so that autocorrelation in the space-dimension
is controlled for. This test will be executed via the xtserial command by Drukker
(2003). As we will see, we indeed have to assume autocorrelation. To deal with this,
I use the robust standard errors by Cameron et al. (2011). They are a generalization
of the well-known White standard errors and robust to heteroskedasticity in both the
time- and the space-dimension. This is implemented via the vce(robust) option of xsmle.
Other possible sources of endogeneity include omitted variable bias (OVB) and simultane-
ity. By speciﬁying the SDM the way I did, I already dealt with one source of OVB, omitted
time-invariate variables. And since I include most variables proposed by previous studies
in my model, I ﬁnd it unlikely that other forms of OVB will arise. Also, as LeSage and Pace
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(2009) point out, a SDM is quite robust to OVB compared to other spatial models due to
the inclusion of spatial lags of the explanatory variables. Simultaneity is another matter
however. As could be seen in Chapter 2 of this study, there are several possible sources
of simultaneity, for example in the police-crime relationship. Therefore, it is essential that
the variables included in my model are picked in such a way that simultaneity is prevented,
more on this in the next chapter.
4 Data
My data-set contains observations for all 402 German counties and spans over 12 years
(2003-14). I should note here that when I speak of counties, I mean those regions with
their own NUTS3-classiﬁcation, i.e. both "Kreise" and "kreisfreie Städte" by the German
classiﬁcation. Also, when mentioning "states", I mean the 16 "Bundesländer". During
these twelve years, there have been several reforms of county structure, especially in the
East. Speciﬁcally, these are the reforms in Saxony-Anhalt 2007, Saxony 2008, Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania 2011 and the combination of the city and the county of Aachen in 2009.
All these reforms have lowered the number of counties, from 439 in 2003 to 402 in 2014.
For details on these reforms, I refer the reader to the website of the Federal Institute
for Research on Building, Urban Aﬀairs and Spatial Development (BBSR)1. This matters
especially from a data-handling perspective, as it necessitates a homogenization of the
data. In most cases, this is quite straightforward, as usually two or more smaller counties
were combined into a larger one. In these cases, the numbers for the new county were
retrospectively calculated by simply adding those of the smaller counties together. Since
all my raw data also included absolute numbers, even in cases where I wanted to use
rates or other relative measures, I was simply able to calculate these after the aggregation,
with only few minor shortcuts described later. The exception to this is the area-reform of
Saxony-Anhalt in 2007. Here, some counties where cut up and re-assembled in a somewhat
arbitrary fashion, making it harder to homogenize observations before and after the reform.
As in most cases no lower-level data was available, I instead combined these counties as
best I could, i.e. merging a county with another if most inhabitants of these two counties
ended up the new one. This is of course a source of aggregation error, to control for which
I have included a dummy for these years and counties. But since we are only talking
about 7 counties over 3-4 years (2003-07, depending on whether the data of 2007 was
reported for the old or the new counties), I am satisﬁed that this is only a minor source
of measurement-error. This is supported by the fact that in none of my regressions this
dummy-term ("lk-ref") is signiﬁcant. Lastly, as xsmle requires a perfectly balanced panel,
some imputation had to be done where there was data missing. Overall, imputations were
only necessary for four variables, and at most 2.6% of the observations had to be imputed,
in the other cases far less. For an overview of what data had to be imputed and how
1http://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Raumbeobachtung/Raumabgrenzungen
/Kreise_Kreisregionen/Kreisreformen/xneueTypen.html.
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imputations where performed, see Table 21 in the Appendix B. I will now describe the
data used and it's sources in more detail, an overview of all data-sources can also be found
in the Appendix B.
4.1 Crime in Germany, 2003-14
The most important source of crime data in Germany is the PKS, the crime-statistic
recorded by the Federal Criminal Police (BKA). Here, statistics on a wide range of oﬀenses
are reported, both regarding the crime, the suspects and the victims. Unfortunately,
this data is only available on the county-level since 2013. And since much of my other
data is only available up to 2014, this is not a satisfying time-frame. Therefore, I'm very
grateful to the department IZ 33 of the BKA for granting me access to data for internal
use that goes back to 2003. The drawback of using this data is that it includes far less
characteristics of an observation. For one, it includes no information on suspect or victim.
For another, it only includes six types of crimes and the total crime number. However, as
using this data adds ten years to the time-frame and therefore 4020 observations to the
data-set, I feel justiﬁed in using it.
The six types of crime included in the data are burglary, theft out of cars, assault (both
light and aggrevated), damage to property, drug oﬀenses and "street crime". This last
type is a bit of a catch-all, as it includes all crimes taking place in a public space, which is
why there is obviously some overlap with the other types of crime. For an exact deﬁnition
of these types of crime, see the PKS documentation by the Bundeskriminalamt (2017).
In further examinations I won't use the total number of crimes, which is also reported.
The reason for this is that the total number of crimes consists to a large degree of oﬀenses
that, while against the law, wouldn't be usually called crimes, like using public transport
without a ticket or passing the border without permission. The latter for example is the
reason why Passau in 2014 had by far the highest crime rate per capita, almost doubling
that of Berlin, when many refugees crossed the border there. Besides these minor oﬀenses,
the total crime number largely consists of theft and fraud, which are then given the same
weight as a murder for instance (see also Entorf and Spengler (2002)). This makes the
total crime number "almost useless", as Entorf and Spengler put it (p.7.), which is why
I will not use it in my study. Also, as in this data-set crimes are reported in absolute
numbers, I calculated the number of crimes commited per 100,000 inhabitants (from now
on: "crime rate"). The population data for this comes from the "Statistische Ämter der
Länder und des Bundes".
Besides the raw numbers of crimes recorded, this data also includes numbers on how many
of these cases were solved, which makes it easy to calculate a clearance rate for each type of
crime for the Becker-Ehrlich model. The resulting numbers are of diﬀering quality, however.
This is due to a well-known problem when it comes to police recorded crime numbers, as
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they naturally only record crimes the police became aware of. With some kinds of crime,
this is not a big problem. It is for example reasonable to assume that almost all burglaries
are reported to the police, as insurance policies usually require a police report in order to
pay out and there is also little reason not to report it. The situation is very diﬀerent when
it comes to drug oﬀenses for example. These are almost never reported, as in most cases
both parties willingly commit the crime together, in a drug deal for instance. Therefore,
the vast majority of drug oﬀenses in this data are instances of the police catching an
individual with drugs on their person or vehicle, for instance during traﬃc stops or border
controls (see Commandeur et al. (2014)). As a result, with my data, the average clearance
rate of drug crimes is 95.6%, which clearly in no way reﬂects the actual clearance rate, nor
the probability of getting caught. I therefore use the clearance rate of street crimes as a
proxy for the overall clearance rate, as it is reasonable to assume that when it comes to
pickpocketing, robbery or assault, the vast majority of incidents are reported. The issue
of underreporting of course does not only applies to clearance rates, but also to the crime
rates themselves. Of course, this only represents a problem if the underreporting of crime
is not homogeneous over space and time, e.g. if in some county or during a certain year
people where less likely to report a robbery for instance. But as Tarling and Morris (2010)
show, there is some reason to believe this is the case, as there survey data shows that
people in areas with lower GDP and higher unemployment are less likely to report crimes.
It is also possible that this underreporting introduces some amount of simultaneity to the
data, as it might be that better staﬀed and equipped police forces uncover more crimes,
thereby causing a higher reported crime rate. However, as this is the only source for crime
numbers on the county level, there is not much I can do about this but point out that the
vast majority of studies on crime use this type of data, with the notable exceptions being
those relying on survey-data (e.g. Entorf (2015)).
4
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2005 2010 2015
Year
Burglaries (log) Theft out of cars (log)
Damage to property (log) Drug crime (log)
Street crime (log) Assault (log)
Source: BKA, own calculations
Figure 2: Crimes per 100,00 inhabitants (log), average over counties, 2003-14
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Looking at the time-dimension depicted in Figure 2, we see very little change of the crime
numbers between 2003 and 2014, with only burglaries exhibiting a small upward trend
from 2010 onwards. This stands in stark contrast to the time-series reported by Entorf
and Spengler (2000) for the years 1975-96, that show a very strong upward trend for
almost all types of crime. From an econometric perspective, this supports the assumption
of stationarity, which will be conﬁrmed by the tests described before. But it also means
that there is very little variance in the time-dimension, which suggests that the estimation
results will have little explanatory power within a region. However, when looking at the
spatial distributions of crime in Figure 3, we see a lot of variance. The base map material
comes by courtesy of the "Bundesamt für Kartographie und Geodäsie" (BKG).
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Source: BKA, BKG, own calculations
Figure 3: Crimes per 100,00 inhabitants (log), averages over time, county level
Here we can clearly see a fair amount of clustering associated with positive spatial
autocorrelation ( compare also to Figure 11 in the Appendix A). This is especially true
for burglaries, theft from cars, damage to property and street crime, while it is less
pronounced for assault and drug crimes. It is important to note, however, that these
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maps depict the average over time for each region. When I disaggregate this and look at
such maps for each year, which I omit here for the sake of space, we can see this type of
pattern for drug crimes as well, while assault is still the odd one out. Also, the classes
used for coloring the maps are somewhat arbitrary, in this case each represents a quartile
of the overall distribution, which of course could be changed to obtain diﬀerent results.
However, with the results at hand, it is interesting that these patterns look quite similar
for the diﬀerent types of crime. We can observe a high-value cluster in the Rhine-Ruhr
region, in the North around Hamburg and in the East around Berlin, while Bavaria and
to a lesser degree Baden-Württemeberg exhibit clusters with low crime rates. Looking
at these maps, it also seems to matter whether a region borders another country. There
seems to be a particularly large high-value cluster of damage to property near the Polish
border and a one of drug oﬀenses along the border with the Netherlands and Belgium.
Another, although not very surprising, result is that especially in maps c)-f), we can
clearly see that cities exhibit much higher crime rates than the surrounding country-side.
Further, there is no apparent diﬀerence between East and West Germany, which is why I
will not use an East-West dummy in may analysis, unlike Messner, Teske, et al. (2013).
To test the theory of Sah (1991), I also include the one-year lag of the clearance rate of
street crime, and to test the broken-window theory, I will use "damage to property", a
quite minor oﬀense, as an explanatory variable rather than as an endogenous one.
I've also performed outlier detection with boxplots on these variables, the results of which
can be found in Figure 14 in the Appendix A. As can be seen there, some outliers do in
fact exist, although not very many considering the 4824 observations. Non-the-less, I've
used these and other box-plot results to construct an outlier dummy to include in my
regressions.
4.2 Economic Determinants
As noted in Chapter 2, economic indicators play a central role in most theories of crime.
Yet at the same time it is diﬃcult to choose variables in such a manner that their eﬀect
is clear and unidirectional. I will use three economic indicators in my study, a proxy
for illegal income opportunities and general wealth of the region, one for legal income
opportunities and one for tourism.
For illegal income opportunities/wealth of the region I've considered several variables,
namely GDP, disposable household income (DHI), primary household income and the
average hourly wage. All these variables were taken from the report "VGR der Länder"
by the "Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder". Of these, DHI
seemed to perform best in my regression, both when considering the AIC/BIC and the
R2-values. It is not surprising that DHI p.c. performed best since DHI is deﬁned as the
part of the income of private households that can actually be spent, i.e. the income after
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taxes, government transfers and other regular payments. For an exact deﬁnition see the
documentation of the data-set these variables were derived from (Brenner et al. 2015). To
make the numbers comparable across regions, I calculated it in Euro per capita (p.c.). To
make it comparable across time, I deﬂated it by the oﬃcial consumer price index (CPI)
with base-year 2010 as reported by the "Statistisches Bundesamt" to obtain real DHI p.c.
This is the measure I will refer to from now on when mentioning DHI. As several authors
before me have found a strong bi-directional relationship between regional wealth and
crime (Entorf and Spengler 2002, Torres-Preciado et al. 2015 etc.), simultaneity might be
an issue. To prevent this, I will use the one-year-lag of DHI to preclude any possibility of
a bi-directional causality in the Granger sense.
Related to this measure of illegal income opportunities is tourist activity, which is
of course also used in the routine activity theory. As a proxy for tourism I use the
number of nights visitors stayed in a county. This data is reported by the local
"Fremdenverkehrsämter" and collected by the "Statistische Ämter der Länder und
des Bundes" (from now on abbreviated "Statistische Ämter". To make it comparable
across regions, I've again divided this number by the total population of a county
and multiplied it by 100,000. I will from now on refer to this measure as "tourism".
Of course, it is also possible that some amount of simultaneity exists with crime and
tourism, as high crime numbers might dissuade tourists from coming. However, this would
be associated with a negative sign of the coeﬃcient, which is not the case in my regressions.
For legal income opportunities, I will use the unemployment numbers as reported by the
"Statistische Ämter". Given previous research (Draca et al. 2015), I have reason to believe
that median income or measures of inequality would perform better as a proxy for legal
income opportunities. Unfortunately, there is no such data is available on the county-level.
Further, while the unemployment numbers are available as rates and as absolute numbers,
I have to account for the county reforms mentioned before. Therefore I can't use the
rates as reported, but rather have to calculate my own rates. Since the number of people
who would be able to work are not reported, I instead calculate unemployment rates as
the number of unemployed relative to the number of inhabitants. Assuming that the
reasons for not participating in the labor market, such as age, education, raising children,
disability etc., are relatively homogeneously distributed across all regions, I ﬁnd this to
be a satisfying approximation. To see whether the hypothesis of Cantor and Land (1985)
holds up, I considered also including long-term unemployment as a variable as well. But
as this did not produce any result of note, I've instead included the one-year lag of the
unemployment rate as done by Ha and Andresen (2017).
As we can see from Figure 4, both unemployment and DHI exhibit quite distinctive clus-
tering, while tourism doesn't seem to. It is apparent at the ﬁrst glance, that maps a) and
b) seem to be the mirror image of the other, which is not surprising, as it just means that
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Figure 4: Unemployment, DHI and tourism, average over time, county level
unemployment and DHI are negatively correlated as one would expect. The one way there
are not similar is that cities tend to have both high unemployment and high DHI p.c.,
especially in the Rhine-Ruhr area. Also, in contrast to the maps of crime earlier, we can
see a clear diﬀerence between East and West Germany. As for tourist activity, it seems
that especially the border regions and the North Sea are attractive destinations, as well as
some of the bigger cities, although except for Cologne none in the Rhine-Ruhr region. As
before, I've used box-plots to ﬁnd outliers for the construction of my outlier-dummy. The
results of this can be found in Figure 15 in Appendix A. As can be seen there, especially
unemployment but also DHI and tourism have some serious outliers.
4.3 Social Determinants
While it was relatively easy to ﬁnd suitable variables for the economic side of my model, the
variables on the societal/social side took a bit more creativity. The ﬁrst variable I needed
was a measure of government response to crime. This mainly means police deployment,
but also youth workers etc. And while the numbers of youth-workers per county are readily
available from the "Statistische Ämter", numbers on the size of the police force are not.
Therefore I'm grateful to the ministries of the interior of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria,
Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland, Bremen
and Lower Saxony as well as the statistical oﬃce of North-Rhine Westfalia for providing me
such numbers. Unfortunately, I didn't end up using this data in my regression for several
reasons. For one, I wasn't able to collect such numbers for all states in Germany. For
another, they all had very diﬀerent levels of aggregation, and only some where on the level
of police districts ("Polizeidirektion"), which roughly equates to counties. But the most
serious problem was that when running my regressions with either the number of police or
number of youth-workers per capita, the results showed serious signs of simultaneity, i.e. a
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positive relationship between crime and numbers of police/youth-workers. This, of course,
resembles the results of Levitt (1995), so that this data doesn't need to go completely to
waste. I used it to check whether Levitt's theory might also hold true for Germany and
checked whether there is a correlation between number of police-oﬃcers p.c. and years with
state elections. The resulting correlation coeﬃcient of -0.01 however strongly suggests that
there is no relationship at all. I've also used it to plot the development of police-oﬃcers
p.c. over time for each state where data was available. The results of this, which can be
found in Figure 13 in the Appendix A, are not very striking though.
To deal with the issue of simultaneity, I had to ﬁnd a proxy that did not exhibit signs of
simultaneity. For this, I used the number of state employees in each county as reported
by the "Statistische Ämter". Speciﬁcally, I used the number of tenured ("verbeamtete")
full-time state employees as for this subset of government workers the data was most
complete. This of course mostly excludes youth and social workers and mainly consist of
police oﬃcers, teachers and people in the administration and justice system. Of course,
a priori it is still not possible to exclude simultaneity in this case. For one, it is still
possible that the share of police oﬃcers among them is so great that it determines the
relationship of the entire variable to crime. For another, it is likely that cities, which as
we saw exhibit higher crime rates, also have more tenured state employees, since they
are administrative centers. However, if this were a serious problem, we would expect
the coeﬃcient associated with government employees to be positive, which it is not (see
next chapter). Again, I've calculated the number of state employees per 100,000 inhab-
itants to make it comparable across regions (from now on referred to as "state employees").
Next, I had to ﬁnd a proxy for the human capital stock among young people. Unfor-
tunately, there is no data available for the educational attainment of all inhabitants in
the counties. Instead, I used the number of students leaving school without a degree as
reported by the "Statistische Ämter". From this I've calculated the share of students
without a degree relative to all ﬁnishing school that year, from now on called "drop-out
rate". I've also tried using the share of those ﬁnishing with a lower- or middle-tier degree
(Haupt-/Realschulabschluss") instead, but with less clear results. Machin et al. (2011)
point out that there might exist some degree of simultaneity here as well. The idea is that
teenagers who "chose" a career of crime are less likely to work on their academic career,
while at the same time students who are not doing well in school might be tempted by a
career in crime. To preclude this, I again only include the one-year lag of the drop-out
rate in my regressions.
For family cohesion, as it is used in the social disorganization theory, I've considered
two diﬀerent proxies, the number of marriages and the number of divorces per 100,000
inhabitants, calculated from numbers by the "Statistisches Bundesamt". Again, there
might be an issue with simultaneity, as criminals are much less likely to get married and
more likely to divorce (Barnes et al. (2014)). For Germany, this is also conﬁrmed by a
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survey among inmates, see Entorf (2008). But as only very few people in any county
are criminals, even those with the highest crime rate, it cannot be expected to be a
major issue for my level of aggregation. I tried using both marriages and divorces on my
regressions, and divorces performed better overall. Unfortunately, the divorce numbers
are only available on the state level for the entire time frame and only for the year 2015
on the county level. But as I will demean the divorce rate and then add their mean as it's
own variable anyway when using the Mundlak-approach described before, I used these two
statistics to obtain a time-trend by state (the demeaned state divorce rate) and a sort of
county ﬁxed eﬀects by including the numbers from 2015, as reported by the "Statistische
Ämter", instead of the means from the state divorce rates. I argue that this comes close
enough to ﬁnding the between- and within-eﬀects of divorce, as I would ideally have, if the
divorce-rates where available on the county level for the entire period.
As mentioned before, most other authors before me didn't explicitly include a variable
for social cohesion, but rather argued that the other economic and social variables would
account for the eﬀect of social capital. In contrast, I will follow Buonanno et al. (2009)
when using voter turn-out as a proxy for social cohesion/social capital. The idea behind
this is that when people feel a high degree of civic duty or when they generally trust and
associate with their neighbors, they are much more likely to vote in an election. Of course,
diﬀerent types of elections always have diﬀerent voter turn-outs, which makes it diﬃcult
to compare results of a national election with a state election, for instance. The solution
for this problem could be to just use one type of election, the national parliamentary
elections for instance, but that would give me only three data-points per county, as they
only happen every four years. To remedy this, I subtract the average voter turn-out to
make state, national and European parliamentary elections comparable. As this procedure
necessarily creates negative values, and since I want to use mostly logarithmized variables
in my regressions, I then add the absolute value of the minimum plus 1 to enforce positive
numbers which can be logarithmized. This way, I ensure that every county has about
8-9 observations each. For the years where no new data is available, as no election took
place, I just repeat the value from the previous year. The source of this data is again the
"Statistische Ämter", who report the absolute number of votes cast and the numbers of
eligible voters per county for these three types of elections, from which voter-turnout was
calculated. I considered whether there is a relationship between crime and the electoral
success of conservative or far-right parties, but no obvious connection emerged. Bateson
(2012) notes that simultaneity might be an issue here as well, as survey data suggests
that people who where victimized recently are far more likely to participate in politics.
This would mean, however, that the relationship between crime and voting should have a
positive sign, which it does not in my regressions.
The spatial distribution of the variables from this section (Figure 5), exhibit in each case
clear, but very distinct pattering. In the case of state employees, we can again clearly
34
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany 4 DATA
distinguish between East and West Germany. Besides this, it is also apparent that the
number of state employees p.c. is especially high in the cities, and in the state capital
for that matter, with the interesting exception of Berlin. There is further no apparent
clustering here, which makes sense considering the deployment of state employees is a
political decision. Contrary, with regards to the drop-out rate, this is not the case. Here
there apparently exists a distinct high-value cluster in the North-East and a low value one
in the South. Again, we can see that this share is especially high in the bigger cities. This
is also true for the divorce rates, where in addition there are far fewer divorces in the East
compared to the West. One reason for this is certainly that there also far less marriages
in the East. This becomes apparent when looking at a similar map for marriages, which I
have omitted here for brevity. Lastly, the (demeaned) voter-turn-out exhibits the strongest
clustering of these four. There are several distinct low- and high values clusters, with turn-
out generally being higher in the South-West than the North-East. And as before, I have
used box-plots for outlier detection, see Figure 15 in the Appendix A. As can be seen there,
especially voter turn-out and the drop-out rate have some serious outliers.
4.4 Other Determinants
Besides these socio-economic determinants mentioned before, there are also some demo-
graphic and geographic characteristics that likely need to be controlled for. For one, it
is apparent from the maps of both the ex- and the endogenous variables, that it matters
whether a county is urban or rural. I've considered two variables to control for this,
population density and the county-classiﬁcations by the BBSR. The latter sorts all Ger-
man counties into four categories, major cities, urbanized, rural with some urbanization
and rural counties, see Einig et al. (2012) for details. This has some advantages over
population density as an indicator, as it also incorporates information on the political
and cultural characteristics of a county. There are several disadvantages to this approach,
however. For one, this is a categorical variable, which would necessitate the inclusion of
three dummies. For another, the BBSR doesn't reclassify counties yearly, which would
mean there were only two observations available per county over the time frame. I
therefore used population density instead, which also performed better than the BBSR
variable with regards to AIC/BIC and R2, likely because it has more within-variance
attached to it. This can also be understood as a proxy for urbanization in the sense of
the social disorganization theory. The population density was calculated from numbers
reported by the "Statistische Ämter" regarding population and area in square kilometers.
From the same data-source, I also constructed variables regarding the age and gender
structure of each county. It is well understood that many types of crime, especially
violent crime, are mainly committed by young males. For Germany, this is supported
by the aforementioned survey among inmates (Entorf (2008)), which reported that 89%
of inmates are male, with an average age of 33. Considering that the crime they were
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Figure 5: Social indicators, average over time, county level
convicted for must have obviously taken place before they landed in prison, this suggests
that most crimes are committed by fairly young people. There are obviously several
diﬀerent ways I could control for this. But as I indeed only want to control for this, also
because this connection is both quite intuitive and well studied, I chose to follow Entorf
and Spengler (2000) and constructed a variable "young & male". This is the share of
males between 15 and 25 relative to the entire population. It could be argued that these
age borders are somewhat arbitrary, but it still tells us something about the general
gender/age structure of the county.
Also from the same data-source, I've constructed the variable "share of foreigners", which
is the proportion of non-citizens living in a given county. In contrast to "young & male",
this variable and its relationship to crime is actually of some interest to me. For one, it is
clearly a very politically charged question whether foreigners commit more crimes, having
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controlled for all other relevant variables. The recent study by Piopiunik and Ruhose (2017)
would suggest that in Germany migration does indeed have a strong impact on crime. Of
course, this can also be understood as a proxy for "racial heterogeneity" in the sense of the
social disorganization theory. Again, there might exist the problem of simultaneity here,
as it is possible, that since many non-Germans are relatively poor, they are forced to move
to poorer and more crime-ridden neighborhoods. Since this can't be diﬀerentiated from
foreigners causing crime, I will again use the one-year lag to make sure that the causality
only goes one way. But it is also possible that foreigners are suspected more often by the
police, and thus more often caught when they have committed a crime. Unfortunately, my
data doesn't allow me to say either way, so this has to be left to future research.
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Figure 6: Pop. dens., young & male, foreigners, average over time, county level
Lastly, I've constructed border dummies, which indicate whether a county borders a
speciﬁc country, i.e. Denmark, Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France,
Luxembourg, Belgium or the Netherlands. From this I also constructed a dummy
indicating whether a region is a border region at all to diﬀerentiate between a possible
increase of crime that comes from any border and country-speciﬁc eﬀects.
When looking at the spatial distribution of these variables (Figure 6), the results are non-
surprising with regards to population density and share of foreigners. As we would expect,
the population density is highest in the cities and lowest in the somewhat underdeveloped
parts of Eastern Germany. The same is true for foreigners, who seemingly tend to agglom-
erate in the larger cities and more in the West than the East. More surprising are the
patterns emerging from the "young & male" variable. The results indicate that especially
in the South and West there are many young men, with less in the North and the east.
Never-the-less, we cannot assume real clustering here, because, while these broad trends
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exist, there are also many instances of high- and low value counties neighboring each other,
which would be associated with negative spatial dependency. Again, I've use box-plots for
outlier-detection. The results can be found in Figure 16 in Appendix A. However, only a
few minor outliers emerged.
5 Results
Having presented the methods of choice and introduced the data-set, this section will dis-
cuss the results. This will be done with particular focus on the ﬁve hypotheses formulated
in Chapter 2. To reiterate, I hypothesized in H1 that the Becker-Ehrlich model would
hold true, H2 asked whether social disorganization theory applies, H3 concerns the routine
activity theory, H4 the broken windows theory and H5 regards the existence of spatial
dependencies. Before considering H1-4, it should ﬁrst be examined, whether spatial de-
pendencies actually exist and what form of clustering they result in.
5.1 Spatial Autocorrelation
When looking at spatial dependencies, I had to ﬁnd a workable deﬁnition of neighbor-
hood. As discussed in Chapter 3, I created several diﬀerent spatial weight matrices (queen-
contiguity, distance cut-oﬀ, inverse distance squared). Then, following LeSage and Pace
(2014), I created a random variable (over only one time period, i.e. with 402 observations)
from a standard-normal distribution and used these three spatial weight matrices to cal-
culate their spatial lags and then calculated their correlations to see whether it makes a
diﬀerence which deﬁnition I use.
Queen contiguity Distance cut-oﬀ Inverse distance
Queen contiguity 1.0000 - -
Distance cut-oﬀ 0.7240 1.0000 -
Inverse distance 0.7860 0.6090 1.0000
Table 2: Correlations of spatial lags with diﬀerent weight matrices
As can be seen from Table 2, the correlations are fairly high across the board, although
queen contiguity seems to be the most similar to the two others. When comparing
these results with the correlations reported by LeSage and Pace (2014), which are also
somewhere around 0.7, it seems fair to assume that the choice of weight matrix doesn't
matter much for the rest of my study. Therefore, I will use the simplest deﬁnition, queen
contiguity, from now on. Here, each region has on average four neighbors. Of course, as
mentioned before, the three weight matrices used here are only the most common ones,
but the literature knows of a plethora of other deﬁnitions. So it is still possible that this
is a misspeciﬁcation, but not al deﬁnitions could be tested in the scope of this study.
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Variable I z-statistic p-value∗
Burglaries (log) 0.143 5.513 0.000
Theft from cars (log) 0.125 4.850 0.000
Dmg. to property (log) 0.079 3.103 0.002
Drug crime (log) 0.057 2.249 0.025
Street crime (log) 0.108 4.194 0.000
Assault (log) 0.105 4.066 0.000
Unemployment (log) 0.156 6.027 0.000
Drop-out rate (log) 0.058 2.280 0.023
DHI p.c. (log) 0.133 5.170 0.000
Share of foreigners (log) 0.036 1.464 0.143
Voter turn-out (log) 0.099 3.890 0.000
Divorce-rate 2015 (log) 0.026 1.085 0.278
Tourism (log) 0.031 1.263 0.206
State employees (log) 0.009 0.431 0.667
Pop. density (log) 0.046 1.848 0.065
Young & male (log) 0.024 1.024 0.306
∗ two-tailed test
Table 3: Global Moran's I for the ex- and endogenous variables averaged over time
Having decided on a spatial weight matrix, it is now possible to take a look at the spatial
structure of my data. The maps in the previous section already suggest some amount of
positive spatial autocorrelation. To conﬁrm this, let us consider ﬁrst the global Moran's I
results reported in Table 3. As we can see here, all crime variables and most exogenous
variables exhibit strong positive spatial auto-correlation. Surprisingly, this is even true for
drug crimes and assault, where we couldn't see a clear pattern previously. Less surprising
is that state employees p.c., share of foreigners and divorce rates don't show signiﬁcant
spatial dependencies, although there seems to be some weak clustering with regards to
population density. Finally, neither tourism nor the share of young males show signiﬁcant
spatial dependency. This is surprising, considering there seemed to be some broad spatial
trends when mapping them previously.
That said, these results already broadly conﬁrm H5, which states that there exist spatial
dependencies with crime and also it's various dependent variables. The implications of
this are already quite stark. For one it means that, when modeling crime on a granular
level, it is absolutely necessary to account for these dependencies. In order to diﬀerentiate
between spill-overs stemming from spatial dependencies among the explanatory variables
and those resulting from dependencies of crime itself, I will include spatial lags of those
variables showing signiﬁcant Moran's Is in my SDM. Secondly, from a policy perspective,
it implies that there exist externalities and feedback loops a crime-ﬁghting policy must
take into account. Of course from this, one cannot say much about the nature of these
externalities and the clustering they result in. We also don't know how stable these
relationships are over space and time, while I need to assume homogeneity for my SDM as
mentioned before. To check whether this is actually the case, I employed two strategies.
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First, I used so-called Moran's scatter plots, which indicate how similar neighboring
regions are. The results of this can be found in Figure 17 in Appendix A. As we can see
there, heterogeneity of the spatial dependency across space might indeed be an issue.
Under homogeneity, one would expect all data-points to be within either the upper right
or lower left quadrant, meaning high- and low value clusters. This is mostly the case for
burglaries, theft from cars and street crimes, while it is less pronounced with regard to
damage to property and completely breaks down for drug crimes and assault. This is an
somewhat odd result, as the global Moran's I reported before are the sum of all local
Moran's, and both assault and drug crime were signiﬁcantly positive there. When looking
at the box-plots of the local Moran's Is (Figure 18 in Appendix A), there is reason to
believe that these contradictions are largely driven by outliers. Given the maps from
the previous chapter, and that most counties do exhibt positive spatial autocorrelation,
I would argue that the instances of negative dependency largely come from cities being
surrounded by rural areas, especially in the South. And since I will control for population
density in my regressions, I don't expect this to be a major problem. Non-the-less, I've
constructed a new outlier-dummy including regions with abnormally large or small local
Moran's I. If I where to include this in the deﬁnition of the dummy constructed before, it
could be argued that it has too many deﬁnitions. And since these two dummies are not
highly correlated (0.03), collinearity is not an issue when using both (called "out1" and
"out2" in the regression results).
5.2 Patterns & Clusters
Having found evidence for spatial dependency, I'm now interested in the patterns that
emerge from this. The maps in the previous chapter already displayed a fair amount
of clustering, but it is not clear whether these patterns are really the result of spatial
dependency or reﬂect the clustering of the underlying variables. This kind of causal
inference is of course also at the heart of the SDM formulated before, but ﬁrst I will
use some exploratory techniques in the hope they can provide more insight into the matter.
First, I'm interested in ﬁnding the clusters that are the result of spatial dependency. For
this I use the local Getis-Ord G, as described in Chapter 3. To reiterate, this statistic
tells us whether and where low and high value clusters exist that are the result of
positive spatial dependency. As also mentioned before, to prevent the problem of multiple
inferences, I will use Bonferroni-bounds to decide whether something is a cluster. On the
5-% signiﬁcance level, this means Φ(z) = 1− 0.05/(2 · 402), resulting in the critical values
of z = ±3.05, where z-values smaller than these suggest a small-value cluster and those
higher a high-value one. Of course, Getis-Ord G is only sensible to use, when there is
reason to believe there actually exists spatial dependency, therefore I will preclude those
variables with insigniﬁcant global Moran's Is from this analysis.
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Figure 7: Getis-Ord G z-value, var. crimes averaged over time
The maps in Figure 7 show the results for the six types of crime I'm studying. All in
all, they are not very surprising considering the patterns that emerged in the maps from
the previous chapter (Figure 3). As we can see, especially the maps for burglaries, theft
from cars and street crime look very similar, with one very large low-value cluster in the
South/South-East (denoted in blue) and one very large high-value one in the North and
West (denoted in orange), while the rest of the republic shows no signiﬁcant clustering
at all (white). These three maps diﬀer slightly in whether there is a cluster in the East,
roughly around Berlin. While theft from cars and street crime show some clustering there,
burglaries do not. When looking at the results for drug crime and assault, the picture
becomes less clear. Assault shows relatively few clusters, one high-value one in the North
around Hamburg, one in the Rhine-Ruhr area, a low-value one in the South-West and
some smaller ones here or there. The clustering completely breaks apart when considering
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drug crimes, with only one distinct high-value cluster in the West, near the Dutch border.
But as argued before, the numbers for drug crimes have to be taken with a grain of salt,
since they are most certainly highly underreported. This might explain why this map
shows Berlin to be in a low-value cluster, which contradicts at least anecdotal evidence.
And of course this applies to all the maps shown here to some degree, since they are
based on averages over time. It is possible that diﬀerent patterns would emerge were the
time-dimension taken into account, but as this would require presenting 12 maps for each
variable, it is omitted in this exploratory part of the study.
Non-the-less, we have now a better idea what kind of clusters exist within my endogenous
variables. In the next step, I'm interested whether similar patterns emerge among
the exogenous variables. If this were the case, it would suggest that the clustering
shown there is at least partially a result of the spatial dependencies of the explanatory
variables. The results from Figure 8 suggest that some relationship does indeed exist. Not
surprisingly, the clustering within unemployment and DHI p.c. are largely a mirror image
of one-another, with a large high-value cluster of unemployment and a corresponding
low-value one of DHI p.c. in the East. A bit more surprising is the fact that, while there is
a high-value cluster of unemployment in the Rhine-Ruhr region, there is no corresponding
cluster of DHI p.c. there as we have also seen in the maps from the previous chapter. This
is likely due to the fact that many large companies have their headquarters there, making
the average household income high, even though there is still much unemployment. In
the South-West, there is again a very large low-value cluster of unemployment and a
high-value one of DHI p.c. The picture of clustering in drop-out rates is somewhat similar,
but the high-value cluster in the East also extends to Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein.
Voter turn-out is the odd one out here, with several medium size clusters all over the map.
Comparing these results with the patterns that emerged with crime, there are some
obvious similarities. In many cases we can detect distinct clusters in the East, the North,
the West and the South. From this, we can already ﬁnd some evidence for H1-4. As
expected, clusters with high unemployment tend to have higher crime rates, while DHI
has an ambivalent eﬀect, as some clusters in the West show both high crime rates and
DHI, for example in the case of burglaries. The drop-out rate clusters also correspond
quite well to the crime clusters, while the relationship between voter turn-out and crime
is not obvious.
Overall, these results are already quite meaningful. For one, it underlines the ﬁnding from
the previous section, that there is signiﬁcant spatial dependency, resulting in clustering, in
my data. Secondly, it is a ﬁrst conﬁrmation of some of my hypothesis regarding causality.
The fact that spatial dependencies also exist for some exogenous variables of course is in
itself also relevant. For one, it means that it might be sensible to explicitly model these
dependencies in my SDM, so that I can diﬀerentiate between spatial eﬀects stemming
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Figure 8: Getis-Ord G z-value, var. determinants averaged over time
from the endogenous and exogenous variables. From a policy perspective, these results are
also quite relevant. For one, due to the feedback-loops associated with spatial dependency,
it would make sense to have a uniﬁed policy within a cluster, as these feedback eﬀects will
make it diﬃcult to enact change without coordination, more on this later.
The last exploratory technique I used is cluster analysis of the explanatory variables
as described in Chapter 3. The idea here is to ﬁnd whether there is a latent pattern
among counties that might explain the clusters I've found before. Again, this is a
non-spatial technique and therefore the clusters that will emerge here have nothing to
do with spatial dependency of crime. Instead, it will ﬁnd counties that have similar
socio-economic characteristics and I will see whether this is associated with the spatial
clustering of crime shown before. As mentioned, I use two diﬀerent hierarchical clustering
techniques, average linkage and Ward. Finding a stopping rule to get a sensible amount
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of clusters proofed somewhat tricky though. As can be seen from the dendrograms
(Figure 19 in Appendix A), in both cases large jumps in dissimilarity begin to appear
after there are only about ﬁve clusters left. This would suggest that stopping at ﬁve
clusters is a good choice, considering the results have to be interpretable, which would
become diﬃcult with 10 or more clusters. When looking at the pseudo-F by Cali«ski
and Harabasz (1974), we see that the results of Ward and average linkage are quite
similar up to around 5 clusters. After that, the pseudo-F values from using average
linkage drop drastically from around 150 when using 5 clusters to about 2 when using
two clusters. This would suggest that here, two clusters are the optimal choice. But
unfortunately, the two clusters which emerge are the entire country and one single-county
cluster. And while this is an interesting result, it is also quite useless. Also, this
convexity is not present when using the Ward-method. I therefore choose ﬁve clusters as
a stopping rule, although the pseudo-F values suggest this isn't optimal for average linkage.
Figure 9 depicts the results of the cluster analysis when using the Ward method. When we
compare it to the results from average linkage method (Figure 21 in Appendix A), we see
that they are quite similar overall, which suggests that these are sensible results (Rencher
2003). But likely because of its space-dilating properties, average linkage has produced
one cluster with only a single county in it, which isn't very useful either. Therefore, and
since it is often considered the default method, I will use the Ward results from now on.
When Looking at Figure 9, we can see a fairly distinct pattern in space emerging. With
Cluster
1
2
3
4
5
Var. sources, own calculations
Figure 9: Cluster analysis results using Ward
this, and considering the averages by cluster shown in Table 4, interpretation of these
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Mean of: Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Unemployment (log) 1.59 1.09 1.93 0.99 1.17
DHI p.c. (log) 9.84 9.85 9.7 9.90 9.92
Drop-out rate (log) 1.94 1.80 2.15 1.76 1.73
Tourism (log) 12.40 13.83 12.79 12.56 11.98
State employees p.c. (log) 7.53 6.74 6.32 6.74 6.72
Divorce (log) 5.29 5.30 5.10 5.31 5.36
Voter turn-out (log) 3.10 3.21 3.15 3.26 3.32
Pop. density (log) 7.10 4.70 4.58 5.10 6.05
Share of foreigners (log) 2.26 1.56 0.49 1.81 2.16
Young & male (log) 1.47 1.40 1.38 1.42 1.39
Table 4: Variable-averages by Ward-cluster
Correlation Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Burglaries (log) 0.34 -0.19 -0.12 -0.22 0.18
Theft from cars (log) 0.44 -0.25 0.00 -0.30 0.10
Damage to property (log) 0.60 -0.25 0.18 -0.45 -0.08
Drug crime (log) 0.47 -0.05 -0.14 -0.25 -0.07
Street crime p.c. (log) 0.60 -0.26 -0.02 -0.38 0.04
Assault (log) 0.70 -0.15 -0.07 -0.40 -0.13
Table 5: Correlation between crime and cluster-dummies
results becomes quite straight-forward. Cluster 1 seems to consist of the major cities like
Hamburg, Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt, cities in the Rhine-Ruhr area etc. These cities show
fairly high unemployment, many state-employees p.c., low voter turn-out and a high share
of foreigners and young men. Cluster 5 seems somewhat similar and to consist of smaller
cities and highly urbanized counties in the West like Hannover, Münster or the Rhein-Main
area without Frankfurt. Here unemployment is lower, but still quite high, the same goes
for the share of foreigners. Interestingly, these cities have the lowest tourist activity out
of all clusters, while having the second highest population density. They also have the
highest relative voter turn-out of all clusters.
Cluster 2 seems to consist of poorer rural counties in the West, with low population density
and relatively high unemployment and low DHI p.c. compared to the other rural counties
in the West (cluster 4). Cluster 3 clearly consists of rural counties in the East, with the
highest unemployment, lowest DHI p.c., lowest population density and a very small share
of foreigners. Lastly, and as mentioned before, cluster 4 seems to consist of richer rural
counties in the West, with the lowest unemployment and second highest DHI p.c. out of all
clusters. Considering this is a exploratory technique, these results seem to give a good idea
about the spatial structure of my covariates. It would therefore be interesting how these
clusters relate to crime rates. For this, I created 5 dummies denoting whether a region
belongs to a speciﬁc cluster and calculated the correlations between this and the crime
rates, the results of which can be found in Table 5. Overall, the results are mainly in line
with H1-4. Cluster 1, the big cities with high unemployment and high population density
correlates positively with all forms of crime. In contrast, cluster 4, the rich rural counties
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in the West, correlate negatively with all forms of crime, with the other clusters falling
somewhere in between. One interesting case is cluster 3, the rural counties in the East. For
one, even though they have the highest unemployment, lowest DHI p.c. and highest drop-
out rates, the correlations are mostly negative. For another, the on exception is damage to
property, where there is a positive correlation. This goes against the broken window policy,
where we would expect more damage to property to cause higher crime rates all around. A
similar thing can be seen in cluster 5, where half the correlations have a positive sign and
the other half a negative one. When comparing these results with the spatial clustering
discussed before, the similarities are limited. We can see a clear East-West divide in the
Ward-clusters but not in the spatial crime clusters, while the North-South divide visible
there is not in the results from hierarchical cluster analysis. This of course might be due
to the algorithm or the stopping-rule I used, which are both arbitrary to some degree. But
to me, it suggests that this clustering is not purely the result of the spatial structure of the
covariates, but rather the result of the spatial dynamics of both the ex- and endogenous
variables. It is impossible to disentangle these relationships without a formal regression
model, to the results of which I will turn now.
5.3 Regression Results
As reporting both the regression results as well as the direct, indirect and total eﬀects for
each regression would take up a lot of space, I will only report a selection of the estimated
average direct and indirect eﬀects that are either signiﬁcant or otherwise of interest, while
listing the rest of the estimation results in Appendix B and omitting total eﬀects completely,
as they are just the sum of indirect and direct eﬀects. I will also not report the coeﬃcients
associated with the three outlier-dummies (outliers in the data, outliers in Moran's I and
problems from merging counties before 2007 in Saxony-Anhalt), although the ﬁrst two are
often signiﬁcant.
5.3.1 Burglaries
ρ Log-Likelihood R2-total Hausman Unit-root Wooldridge Mundlak
Statistic 0.2483 -1889.25 0.6149 646.86 -12.6612 176.305 1468.20
p-value 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Burglaries: Tests and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
Before turning to the results, ﬁrst a quick word about the test and goodness-of-ﬁt
results reported in Table 6. The estimated spatial lag coeﬃcient of the endogenous
variable is denoted by ρ. Here, we can infer a very signiﬁcant positive relationship
between burglaries in county i and the neighboring county j, which of course will
trickle down through all counties. Further, Hausman shows the results of the Hausman
test. It is important to note that this is not a post-regression test, as my regression
includes time-invariates. Instead it is a test comparing two auxiliary regressions of the
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Direct Eﬀects: Burglaries
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Dmg. to property (log) -0.2441 0.0450 -5.4247 0.0000 -0.3323,-0.1559
State employees p.c. (log) -0.3491 0.0548 -6.3748 0.0000 -0.4564,-0.2418
Young & male (log) 0.3267 0.0669 4.8839 0.0000 0.1956,0.4579
Divorce rate (log) 0.3874 0.1246 3.1090 0.0019 0.1432,0.6316
Unemployment (log) 0.1423 0.0324 4.3953 0.0000 0.0788,0.2058
Tourism (log) 0.2272 0.0453 5.0150 0.0000 0.1384,0.3160
Pop. density (log) 1.7280 0.2882 5.9950 0.0000 1.1631,2.2929
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0767 0.0302 2.5400 0.0111 0.0175,0.1360
Lag DHI p.c. (log) 1.4403 0.2122 6.7860 0.0000 1.0243,1.8563
Lag clearance rate (log) -0.0811 0.0349 -2.3251 0.0201 -0.1494,-0.0127
Border to Switzerland -0.5614 0.2725 -2.0602 0.0394 -1.0954,-0.0273
Border to Belgium 0.6135 0.2720 2.2556 0.0241 0.0804,1.1466
Border to Luxembourg 0.6555 0.2843 2.3057 0.0211 0.0983,1.2128
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.7213 0.1145 6.2996 0.0000 0.4969,0.9457
Avg. young & male (log) -1.4315 0.2867 -4.9927 0.0000 -1.9934,-0.8695
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.4389 0.0671 6.5406 0.0000 0.3074,0.5704
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4905 0.1203 4.0769 0.0000 0.2547,0.7263
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -1.0991 0.1081 -10.1661 0.0000 -1.3109,-0.8872
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.5635 0.1180 4.7759 0.0000 0.3322,0.7947
Table 7: Selection of avg. direct eﬀects: Burglaries (log)
time-variate variables, one using FE and the other RE, where the approach by Mundlak
(1978) is not implemented. As mentioned before, here H0 is that there is no systematic
diﬀerence between the two, which we have to reject in our case. Therefore it is crucial
to use the Mundlak-approach in my main regression. Unit root denotes the results of
the unit-root test by Breitung and Das (2005), where the H0 is that the endogenous
variable contains a unit-root, which again has to be strongly rejected here, meaning the
data-generating process is likely stationary. Wooldridge reports the results of the test for
serial correlation by Wooldridge (2010), where under H0 there is no serial correlation,
which has to be rejected again. Therefore it is important to use the robust standard-errors
by Cameron et al. (2011). Lastly, Mundlak denotes the results of a Wald-test of the
coeﬃcients associated with the averages over time. If they are jointly signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, we can assume that this regression has the same properties regarding
unbiasedness and consistency as an FE estimation (Bell and Jones 2015). In Table 22
(in Appendix B) I also report AIC/BIC and other goodness-of-ﬁt measures. Here it
becomes obvious from looking at the within-/ between-R2 that the explanatory power
of my model largely comes from the between dimension, while it struggles to explain
variation across time, likely because there is no real observable trend there. Lastly, as can
be seen from both the histograms and KDE of the residuals (Figure 22 in Appendix A),
the assumption of normality seems to be mostly met. These test results are quite simi-
lar across all ﬁve estimations, so I won't comment on them again unless something changes.
From the estimated average direct eﬀects reported in Table 7, we can already see that
many of my hypothesis are conﬁrmed in the case of burglaries. With regard to the Becker-
Ehrlich model (H1), we can conclude that lag of DHI p.c. indeed has a positive impact
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on the burglary rate, meaning it seems to represent opportunities for burglary rather than
the access to resources to ﬁght crime, as the social disorganization theory would have us
believe. It is important to remember here that this variable is demeaned, and interestingly
the time-average of DHI p.c. is not signiﬁcant. On the other hand, unemployment seems
to strongly impact crime, both the average level as well as the demeaned lag and the
current period values. This is further evidence that the Becker-Ehrlich theory works well
here, which is especially interesting, as many other previous studies have failed to show
this intuitively sensible result (Entorf (2008)). Since the sign for unemployment in the
current period is positive, it suggests that the theory by Cantor and Land (1985) has
to be rejected for the case of burglaries, as the fact that people are unemployed doesn't
seem to increase the vigilance of the inhabitants in a manner that would lower crime. In
terms of deterrence, we see that the overall government response to crime, measured by
the number of state employees, as well as the clearance rate, in fact lowers crime. It also
seems to conﬁrm the theory by Sah (1991), as not only the average, but also the lag of
the clearance rate signiﬁcantly lowers crime. This suggests that potential criminals look
at the last period to make a decision whether to commit crime in the current one. In this
context also ﬁts that the lag of unemployment is signiﬁcant. With respect to H2, I already
mentioned that DHI p.c. seems to have the wrong sign for the social disorganization
theory to be a good ﬁt. As a saving grace for H2, the divorce rate, both over time and
between counties, seems to increase crime as expected. But this could of course also taken
as conformation for the routine activity theory (H3), which is also supported by the fact
that both tourism seems to increase burglaries. It seems likely that this is due to the
fact that tourist accommodations are more often empty than other homes. With regard
to the broken window theory (H4), the results are somewhat ambiguous. While damage
to property averaged over time has a signiﬁcant positive impact on burglaries, the sign
of the coeﬃcient aﬃliated with the demeaned variable is negative. As mentioned before,
damage to property was included as a proxy for general "disorder", and it seems while
the general level of disorder increases burglaries, an increase from one year to another
lowers it. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that increases in damage to
property might temporarily result in a response by the government, for example in an
increase of police presence, that also dissuades potential burglars. However, this has to be
investigated further to come to a conclusive result. Lastly, when considering the various
control variables, the share of young males shows a similar behavior than the damage to
property rate. While the demeaned variable seems to have a signiﬁcant positive impact,
the average over time has a negative one. This is a contradiction I can't quite explain,
but it makes sense to assume that burglaries are less sensitive to the share of young males
than other crime variables. In contrast, population density behaves like expected, with a
higher burglary rate in regions with higher population densities, which also conﬁrms H2.
Interestingly, the lag of the share of foreigners wasn't signiﬁcant at all (see also complete
results in Appendix B). Lastly the eﬀects neighboring countries have on the burglary rate
are somewhat counter-intuitive. In contrast to popular belief, it is not regions neighboring
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Indirect Eﬀects: Burglaries
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Dmg. to property (log) -0.0764 0.0152 -5.0357 0.0000 -0.1062,-0.0467
State employees p.c. (log) -0.1095 0.0202 -5.4238 0.0000 -0.1491,-0.0700
Young & male (log) 0.1028 0.0243 4.2303 0.0000 0.0552,0.1504
Divorce rate (log) 0.1214 0.0403 3.0112 0.0026 0.0424,0.2004
Tourism (log) 0.0713 0.0158 4.5201 0.0000 0.0404,0.1022
Pop. density (log) 0.5416 0.1011 5.3552 0.0000 0.3434,0.7398
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0241 0.0098 2.4611 0.0139 0.0049,0.0432
Lag DHI p.c. (log) 2.3366 0.3541 6.5991 0.0000 1.6426,3.0306
Lag clearance rate (log) -0.0255 0.0114 -2.2414 0.0250 -0.0478,-0.0032
Border to Switzerland -0.1760 0.0866 -2.0325 0.0421 -0.3457,-0.0063
Border to Belgium 0.1924 0.0876 2.1975 0.0280 0.0208,0.3640
Border to Luxembourg 0.2057 0.0914 2.2504 0.0244 0.0266,0.3849
Voter turn-out (log) 0.2224 0.0733 3.0319 0.0024 0.0786,0.3661
Avg. young & male (log) -0.4489 0.0982 -4.5695 0.0000 -0.6415,-0.2564
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1378 0.0253 5.4461 0.0000 0.0882,0.1874
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.1538 0.0401 3.8387 0.0001 0.0753,0.2324
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -0.3449 0.0473 -7.2913 0.0000 -0.4376,-0.2522
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.1772 0.0423 4.1910 0.0000 0.0943,0.2600
Table 8: Selection of avg. indirect eﬀects: Burglaries (log)
Eastern European countries that suﬀer from more burglaries, but rather those bordering on
Belgium and Luxembourg, while bordering Switzerland has a negative impact. It should
be remembered here that I diﬀerentiate between the country-speciﬁc eﬀect and the eﬀect
of living on the border in general, which didn't turn out to be signiﬁcant however. This
is also largely in line with the ﬁndings of Oberwittler and Gerstner (2011) for Baden-
Wurttemberg.
When looking at the average indirect eﬀects (Table 8), we can see clear evidence of spill-
overs. First of all, this of course again conﬁrms H5, that the feedback loops due to spatial
dependencies play a crucial role in explaining crime in a county. Largely, the eﬀect seems
to consist of the neighboring county being in a condition predestined to increase crime in
their own county, which then radiates out to the neighboring counties. This is implied by
the fact that all the same variables proofed to be signiﬁcant, with the same signs of the
coeﬃcients. This is also an interesting result, as it means that all these variables cause the
positive spatial auto-correlation of crime noted earlier and we do not see a "displacement"
of crime, i.e. criminals moving from one county to the other as enforcement increases , as
also rejected by Weisburd et al. (2006). Especially with burglaries, one could have expected
that for example the indirect eﬀects of DHI pc. or unemployment could have the opposite
sign than the direct eﬀects, as inhabitants of poor counties go to richer counties to rob its
inhabitants. Arguably, the reason this can't be observed is due to the fact that income
and unemployment are highly clustered themselves, so that very few rich counties border
poor ones. Another particular interesting result is that only the lag of unemployment is
signiﬁcant here, which could be suggesting that the spatial spill-over of unemployment,
and arguably other variables, needs time to manifest itself. Therefore, it might interesting
to model crime with a temporal-spatial model, i.e. a model that also takes time dynamics
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into account. But this has to be left to future research. Also interesting is that the border
eﬀects seem to be so strong that they trickle down through the regions as well, meaning for
example that counties which border counties that in turn border Belgium or Luxembourg
also suﬀer higher rates of burglaries.
5.3.2 Theft from Cars
ρ Log-Likelihood R2-total Hausman Unit-root Wooldridge Mundlak
Statistic .4832 -835.01 0.6715 161.45 -12.2707 483.844 1836.75
p-value 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 9: Theft from cars: Tests and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
Direct Eﬀects: Theft from cars
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) -0.1229 0.0265 -4.6339 0.0000 -0.1750,-0.0709
State employees p.c. (log) -0.1039 0.0436 -2.3827 0.0172 -0.1894,-0.0184
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.1091 0.0410 2.6594 0.0078 0.0287,0.1894
Young & male (log) -0.4321 0.0532 -8.1202 0.0000 -0.5364,-0.3278
Unemployment (log) 0.1571 0.0250 6.2769 0.0000 0.1081,0.2062
Tourism (log) -0.0896 0.0361 -2.4832 0.0130 -0.1603,-0.0189
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.0996 0.0220 -4.5175 0.0000 -0.1428,-0.0564
Lag DHI p.c. (log) 1.5546 0.1695 9.1701 0.0000 1.2223,1.8868
Lag clearance rate (log) -0.2091 0.0279 -7.5052 0.0000 -0.2637,-0.1545
Border to Austria -0.4747 0.2155 -2.2030 0.0276 -0.8970,-0.0524
Border to Switzerland -0.5183 0.2490 -2.0815 0.0374 -1.0064,-0.0303
Border to Luxembourg 0.5251 0.2598 2.0214 0.0432 0.0160,1.0342
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0646 0.0304 -2.1252 0.0336 -0.1242,-0.0050
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.6531 0.1048 6.2305 0.0000 0.4476,0.8585
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1840 0.0613 3.0029 0.0027 0.0639,0.3042
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4919 0.1100 4.4724 0.0000 0.2763,0.7075
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -1.2469 0.0987 -12.6369 0.0000 -1.4403,-1.0535
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.3934 0.1079 3.6462 0.0003 0.1819,0.6049
Table 10: Selection of avg. direct eﬀects: Theft from cars (log)
The results concerning theft from cars are largely similar to those regarding burglaries.
This makes sense, as both are property crimes and probably largely driven by the same
motivation. The ﬁrst notable diﬀerence is that the model seems to be a better ﬁt, as sug-
gested by the log-likelihood, R2 and AIC/BIC (Table 22 in Appendix B). Secondly, here
voter turn-out has the hypothesized impact on crime, which makes the social disorganiza-
tion theory (H2) a better ﬁt. Potentially, this is because theft from a car is more a crime
of opportunity compared to a burglary, which makes social cohesion and control more
important, as it is not only committed by hardened professionals. Thirdly, the share of
foreigners now signiﬁcantly increases the rate of thefts, which also suggests that burglaries
and thefts from cars are diﬀerent in kind. Other than this, the results reported in Table 10
again largely support the Becker-Ehrlich theory, with clearance rate and it's lag as well as
rate of state employees p.c. having a negative eﬀect on crime, while DHI p.c. and unem-
ployment having a positive one. Beside the eﬀect of voter turn-out, H2 is also conﬁrmed by
divorces increasing the amount of theft. However, the routine activity theory (H3) doesn't
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Indirect Eﬀects: Theft from cars
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) -0.1025 0.0229 -4.4675 0.0000 -0.1474,-0.0575
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0866 0.0367 - 2.3584 0.0184 -0.1586,-0.0146
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0910 0.0353 2.5771 0.0100 0.0218,0.1603
Young & male (log) -0.3598 0.0469 -7.6765 0.0000 -0.4516,-0.2679
Unemployment (log) 0.5819 0.0584 9.9599 0.0000 0.4674,0.6964
Tourism (log) -0.0746 0.0303 -2.4595 0.0139 -0.1341,-0.0152
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1920 0.0618 -3.1072 0.0019 -0.3132,-0.0709
Lag DHI p.c. 3.4987 0.3934 8.8931 0.0000 2.7276,4.2698
Lag clearance rate (log) -0.1742 0.0254 -6.8661 0.0000 -0.2240,-0.1245
Border to Austria -0.3950 0.1795 -2.2002 0.0278 -0.7469,-0.0431
Border to Switzerland -0.4314 0.2070 -2.0846 0.0371 -0.8371,-0.0258
Border to Luxembourg 0.4377 0.2180 2.0076 0.0447 0.0104,0.8650
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1534 0.0519 2.9555 0.0031 0.0517,0.2552
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4100 0.0947 4.3314 0.0000 0.2245,0.5955
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -1.0391 0.1017 -10.2192 0.0000 -1.2384,-0.8398
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.3283 0.0935 3.5121 0.0004 0.1451,0.5115
Table 11: Selection of avg. indirect eﬀects: Theft from cars (log)
seem to work as well. For one, the general level of tourism isn't signiﬁcant at all, and the
within-eﬀect has a negative sign, though being quite small. This is counter-intuitive, but
might be related to the relationship between disorder and theft rate, i.e. that high amounts
of disorder lower tourist activity while increasing theft from cars. This is supported by
the fact that the time average of damage to property again signiﬁcantly increases the rate
of thefts, thus conﬁrming H4 to some degree. Somewhat odd is that the share of young
males is again negatively impacting crime, the same as the school drop-out rate. I'm not
entirely clear why that is, but it should be noted that these results, as well as in the case
of burglaries, are very robust to various diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model. Lastly, we
can see that bordering Austria and Switzerland seems to lower the rate of thefts, while
bordering Luxembourg increases it. This is interesting, although no obvious interpretation
springs to mind. The average indirect eﬀects (Table 11) are very similar to the direct one,
again suggesting a very straight spill-over from one county to the other and not showing
any signs of displacement in the sense of Weisburd et al. (2006). One notable diﬀerence
is that voter turn-out doesn't seem to show such spill-over eﬀects. This makes a certain
amount of sense, considering that the social cohesion of a group likely only impacts crime
within that group directly.
5.3.3 Drug Crime
ρ Log-Likelihood R2-total Hausman Unit-root Wooldridge Mundlak
Statistic 0.1431 -438.66 0.4736 73.28 -12.6636 145.306 1020.61
p-value 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 12: Drug crime: Tests and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
With regard to drug crime, it seems that the model is not as good a ﬁt as before. For
one, the coeﬃcient of the spatial AR-term (ρ) is much smaller, while still being highly
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signiﬁcant. But also in terms of R2, the ﬁt is worse, although interestingly both log-
likelihood and AIC/BIC (Table 22 in Appendix B) would suggest a better ﬁt. That there
is less spatial autocorrelation is of course in line with the ﬁndings from Moran's I and
Getis-Ord's G, where we saw far less clustering than with other types of crime.
Direct Eﬀects: Drug crime
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) 0.0934 0.0237 3.9421 0.0001 0.0470,0.1399
State employees p.c. (log) 0.1525 0.0391 3.9048 0.0001 0.0760,0.2291
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0824 0.0367 2.2455 0.0247 0.0105,0.1544
Young & male (log) -0.3379 0.0476 -7.1014 0.0000 -0.4311,-0.2446
Divorce rate (log) 0.3611 0.0888 4.0678 0.0000 0.1871,0.5351
Unemployment (log) 0.0523 0.0233 2.2467 0.0247 0.0067,0.0979
Lag clearance rate 0.0636 0.0249 2.5580 0.0105 0.0149,0.1123
Border to the Netherlands 0.5330 0.1844 2.8907 0.0038 0.1716,0.8944
Border to Denmark -0.5383 0.2466 -2.1827 0.0291 -1.0217,-0.0549
Voter turn-out (log) 0.1624 0.0270 6.0120 0.0000 0.1094,0.2153
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4801 0.2421 -1.9832 0.0473 -0.9546,-0.0056
Avg. young & male (log) -0.5302 0.2196 -2.4139 0.0158 -0.9607,-0.0997
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.2419 0.0514 4.7031 0.0000 0.1411,0.3426
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) 0.4232 0.0490 8.6393 0.0000 0.3272,0.5193
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.3205 0.0922 3.4755 0.0005 0.1398,0.5012
Avg. Clearance rate (log) 0.1962 0.0830 2.3655 0.0180 0.0336,0.3588
Table 13: Selection of avg. direct eﬀects: Drug crime (log)
Secondly, considering the results from Table 13, it seems that the Becker-Ehrlich theory
(H1) doesn't apply anymore. Because while unemployment still increases the amount of
drug crime, DHI p.c. lowers it, suggesting that it no longer can be considered as a proxy for
illegal income opportunities. Instead it could be considered as a proxy for the resources a
community has access to in order to organize itself, in the sense of the social disorganization
theory (H2). That the Becker-Ehrlich model breaks down here can also be seen from
the eﬀect of the deterrence variables, clearance rates and state employees p.c., that both
increase the rate of drug crimes. To me, this suggests that there might exist a problem
with simultaneity here. As discussed before, drug crimes are notoriously underreported,
and so it seems likely that an increase in government action doesn't increases the amount of
drug crimes committed but rather the amount of drug crimes detected. Therefore, all the
following results have to be taken with a larger grain of salt than usual. For the validity of
the social disorganization theory in this case also speaks that the both the divorce rate and
the share of foreigners strongly increases the rate of drug crimes. However, voter turn does
as well, which I again attribute to the simultaneity problem discussed before, as it seems
likely that communities with more cohesion are better at detecting drug crimes, which again
would explain why Berlin was in a low drug crime cluster before. The same is true for the
share of young men, which seem to lower the amount of drug crimes, which is not sensible
at all. However, the broken window theory (H4) seems to be conﬁrmed again, with the
rate of damage to property crimes increasing the amount of drug crime. But simultaneity
might be a problem here as well, as more drug consumption could likely also lead to more
damage to property. A more reasonable result is that the amount of drug crime is very
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high close to the border to the Netherlands. With respect to the indirect eﬀects (Table
14), the picture is again very similar to the cases before. The same variables that aﬀect
drug crime in a county also aﬀect them in the neighboring counties, implying a straight
forward spill-over process. Overall, the results for drug crimes have to be disregarded to
some degree however, as the presence of simultaneity stemming from the data gathering
process makes a good estimation diﬃcult.
Indirect Eﬀects: Drug crime
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) 0.0152 0.0046 3.2790 0.0010 0.0061,0.0243
State employees p.c. (log) 0.0248 0.0077 3.2300 0.0012 0.0098,0.0399
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0135 0.0066 2.0283 0.0425 0.0005,0.0265
Young & male (log) -0.0549 0.0119 -4.6052 0.0000 -0.0783,-0.0315
Divorce rate (log) 0.0586 0.0169 3.4692 0.0005 0.0255,0.0917
Unemployment (log) 0.3176 0.0367 8.6435 0.0000 0.2456,0.3896
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1327 0.0362 -3.6626 0.0002 -0.2038,-0.0617
Lag clearance rate(log) 0.0104 0.0045 2.2875 0.0222 0.0015,0.0193
Border to the Netherlands 0.0870 0.0343 2.5359 0.0112 0.0198,0.1543
Border to Denmark -0.0873 0.0421 -2.0734 0.0381 -0.1699,-0.0048
Voter turn-out (log) 0.2958 0.0479 6.1722 0.0000 0.2019,0.3898
Avg. young & male (log) -0.0863 0.0390 -2.2158 0.0267 -0.1627,-0.0100
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0395 0.0112 3.5363 0.0004 0.0176,0.0614
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) 0.0691 0.0152 4.5399 0.0000 0.0393,0.0989
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.0521 0.0172 3.0266 0.0025 0.0184,0.0859
Avg. Clearance rate (log) 0.0320 0.0148 2.1627 0.0306 0.0030,0.0610
Table 14: Selection of avg. indirect eﬀects: Drug crime (log)
5.3.4 Street Crime
ρ Log-Likelihood R2-total Hausman Unit-root Wooldridge Mundlak
Statistic 0.1035 3627.15 0.8228 150.32 -12.0008 263.144 3481.641
p-value 0.0000 - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 15: Street crime: Tests and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
As far as street crimes are concerned, the model seems to perform a lot better. Not only is
the log-likelihood quite high, but so is R2. As can be seen from Table 22 in Appendix B,
this is also due to the fact that here the model explains the majority of within-variation,
which isn't the case in the other regressions. However, the spatial AR-coeﬃcient ρ is
lower than in all previous cases, while still being highly signiﬁcant. The Becker-Ehrlich
theory (H1) seems to ﬁt quite well here, although with some limitations. Clearance rates,
both lagged, current period and time average, lower crime as one would expect under H1,
however the number of state employees p.c. is not signiﬁcant here and neither is DHI p.c.
But since unemployment increases the rate of street crimes, overall this theory still ﬁts
well. The same is true for the social disorganization theory (H2), with divorce rates, share
of foreigners and population density all increasing the crime rate. The routine activity
theory performs less well, with tourism lowering crime and all other variables associated
with it not being signiﬁcant. That tourism lowers crime is again likely due to the fact,
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that disorder, i.e. it's proxy, damage to property, has a highly signiﬁcant impact on street
crime while likely also reducing the attractiveness of the region for tourists. This of course
also conﬁrms the broken window theory (H4). Lastly it is interesting to see that the only
border that has a signiﬁcant impact is the one to Netherlands.
Direct Eﬀects: Street crime
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) -0.0392 0.0090 -4.3797 0.0000 -0.0568,-0.0217
Dmg. to property (log) 0.4631 0.0121 38.2135 0.0000 0.4393,0.4869
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0327 0.0139 2.3614 0.0182 0.0056,0.0599
Divorce rate (log) 0.3864 0.0341 11.3221 0.0000 0.3195,0.4533
Unemployment (log) 0.0399 0.0088 4.5114 0.0000 0.0226,0.0572
Tourism (log) -0.0757 0.0122 -6.1961 0.0000 -0.0997,-0.0518
Lag clearance rate(log) -0.0860 0.0094 -9.1635 0.0000 -0.1044,-0.0676
Border to the Netherlands 0.3263 0.1263 2.5834 0.0098 0.0788,0.5739
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.2190 0.0600 3.6475 0.0003 0.1013,0.3366
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1648 0.0352 4.6884 0.0000 0.0959,0.2337
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.9076 0.0631 14.3873 0.0000 0.7840,1.0313
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -0.5031 0.0568 -8.8564 0.0000 -0.6145,-0.3918
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.1665 0.0611 2.7245 0.0064 0.0467,0.2862
Table 16: Selection of avg. direct eﬀects: Street crime (log)
Indirect Eﬀects: Street crime
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate (log) -0.0045 0.0014 -3.2819 0.0010 -0.0071,-0.0018
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0527 0.0106 4.9500 0.0000 0.0318,0.0735
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0037 0.0018 2.0604 0.0394 0.0002,0.0073
Divorce rate (log) 0.0438 0.0087 5.0567 0.0000 0.0268,0.0607
Unemployment (log) 0.0732 0.0134 5.4769 0.0000 0.0470,0.0994
Tourism (log) -0.0086 0.0022 -3.9166 0.0001 -0.0129,-0.0043
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0516 0.0134 3.8616 0.0001 0.0254,0.0778
Lag DHI p.c. (log) 0.3696 0.0808 4.5770 0.0000 0.2113,0.5279
Lag clearance rate -0.0098 0.0023 -4.3025 0.0000 -0.0142,-0.0053
Border to the Netherlands 0.0372 0.0167 2.2277 0.0259 0.0045,0.0699
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0188 0.0055 3.4220 0.0006 0.0080,0.0295
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.1032 0.0217 4.7591 0.0000 0.0607,0.1458
Avg. Clearance rate (log) -0.0572 0.0132 -4.3239 0.0000 -0.0832,-0.0313
Divorce rate 2015 (log) 0.0190 0.0082 2.3272 0.0200 0.0030,0.0350
Table 17: Selection of avg. indirect eﬀects: Street crime (log)
When considering the average indirect eﬀects (Table 17), the results are largely similar to
those reported before, with most of the variables determining crime in one's own county
spilling over to the neighboring ones. One diﬀerence is however that the drop-out rate is
now signiﬁcantly increasing street crime in neighboring counties. This is a very interesting
result, as it suggests a spatial mobility of oﬀenders not seen before, i.e. people with low
academic performance crossing county lines to commit crimes there. This seems to be
the only reasonable explanation for this result, as it seems unlikely that the quality of
education in a neighboring county inspires people in the other county to commit crimes.
Another interesting diﬀerence is that the lag of DHI p.c. also increases crime only indirectly.
This is somewhat odd, as one would expect DHI, when taken as a proxy for illegal income
opportunities, to eﬀect crime only in the county the crime takes place in, not the other way
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around. There are several possibilities why this is not the case. It could be that jealousy
plays a role here, i.e people in one county comparing themselves to those in another who
became richer and therefore deciding to take up crime. It is also possible that this is
some kind of displacement eﬀect, i.e. that higher wealth in a county leads to more social
organization, driving criminals away into the neighboring one. However, further research
is needed to see whether this result holds up and what causes it.
5.3.5 Assault
ρ Log-Likelihood R2-total Hausman Unit-root Wooldridge Mundlak
Statistic 0.0399 3504.08 0.7306 118.81 -8.5453 263.144 71.751
p-value 0.0400 - - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 18: Assault: Tests and goodness-of-ﬁt measures
Direct Eﬀects: Assault
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0780 0.0094 -8.3187 0.0000 -0.0964,-0.0596,
Dmg. to property (log) 0.2792 0.0127 21.9416 0.0000 0.2542,0.3041
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0513 0.0155 -3.3226 0.0009 -0.0816,-0.0211
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0427 0.0145 2.9456 0.0032 0.0143,0.0711
Divorce rates (log) 0.1835 0.0354 5.1790 0.0000 0.1141,0.2530
Tourism (log) 0.0436 0.0128 3.4157 0.0006 0.0186,0.0686
Lag clearance rate -0.0359 0.0098 -3.6490 0.0003 -0.0551,0.0166
Border to Austria 0.2148 0.1049 2.0474 0.0406 0.0092,0.4204
Border to France 0.2083 0.1053 1.9777 0.0480 0.0019,0.4147
Border to Belgium 0.2532 0.1210 2.0930 0.0363 0.0161,0.4903
Border to Denmark 0.2961 0.1430 2.0701 0.0384 0.0158,0.5765
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1466 0.0483 3.0362 0.0024 0.0520,0.2412
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4583 0.1404 -3.2643 0.0011 -0.7335,-0.1831
Avg. population density(log) 0.0542 0.0192 2.8195 0.0048 0.0165,0.0919
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1007 0.0298 3.3821 0.0007 0.0423,0.1591
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.1457 0.0283 -5.1392 0.0000 -0.2012,-0.0901
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.6431 0.0535 12.0273 0.0000 0.5383,0.7479
Avg. Clearance rate(log) -0.2641 0.0481 -5.4852 0.0000 -0.3585,-0.1697
Table 19: Selection of avg. direct eﬀects: Assault (log)
Lastly, concerning assault, we can see that the spatial dependency plays only a small role,
with ρ being close to zero and barely signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the model still seems to
be a good ﬁt, considering the log-likelihood, R2 and AIC/BIC (Table 22 in Appendix
B). In terms of average direct eﬀects, assault seems in some ways similar to drug crime.
Like it was the case there, the Becker-Ehrlich model (H1) doesn't seem to work too well.
Unemployment for instance has no signiﬁcant impact on the rate of assaults, and DHI.
p.c. even seems to lower it. Again, this suggests that here DHI is not a proxy for illegal
income opportunities, that aren't really there in the case of assault anyway. Instead,
it seems to be a proxy for the access to resources a community has to organize itself,
with the eﬀect that the rate of assaults gets lowered. This is also supported by the fact
that the deterrence variables, clearance rates and state employees, in their various forms
all eﬀectively lower the assault rates. This of course supports the social disorganization
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theory and is also in line with the results from Messner, Teske, et al. (2013), who also used
assault as one of their two crime variables, but as they didn't model spatial dependency
explicitly, this comparison can only go so far. However, in contrast to their ﬁndings, the
share of young men is not signiﬁcant in my results.
This, but also the rest of the results, suggests that the social disorganization theory (H2)
seems well suited to explain the rate of assaults. Both the share of foreigners as well as
population density increase their occurrence, as well as the divorce rate. The last result
could of course be also interpreted in favor of the routine activity theory (H3), especially
since tourism positively aﬀects the assault rate as well. Lastly, even the broken window
theory (H4) seems to largely apply here, as damage to property increases the number of
assaults per capita. Obviously, this stands in conﬂict with the results for street crime,
where tourism and damage to property had the opposite eﬀect, which was interpreted as
disorder lowering tourist activity, but this doesn't seem to be the case here. Finally, as
hypothesized, the drop-out rate increases crime. So interestingly, assault and street crime
are the only cases where the drop-out rate seems to play a signiﬁcant role explaining crime.
Indirect Eﬀects: Assault
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0032 0.0017 -1.8777 0.0604 -0.0066,0.0001
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0116 0.0060 1.9423 0.0521 -0.0001,0.0234
Divorce rates 0.0076 0.0043 1.7751 0.0759 -0.0008,0.0161
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1764 0.0809 -2.1798 0.0293 -0.3351,-0.0178
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.3364 0.1798 -1.8703 0.0614 -0.6888,0.0161
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0042 0.0026 1.6515 0.0986 -0.0008,0.0093
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0061 0.0036 -1.7271 0.0841 -0.0131,0.0008
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.0268 0.0139 1.9336 0.0532 -0.0004,0.0539
Avg. Clearance rate -0.0110 0.0061 -1.8082 0.0706 -0.0230,0.0009
Table 20: Selection of avg. indirect eﬀects: Assault (log)
When comparing the average indirect eﬀects on assault (Table 20) to the other regression
results, a clear contrast emerges. Since ρ is far lower, the spill-over eﬀects are far less
pronounced, and often only signiﬁcant on the α ≤ 10% level. But other than this, the
nature of spill-overs is still mostly the same as before, again the same variables determining
the crime rate in one's own county also aﬀect those in neighboring ones.
5.3.6 Summary of Regression Results
In summary, one could say that the regression results fall into two broad categories: There
are those concerning crimes against property, where the Becker-Ehrlich model (H1) takes
on much of the explanatory power. This of course makes sense, as this model was especially
built to explain property crime, but is still interesting to see conﬁrmed. This is also largely
in line with the non-spatial results by Entorf and Spengler (2000). In the other category
are crimes not directed against someone else's property, like drug crimes and assault. Here
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the theory of social disorganization seems to explain regional variation much better. As
street crime is a mixture of those two, in makes sense that here the results also do, as both
H1 and H2 perform reasonably well. In both categories, the routine activity (H3) theory
largely seems to apply as well as the the broken window theory (H4), with the exception of
burglaries, where the results were mixed. With respect to the spatial dependencies (H5),
all forms of crime exhibited signiﬁcant spatial lag terms, although of varying size, with
assault exhibiting the least spatial dependency. The resulting spill-over eﬀects also were
largely similar across crime types, with a few exceptions it was always the same variables
that caused crime in one region that also radiated out, causing crime in a neighboring one.
Therefore, the theory that crime gets displaced to another county when circumstances or
policy lower it in a neighboring one, has to be rejected, as also found by Weisburd et al.
(2006). In terms of ﬁt, most models seemed to have a fairly high explanatory power,
especially between counties, with the exception of drug crimes. Here it became apparent
that the data exhibited strong signs of simultaneity, likely the result of underreporting of
crime not being homogeneous across regions but rather being causally linked to clearance
rate, unemployment or the number of state employees. Therefore these results have to
be interpreted carefully. Lastly, there were a number of results which could be the jump-
oﬀ point for further research. The burglary rate only seemed to respond to the lagged
clearance rate, giving support to the theory by Sah (1991) of crime dynamics. Also, DHI
had only an indirect eﬀect on street crime, which could signify a displacement process of
crime. Lastly, it is notable that the share of foreigners had a signiﬁcant positive impact
on all types of crime except burglaries. This of course supports the ﬁndings of Piopiunik
and Ruhose (2017).
6 Discussion
Lastly, let us discuss what these ﬁndings mean in terms of policy and what their limitations
are. After this, I will then come to a conclusion.
6.1 Policy Implications
The question now becomes what these results means for crime-ﬁghting policy. And there
is good news and bad news. For one, it became apparent that crime rates do respond to
government action. In most cases, the clearance rate signiﬁcantly lowers crime, which of
course implies that size and training of the police force is a key factor when one wants
to lower crime rate. This is also supported by the fact that the share of state employees,
as a proxy for government response to crime, signiﬁcantly lowers crime in most cases,
the exception being street crime, where it had no signiﬁcant impact, and drug crime,
which displayed problems with simultaneity. This is of course an intuitive result, but
an important one, as the money spent on crime ﬁghting is a very easy thing to change
from a policy perspective, especially compared to problems like unemployment or the
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drop-out rate. But here the spatial aspect also becomes important, as it is not enough to
increase clearance rates or government staﬀ in one's own county, the neighboring counties
should ideally do the same. And since there is no evidence of displacement, this should be
possible without conﬂicts between counties arising, as more police action in one county
doesn't increase but rather lowers crime in neighboring ones. But, as so often in the
presence of externalities, the problem of free-riders can arise here. For example, a county
i can proﬁt from increased spending in neighboring county j without increasing their own
spending. From a general welfare perspective it would obviously be optimal to harness the
power of the feedback loops associated with spatial spill-overs by coordinating spending
within one of the crime-clusters found using Getis-Ord G. Therefore, it is fortunate that in
Germany crime ﬁghting policies are decided on the state level, which drastically decreases
the free-riding problem. But since the clusters found also cross state lines, between-state
cooperation still seems advisable.
This is even more the case, as the broken window theory seems to apply for basically all
types of crime to some degree and also exhibits spill-over behavior. Therefore, it indeed
seems to be a good idea to ﬁght disorder as a preventive measure and not treat damage to
property as a minor oﬀense. This of course raises questions of fairness, mainly whether it
is just to punish someone not for the crime they have committed but rather for the crimes
their crime could instigate others to commit. But this is a question I do not feel qualiﬁed
to answer authoritatively.
Of course deterrence cannot eliminate crime, and likely exhibits a decreasing marginal
eﬀect. If one wants to lower crime beyond the point where deterrence ceases to be
eﬀective, it becomes important to consider the social and economic causes of crime. My
results suggests that a good starting point would be unemployment, especially when it
comes to crimes against property. Increasing the chances for employment is of course
a social good in itself, but will likely also decrease property crime in ones own county
as well as the neighboring ones. And since it is a social good in itself, cooperation to
harness positive feedback loops shouldn't be diﬃcult to accomplish as there is no conﬂict
of interest here. The same is true for the drop-out rate, which especially seemed to impact
violent crime, i.e. assault. And while unemployment or the drop-out rate are diﬃcult to
change as a policy maker, it is even more diﬃcult to change things like social or family
cohesion. Especially the latter has proven to impact basically all kinds of crime, either
because single parents have less time to supervise their children, because they often have
less resources for raising their children, or because the stresses of a divorce make it more
likely for the child to turn to crime. If it were the ﬁrst two, one theoretically could
make divorce more diﬃcult and thereby decrease crime, although this of course would be
morally and politically problematic. But if it is the ladder, i.e. that children traumatized
by a divorce are more likely to be criminal, this of course not a solution, as they would
likely also be traumatized living in an unhappy and dysfunctional family. It might
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therefore be more promising to try to promote social cohesion by supporting local clubs
and groups, ﬁnancially or otherwise. However, my results suggest that the likely pay-out
in terms of crime reduction is relatively small. Here, it is again important to remember the
spill-over eﬀects, which would make inter-region cooperation on these issues very beneﬁcial.
Other social-economic factors are more of a double-edged sword. DHI p.c. for instance
increases property crime, while it decreases drug and violent crime. And of course a high
DHI is also desirable for diﬀerent reasons, so that artiﬁcially lowering DHI p.c. in order
to decrease property crime is a preposterous idea. But here the externalities become
problematic, because a conﬂict of interests of neighboring counties arises. My results
suggest, that an increase in wealth in one county increases property crime there, which
then spills over into neighboring ones that didn't enjoy an increase in DHI. This means
that the neighboring counties have to bear some of the costs for one county having higher
wealth. It is clear that this can cause ineﬃciency in the Pareto sense, and it might be
necessary to compensate the neighboring counties when one becomes wealthier. This of
course already happens to some degree, for one since there is much redistribution of tax
income via the state or federal government, and for another because as we have seen DHI
exhibits fair amount of spatial spill-over itself, meaning that higher DHI in one county
increases income in the neighboring ones. This is less true for tourism, which causes the
same externality problem as DHI, but without there being any kind of redistribution
scheme in place to compensate counties neighboring those with high tourist activity for
the increase in crime. It is therefore worth considering whether one should introduce such
a scheme.
Likely the politically most explosive ﬁnding is that it seems that migration indeed
increases crime, with the exception burglaries. As this is a touchy subject, I feel it
necessary to make some qualifying remarks here. First, my data is not granular enough
to say how this increase takes place. It might be that migrants are more likely to turn to
crime, that they are more likely to be caught or that them moving to a county decreases
social cohesion there, which makes the inhabitants in that county overall more criminal.
Also, again because my data is not granular enough, it is possible that my measures
for unemployment and DHI p.c. do not describe the economic situation of migrants
well, as it is possible that even though the county is quite rich overall, the migrants
living there are quite poor. Non-the-less, this result is so robust that it would be wrong
to dismiss it, just because it is politically inconvenient. It seems that, no matter how
this happens exactly, a county receiving a large inﬂow of migrants has to be aware
that this might increase the crime rates and prepare accordingly. However, as my data
ends in 2014, the large inﬂow of refugees in 2015/16 hasn't been taken into account
here, so that my results can't be generalized for this situation. Of course migration
isn't the only event with the potential to increase a crime a county has to prepare or,
the same is true for urbanization, i.e. an increase of population density. In both cases
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there are indirect eﬀects onto neighboring counties, which make again makes it nec-
essary to plan for these events in a coordinated manner, a least within a high-crime cluster.
It should be noted that this need for cooperation within a cluster seems especially urgent
with regard to property crimes as well as street crime and less so when considering lowering
violent crime, as the spatial spill overs are far less pronounced there. Also, border regions
in general don't seem to show higher crime rate, but bordering BeNeLux, Denmark and
some other countries often does. There is of course nothing one can do about bordering
another country, but it seems likely to me that these eﬀects have something to do with
policies in these countries, the most obvious example being the Netherlands with their
legalization of marijuana. This might mean that a successful crime ﬁghting policy also
relies on international co-operation, as is of course already happening to some extend
within the EU.
6.2 Limitations
Over the course of this thesis it has become apparent that there are some limitations,
most of them due to data availability. For one, the county level is still quite a large scale
of observation, although more granular than most other studies of crime in Germany.
This is especially the case as it includes some very large cities such as Hamburg or Berlin
as a single observation, which causes the diﬀerences between parts of these large cities to
be averaged away. Ideally, this study should be repeated with observations being cells on
a smalls scale grid, like 500x500 meter cells. This of course would also somewhat alleviate
the modiﬁed area unit problem (MAUP), as the area units would no longer arbitrarily
vary in size and shape and be far more granular. And it would get rid of the measurement
error introduced by the fact that Saxony-Anhalt in 2007 merged some of their counties in
a non-straightforward way. Unfortunately, no such data currently exists as far as I know.
Secondly, it is not ideal that this studies had to rely on police recorded data due to the
problem of underreporting discussed before. Especially for drug crimes this caused some
major issues of simultaneity I wasn't able to ﬁx. Therefore, survey data might perform
better here, or in case of drug crime an analysis of drug content in the sewage of each
county, following Commandeur et al. (2014). But again, to my knowledge no such data
exists on this granular a level or over this time frame.
With regard to the explanatory variables, it would have been nice to get some indicator
of inequality, or an order statistic of income, as it reportedly performs better than unem-
ployment in most studies. But again, no such data was available on the scale needed. It
is of course also less than ideal that the yearly divorce rates where only available on the
state level, and I therefore had to use the divorces rates of 2015 as a proxy for the time-
average of divorce rates, although considering the results I feel this has worked reasonably
well. Regarding social cohesion, voter-turn-out has only somewhat worked as a proxy, and
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I'm not sure whether this is because social cohesion is not very important, or because
the proxy didn't work well. Therefore it might be a good idea to repeat this study with
a variable like membership in clubs or something similar, which wasn't available either.
Lastly, concerning the choice of model, I'm fairly content with the results, although of
course no model is perfect and the problems discussed in Chapter 3 apply. The results
also show that it might be a good idea to use a diﬀerent model for diﬀerent types of crime,
for example burglaries might have been better explained using a temporal-spatial model,
even though the Breitung-test suggested that there is no unit root in the data. In general,
it seems that models trying to explain crimes against property should largely rely on the
Becker-Ehrlich model and those explaining violent crime more in the social disorganization
theory. However, overall I still contest that this study is the most exhaustive and granular
look at the causes and spatial dependencies of crime in Germany that has been conducted
so far, and thus a good jumping-oﬀ point for future research.
6.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, this study looked at the question what causes regional variation of crime.
The literature suggested a range of possibilities, focusing on economic incentives in the case
of the Becker-Ehrlich theory, on the social context in the case of social disorganization and
the routine activity theory and on the eﬀect of disorder in the case of the broken window
theory. Also, many authors found that crime exhibits spatial dependencies. That this is
indeed the case was tested with various measures and largely conﬁrmed, although especially
property crime exhibits much spatial autocorrelation and violent crime less so. I was also
able to show that this leads to clusters of high and of low crime rates. And that these
clusters are indeed the result of spatial dynamics and not simply an echo of the spatial
structure of the explanatory variables was shown by the results of the cluster analysis.
Therefore, it was crucial to use a spatial model when trying to explain this variation,
and since some explanatory variables showed spatial dependencies of their own, I chose to
utilize a Spatial Durbin Model. This model seemed to perform reasonably well, even though
it mostly explained the between-variation in the data. But as the endogenous variables
didn't vary much over time, as seen from plotting them and also the Breitung-test, this
was expected. The Becker-Ehrlich model seemed to work well to explain crimes against
property, while the social disorganization theory had good explanatory power regarding
violent and drug crime. The broken window and routine activity theory seemed to mostly
apply to all types of crime. The spatial dependencies observed earlier seem to largely
stem from a straight-forward spill-over process and not from displacement, as the same
factors causing an increase in crime in one county also increase crime in the neighboring
counties. From a policy perspective, this implies externalities that can cause ineﬃciencies
if not remedied by cooperation or compensation. Also, it is important for policy makers
to be aware of the eﬀect a change in population density, tourism or the share of foreigners
in their or neighboring counties can have on the crime rates and to prepare accordingly.
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However, largely the policy response to crime seems to be eﬀective in Germany. Therefore,
the easiest way to ﬁght crime is ensuring better staﬀed and trained workforce countering
it.
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Appendix A: Figures
Rook Contiguity Knight contiguity Queen Contiguity
Own representation
= pivotal region = no neighbor= neighbor
Figure 10: Spatial weights: Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of contiguity
Positive Spatial Auto-correlation
 i.e.   I-E(I)>0
Negative Spatial Auto-correlation
 i.e.   I-E(I)<0
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Figure 11: Patterns resulting from spatial auto-correlation (assuming rook contiguity)
R1 R2 R3 R4
= 1st order effects = 2nd order effects = 3rd order effects
Own representation
Figure 12: Feedback loop after a change in region 2 in the face of spatial autocorrelation, ﬁrst
three iterations
endﬁgure
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Figure 13: Number of police oﬃcers (full-time equiv.) per 100,000 inhabitants
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Figure 14: Outlier detection: Boxplots of crime rates
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Figure 15: Outlier detection: Boxplots of economic and social determinants
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Figure 16: Outlier detection: Boxplots of other determinants
73
Regional Variation of Crime in Germany APPENDIX A
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
of
 b
ur
gl
ar
ie
s 
(lo
g)
−2 −1 0 1 2
Burgalries (log)
Fitted values
(a) Burglaries (log)
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
th
ef
t f
ro
m
 c
ar
s 
(lo
g)
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Theft from cars (log)
Fitted values
(b) Theft from cars (log)
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
da
m
ag
e 
to
 p
ro
pe
rty
 (lo
g)
−2 0 2 4
Damage to property (log)
Wln_rate_dam Fitted values
(c) Damage to property (log)
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
of
 d
ru
g 
cr
im
es
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Drug crimes (log)
Fitted values
(d) Drug crime (log)
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
of
 a
ss
au
lt 
(lo
g)
−2 −1 0 1 2 3
Assault (log)
Fitted values
(e) Assault (log)
−
2
−
1
0
1
2
Sp
at
ia
l la
g 
of
 s
tre
et
 c
rim
e 
(lo
g)
−2 −1 0 1 2
Street crime (log)
Fitted values
(f) Street crime (log)
Source: BKA, BKG, own calculations
Figure 17: Moran scatter plots, diﬀerent types of crime, average over time
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Figure 18: Boxplots of local Moran's I, diﬀerent types of crime
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Figure 19: Dendrograms, Ward and avg.-linkage cluster analysis , last 50 iterations
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Figure 20: Pseudo-F by Cali«ski and Harabasz (1974) for Ward and average linkage
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Figure 21: Cluster analysis results using average linkage
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Figure 22: Histograms of regression residuals
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Appendix B: Tables
Variable Share of obs. imputed Exogenous vars. used Estimation technique
Unemployment 0.31% GDP p.c., DHI p.c. and their lags OLS, White std. errors
Drop out rate 2.61% GDP p.c., youth workers p.c. OLS, White std. errors
State employees 1.07% GDP p.c., DHI p.c, population dens. OLS, White std. errors
Tourism 0.33% GDP p.c., border dummies, population dens. OLS, White std. errors
Table 21: Imputations used to create balanced panel
Endogenous var. AIC BIC R2-within R2-between R2-total
Burglaries (log) 3876.518 4189.841 0.1151 0.7156 0.6149
Theft from cars (log) 1768.011 2081.334 0.3470 0.7432 0.6715
Drug crime (log) 975.311 1288.634 0.1066 0.5677 0.4736
Street crime (log) -7156.294 -6842.971 0.5928 0.8377 0.8228
Assault (log) -6910.168 -6596.845 0.2053 0.7682 0.7306
Table 22: Goodness-of-ﬁt measures of the regressions
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Main
Clearance rate -0.0117 0.0334 -0.3515 0.7252 -0.0772,0.0537
Dmg. to property (log) -0.2411 0.0443 -5.4409 0.0000 -0.3279,-0.1542
State employees p.c. (log) -0.3463 0.0579 -5.9785 0.0000 -0.4598,-0.2328
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0270 0.0514 0.5250 0.5996 -0.0737,0.1277
Young & male (log) 0.3199 0.0648 4.9337 0.0000 0.1928,0.4470
Divorce rates 0.3847 0.1201 3.2018 0.0014 0.1492,0.6202
Unemployment (log) 0.1438 0.0336 4.2829 0.0000 0.0780,0.2096
Tourism (log) 0.2265 0.0438 5.1746 0.0000 0.1407,0.3122
Pop. density (log) 1.7108 0.2932 5.8351 0.0000 1.1361,2.2854
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0369 0.0279 1.3240 0.1855 -0.0177,0.0916
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0762 0.0303 2.5156 0.0119 0.0168,0.1356
Lag DHI p.c. 1.3470 0.2160 6.2372 0.0000 0.9237,1.7703
Lag clearance rate -0.0797 0.0321 -2.4817 0.0131 -0.1426,-0.0168
Border region -0.0895 0.2223 -0.4024 0.6874 -0.5251,0.3462
Border to Poland -0.0797 0.2461 -0.3238 0.7461 -0.5621,0.4027
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.2409 0.2214 -1.0881 0.2765 -0.6749,0.1930
Border to Austria -0.4134 0.2352 -1.7579 0.0788 -0.8743,0.0475
Border to Switzerland -0.5851 0.2818 -2.0761 0.0379 -1.1374,-0.0327
Border to France 0.2146 0.2329 0.9214 0.3569 -0.2419,0.6711
Border to Belgium 0.5968 0.2580 2.3134 0.0207 0.0912,1.1025
Border to the Netherlands 0.2002 0.2444 0.8192 0.4127 -0.2788,0.6793
Border to Denmark 0.3712 0.3213 1.1552 0.2480 -0.2586,1.0010
Border to Luxembourg 0.6380 0.2699 2.3639 0.0181 0.1090,1.1670
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0097 0.0375 0.2576 0.7967 -0.0639,0.0832
out1 -0.1276 0.0417 -3.0565 0.0022 -0.2094,-0.0458
out2 -0.0927 0.0153 -6.0407 0.0000 -0.1227,-0.0626
lk-ref -0.0355 0.1517 -0.2343 0.8147 -0.3328,0.2617
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.1257 0.1029 -1.2208 0.2222 -0.3274,0.0761
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4406 0.3038 -1.4500 0.1471 -1.0360,0.1549
Avg. poulation density -0.0726 0.0425 -1.7070 0.0878 -0.1560,0.0108
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0217 0.0289 -0.7530 0.4515 -0.0784,0.0349
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.7142 0.1137 6.2823 0.0000 0.4914,0.9371
Avg. young & male (log) -1.4080 0.2879 -4.8911 0.0000 -1.9723,-0.8438
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.4317 0.0655 6.5876 0.0000 0.3032,0.5601
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0736 0.0642 -1.1470 0.2514 -0.1994,0.0522
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4856 0.1172 4.1439 0.0000 0.2559,0.7153
Avg. Clearance rate -1.0797 0.1060 -10.1863 0.0000 -1.2874,-0.8719
Divorce rates 2015 0.5534 0.1099 5.0341 0.0000 0.3379,0.7688
Constant 3.6990 5.0004 0.7397 0.4595 -6.1017,13.4996
Spatial lags of regressors
Unemployment (log) -0.0870 0.0448 -1.9412 0.0522 -0.1749,0.0008
Lag DHI p.c. 1.4906 0.2822 5.2813 0.0000 0.9374,2.0438
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1448 0.0447 -3.2402 0.0012 -0.2325,-0.0572
Voter turn-out (log) 0.1692 0.0592 2.8578 0.0043 0.0532,0.2853
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0416 0.1273 -0.3267 0.7439 -0.2911,0.2079
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.2494 0.3767 0.6621 0.5079 -0.4888,0.9877
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0556 0.1886 -0.2949 0.7681 -0.4253,0.3140
Spatial lag of regressand
ρ 0.2483 0.0190 13.1025 0.0000 0.2112,0.2855
Table 23: Burglaries (log): SDM estimation results
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Direct Eﬀects: Burglaries
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0129 0.0333 -0.3872 0.6986 -0.0781,0.0523
Dmg. to property (log) -0.2441 0.0450 -5.4247 0.0000 -0.3323,-0.1559
State employees p.c. (log) -0.3491 0.0548 -6.3748 0.0000 -0.4564,-0.2418
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0256 0.0514 0.4980 0.6185 -0.0752,0.1264
Young & male (log) 0.3267 0.0669 4.8839 0.0000 0.1956,0.4579
Divorce rates 0.3874 0.1246 3.1090 0.0019 0.1432,0.6316
Unemployment (log) 0.1423 0.0324 4.3953 0.0000 0.0788,0.2058
Tourism (log) 0.2272 0.0453 5.0150 0.0000 0.1384,0.3160
Pop. density (log) 1.7280 0.2882 5.9950 0.0000 1.1631,2.2929
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0304 0.0278 1.0924 0.2747 -0.0242,0.0850
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0767 0.0302 2.5400 0.0111 0.0175,0.1360
Lag DHI p.c. 1.4403 0.2122 6.7860 0.0000 1.0243,1.8563
Lag clearance rate -0.0811 0.0349 -2.3251 0.0201 -0.1494,-0.0127
Border region -0.1116 0.2205 -0.5060 0.6129 -0.5437,0.3206
Border to Poland -0.0709 0.2489 -0.2848 0.7758 -0.5587,0.4169
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.2316 0.2221 -1.0429 0.2970 -0.6668,0.2037
Border to Austria -0.4003 0.2358 -1.6978 0.0896 -0.8625,0.0618
Border to Switzerland -0.5614 0.2725 -2.0602 0.0394 -1.0954,-0.0273
Border to France 0.2342 0.2369 0.9888 0.3228 -0.2300,0.6984
Border to Belgium 0.6135 0.2720 2.2556 0.0241 0.0804,1.1466
Border to the Netherlands 0.2234 0.2405 0.9286 0.3531 -0.2481,0.6948
Border to Denmark 0.3818 0.3217 1.1866 0.2354 -0.2488,1.0124
Border to Luxembourg 0.6555 0.2843 2.3057 0.0211 0.0983,1.2128
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0165 0.0371 0.4459 0.6557 -0.0561,0.0892
out1 -0.1287 0.0440 -2.9274 0.0034 -0.2149,-0.0425
out2 -0.0939 0.0149 -6.2987 0.0000 -0.1232,-0.0647
lk-ref -0.0376 0.1531 -0.2459 0.8058 -0.3376,0.2624
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.1308 0.1088 -1.2020 0.2294 -0.3441,0.0825
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4410 0.3160 -1.3958 0.1628 -1.0604,0.1783
Avg. poulation density -0.0758 0.0434 -1.7444 0.0811 -0.1609,0.0094
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0219 0.0285 -0.7696 0.4416 -0.0777,0.0339
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.7213 0.1145 6.2996 0.0000 0.4969,0.9457
Avg. young & male (log) -1.4315 0.2867 -4.9927 0.0000 -1.9934,-0.8695
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.4389 0.0671 6.5406 0.0000 0.3074,0.5704
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0737 0.0639 -1.1537 0.2486 -0.1989,0.0515
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4905 0.1203 4.0769 0.0000 0.2547,0.7263
Avg. Clearance rate -1.0991 0.1081 -10.1661 0.0000 -1.3109,-0.8872
Divorce rates 2015 0.5635 0.1180 4.7759 0.0000 0.3322,0.7947
Table 24: Avg. direct eﬀects: Burglaries (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0040 0.0105 -0.3862 0.6994 -0.0246,0.0165
Dmg. to property (log) -0.0764 0.0152 -5.0357 0.0000 -0.1062,-0.0467
State employees p.c. (log) -0.1095 0.0202 -5.4238 0.0000 -0.1491,-0.0700
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0081 0.0164 0.4944 0.6210 -0.0241,0.0404
Young & male (log) 0.1028 0.0243 4.2303 0.0000 0.0552,0.1504
Divorce rates 0.1214 0.0403 3.0112 0.0026 0.0424,0.2004
Unemployment (log) -0.0656 0.0555 -1.1811 0.2376 -0.1743,0.0432
Tourism (log) 0.0713 0.0158 4.5201 0.0000 0.0404,0.1022
Pop. density (log) 0.5416 0.1011 5.3552 0.0000 0.3434,0.7398
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1760 0.0564 -3.1241 0.0018 -0.2865,-0.0656
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0241 0.0098 2.4611 0.0139 0.0049,0.0432
Lag DHI p.c. 2.3366 0.3541 6.5991 0.0000 1.6426,3.0306
Lag clearance rate -0.0255 0.0114 -2.2414 0.0250 -0.0478,-0.0032
Border region -0.0354 0.0691 -0.5124 0.6084 -0.1709,0.1000
Border to Poland -0.0219 0.0780 -0.2804 0.7792 -0.1748,0.1310
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.0721 0.0688 -1.0481 0.2946 -0.2070,0.0627
Border to Austria -0.1253 0.0742 -1.6884 0.0913 -0.2708,0.0202
Border to Switzerland -0.1760 0.0866 -2.0325 0.0421 -0.3457,-0.0063
Border to France 0.0738 0.0748 0.9872 0.3235 -0.0727,0.2203
Border to Belgium 0.1924 0.0876 2.1975 0.0280 0.0208,0.3640
Border to the Netherlands 0.0703 0.0760 0.9256 0.3546 -0.0786,0.2193
Border to Denmark 0.1201 0.1023 1.1740 0.2404 -0.0804,0.3206
Border to Luxembourg 0.2057 0.0914 2.2504 0.0244 0.0266,0.3849
Voter turn-out (log) 0.2224 0.0733 3.0319 0.0024 0.0786,0.3661
out1 -0.0404 0.0144 -2.8077 0.0050 -0.0685,-0.0122
out2 -0.0295 0.0055 -5.3842 0.0000 -0.0402,-0.0187
lk-ref -0.0123 0.0487 -0.2520 0.8010 -0.1077,0.0831
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.1241 0.2344 -0.5296 0.5964 -0.5836,0.3353
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.1520 0.4970 0.3059 0.7597 -0.8221,1.1262
Avg. poulation density -0.0238 0.0140 -1.7045 0.0883 -0.0512,0.0036
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0068 0.0089 -0.7660 0.4436 -0.0243,0.0106
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.1789 0.1638 1.0921 0.2748 -0.1421,0.4999
Avg. young & male (log) -0.4489 0.0982 -4.5695 0.0000 -0.6415,-0.2564
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1378 0.0253 5.4461 0.0000 0.0882,0.1874
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0230 0.0201 -1.1461 0.2517 -0.0624,0.0164
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.1538 0.0401 3.8387 0.0001 0.0753,0.2324
Avg. Clearance rate -0.3449 0.0473 -7.2913 0.0000 -0.4376,-0.2522
Divorce rates 2015 0.1772 0.0423 4.1910 0.0000 0.0943,0.2600
Table 25: Avg. indirect eﬀects: Burglaries (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Main
Clearance rate -0.1157 0.0256 -4.5271 0.0000 -0.1658,-0.0656
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0108 0.0339 0.3194 0.7495 -0.0556,0.0772
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0972 0.0442 -2.1976 0.0280 -0.1839,-0.0105
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.1046 0.0393 2.6636 0.0077 0.0276,0.1815
Young & male (log) -0.4113 0.0498 -8.2634 0.0000 -0.5088,-0.3137
Divorce rates 0.2963 0.0918 3.2257 0.0013 0.1162,0.4763
Unemployment (log) 0.1193 0.0258 4.6287 0.0000 0.0688,0.1698
Tourism (log) -0.0832 0.0334 -2.4905 0.0128 -0.1487,-0.0177
Pop. density (log) 0.3845 0.2299 1.6724 0.0944 -0.0661,0.8351
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.0877 0.0213 -4.1157 0.0000 -0.1295,-0.0460
Lag unemployment (log) -0.0069 0.0231 -0.3004 0.7639 -0.0523,0.0384
Lag DHI p.c. 1.3318 0.1662 8.0109 0.0000 1.0059,1.6576
Lag clearance rate -0.1977 0.0246 -8.0494 0.0000 -0.2458,-0.1496
Border region -0.0083 0.1949 -0.0426 0.9660 -0.3903,0.3737
Border to Poland 0.1057 0.2157 0.4902 0.6240 -0.3171,0.5286
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.2250 0.1941 -1.1594 0.2463 -0.6054,0.1554
Border to Austria -0.4654 0.2062 -2.2572 0.0240 -0.8694,-0.0613
Border to Switzerland -0.5178 0.2471 -2.0956 0.0361 -1.0022,-0.0335
Border to France 0.1150 0.2042 0.5633 0.5732 -0.2852,0.5152
Border to Belgium 0.3962 0.2262 1.7515 0.0799 -0.0472,0.8395
Border to the Netherlands -0.0160 0.2143 -0.0746 0.9406 -0.4361,0.4041
Border to Denmark -0.1350 0.2817 -0.4793 0.6318 -0.6871,0.4171
Border to Luxembourg 0.4891 0.2365 2.0678 0.0387 0.0255,0.9527
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0691 0.0296 -2.3356 0.0195 -0.1271,-0.0111
out1 0.0127 0.0321 0.3941 0.6935 -0.0503,0.0756
out2 -0.0229 0.0118 -1.9343 0.0531 -0.0460,0.0003
lk-ref -0.1206 0.1241 -0.9713 0.3314 -0.3638,0.1227
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0516 0.0902 -0.5726 0.5669 -0.2284,0.1251
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4069 0.2662 -1.5285 0.1264 -0.9288,0.1149
Avg. poulation density 0.0435 0.0372 1.1684 0.2427 -0.0295,0.1164
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0232 0.0253 0.9166 0.3594 -0.0264,0.0728
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.6581 0.0996 6.6064 0.0000 0.4629,0.8533
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1749 0.2522 -0.6933 0.4881 -0.6692,0.3195
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1727 0.0574 3.0077 0.0026 0.0602,0.2853
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0744 0.0562 -1.3223 0.1861 -0.1846,0.0359
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4670 0.1027 4.5452 0.0000 0.2656,0.6683
Avg. Clearance rate -1.1759 0.0929 -12.6572 0.0000 -1.3580,-0.9938
Divorce rates 2015 0.3700 0.0964 3.8398 0.0001 0.1811,0.5588
Constant 1.9583 4.3826 0.4468 0.6550 -6.6313,10.5480
Spatial lags of regressors
Unemployment (log) 0.2618 0.0349 7.4979 0.0000 0.1934,0.3302
Lag DHI p.c. 1.2786 0.2239 5.7106 0.0000 0.8398,1.7175
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.0617 0.0341 -1.8107 0.0702 -0.1286,0.0051
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0838 0.0466 1.7989 0.0720 -0.0075,0.1750
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.3652 0.1115 -3.2760 0.0011 -0.5836,-0.1467
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.2757 0.3297 0.8362 0.4030 -0.3705,0.9220
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1182 0.1652 0.7159 0.4740 -0.2055,0.4419
Spatial lag of regressand
ρ 0.4833 0.0153 31.6706 0.0000 0.4533,0.5132
Table 26: Theft from cars (log): SDM estimation results
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Direct Eﬀects: Theft from cars
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.1229 0.0265 -4.6339 0.0000 -0.1750,-0.0709
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0115 0.0359 0.3190 0.7497 -0.0590,0.0819
State employees p.c. (log) -0.1039 0.0436 -2.3827 0.0172 -0.0184-0.1894
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.1091 0.0410 2.6594 0.0078 0.0287,0.1894
Young & male (log) -0.4321 0.0532 -8.1202 0.0000 -0.5364,-0.3278
Divorce rates 0.3110 0.0992 3.1346 0.0017 0.1166,0.5055
Unemployment (log) 0.1571 0.0250 6.2769 0.0000 0.1081,0.2062
Tourism (log) -0.0896 0.0361 -2.4832 0.0130 -0.1603,-0.0189
Pop. density (log) 0.4024 0.2353 1.7103 0.0872 -0.0587,0.8635
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.0996 0.0220 -4.5175 0.0000 -0.1428,-0.0564
Lag unemployment (log) -0.0077 0.0241 -0.3190 0.7497 -0.0548,0.0395
Lag DHI p.c. 1.5546 0.1695 9.1701 0.0000 1.2223,1.8868
Lag clearance rate -0.2091 0.0279 -7.5052 0.0000 -0.2637,-0.1545
Border region -0.0280 0.2015 -0.1388 0.8896 -0.4230,0.3670
Border to Poland 0.1206 0.2275 0.5303 0.5959 -0.3253,0.5666
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.2263 0.2028 -1.1157 0.2645 -0.6237,0.1712
Border to Austria -0.4747 0.2155 -2.2030 0.0276 -0.8970,-0.0524
Border to Switzerland -0.5183 0.2490 -2.0815 0.0374 -1.0064,-0.0303
Border to France 0.1369 0.2165 0.6322 0.5273 -0.2875,0.5612
Border to Belgium 0.4267 0.2487 1.7158 0.0862 -0.0607,0.9141
Border to the Netherlands 0.0019 0.2198 0.0089 0.9929 -0.4289,0.4328
Border to Denmark -0.1371 0.2940 -0.4664 0.6409 -0.7134,0.4391
Border to Luxembourg 0.5251 0.2598 2.0214 0.0432 0.0160,1.0342
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0646 0.0304 -2.1252 0.0336 -0.1242,-0.0050
out1 0.0138 0.0353 0.3895 0.6969 -0.0555,0.0830
out2 -0.0242 0.0120 -2.0205 0.0433 -0.0477,-0.0007
lk-ref -0.1287 0.1307 -0.9844 0.3249 -0.3848,0.1275
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0421 0.1004 -0.4190 0.6752 -0.2388,0.1547
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4059 0.2900 -1.3998 0.1616 -0.9742,0.1624
Avg. poulation density 0.0438 0.0396 1.1064 0.2685 -0.0338,0.1215
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0246 0.0260 0.9463 0.3440 -0.0264,0.0756
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.6531 0.1048 6.2305 0.0000 0.4476,0.8585
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1899 0.2620 -0.7249 0.4685 -0.7033,0.3235
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1840 0.0613 3.0029 0.0027 0.0639,0.3042
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0777 0.0583 -1.3317 0.1830 -0.1920,0.0366
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4919 0.1100 4.4724 0.0000 0.2763,0.7075
Avg. Clearance rate -1.2469 0.0987 -12.6369 0.0000 -1.4403,-1.0535
Divorce rates 2015 0.3934 0.1079 3.6462 0.0003 0.1819,0.6049
Table 27: Avg. direct eﬀects: Theft from cars (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.1025 0.0229 -4.4675 0.0000 -0.1474,-0.0575
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0098 0.0301 0.3264 0.7441 -0.0492,0.0688
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0866 0.0367 - 2.3584 0.0184 -0.1586,-0.0146
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0910 0.0353 2.5771 0.0100 0.0218,0.1603
Young & male (log) -0.3598 0.0469 -7.6765 0.0000 -0.4516,-0.2679
Divorce rates 0.2585 0.0820 3.1526 0.0016 0.0978,0.4193
Unemployment (log) 0.5819 0.0584 9.9599 0.0000 0.4674,0.6964
Tourism (log) -0.0746 0.0303 -2.4595 0.0139 -0.1341,-0.0152
Pop. density (log) 0.3337 0.1940 1.7201 0.0854 -0.0465,0.7140
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1920 0.0618 -3.1072 0.0019 -0.3132,-0.0709
Lag unemployment (log) -0.0064 0.0202 -0.3177 0.7507 -0.0460,0.0332
Lag DHI p.c. 3.4987 0.3934 8.8931 0.0000 2.7276,4.2698
Lag clearance rate -0.1742 0.0254 -6.8661 0.0000 -0.2240,-0.1245
Border region -0.0239 0.1674 -0.1431 0.8862 -0.3519,0.3041
Border to Poland 0.1011 0.1899 0.5325 0.5944 -0.2711,0.4733
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.1877 0.1674 -1.1209 0.2623 -0.5158,0.1405
Border to Austria -0.3950 0.1795 -2.2002 0.0278 -0.7469,-0.0431
Border to Switzerland -0.4314 0.2070 -2.0846 0.0371 -0.8371,-0.0258
Border to France 0.1145 0.1809 0.6330 0.5267 -0.2400,0.4690
Border to Belgium 0.3556 0.2085 1.7055 0.0881 -0.0530,0.7643
Border to the Netherlands 0.0020 0.1829 0.0107 0.9915 -0.3566,0.3605
Border to Denmark -0.1140 0.2449 -0.4654 0.6416 -0.5939,0.3660
Border to Luxembourg 0.4377 0.2180 2.0076 0.0447 0.0104,0.8650
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0940 0.0833 1.1287 0.2590 -0.0692,0.2573
out1 0.0115 0.0295 0.3896 0.6968 -0.0464,0.0694
out2 -0.0202 0.0101 -1.9970 0.0458 -0.0400,-0.0004
lk-ref -0.1078 0.1103 -0.9772 0.3285 -0.3240,0.1084
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1536 0.2996 0.5127 0.6082 -0.4335,0.7407
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.1071 0.6492 0.1650 0.8689 -1.1653,1.3795
Avg. poulation density 0.0365 0.0331 1.1022 0.2704 -0.0284,0.1015
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0206 0.0217 0.9474 0.3435 -0.0220,0.0631
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0796 0.2151 -0.3703 0.7112 -0.5011,0.3419
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1579 0.2175 -0.7262 0.4677 -0.5842,0.2683
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1534 0.0519 2.9555 0.0031 0.0517,0.2552
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0646 0.0486 -1.3299 0.1835 -0.1598,0.0306
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.4100 0.0947 4.3314 0.0000 0.2245,0.5955
Avg. Clearance rate -1.0391 0.1017 -10.2192 0.0000 -1.2384,-0.8398
Divorce rates 2015 0.3283 0.0935 3.5121 0.0004 0.1451,0.5115
Table 28: Avg. indirect eﬀects: Theft from cars (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Main
Clearance rate 0.0937 0.0240 3.9051 0.0001 0.0467,0.1408
Dmg. to property (log) -0.0128 0.0318 -0.4031 0.6869 -0.0751,0.0495
State employees p.c. (log) 0.1508 0.0417 3.6192 0.0003 0.0691,0.2325
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0833 0.0370 2.2511 0.0244 0.0108,0.1558
Young & male (log) -0.3385 0.0466 -7.2640 0.0000 -0.4298,-0.2471
Divorce rates 0.3612 0.0863 4.1833 0.0000 0.1920,0.5304
Unemployment (log) 0.0437 0.0242 1.8069 0.0708 -0.0037,0.0912
Tourism (log) 0.0128 0.0314 0.4079 0.6833 -0.0488,0.0744
Pop. density (log) -0.0767 0.2129 -0.3601 0.7188 -0.4940,0.3407
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0330 0.0201 1.6424 0.1005 -0.0064,0.0723
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0056 0.0218 0.2574 0.7968 -0.0371,0.0483
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1215 0.1549 -0.7842 0.4329 -0.4251,0.1821
Lag clearance rate 0.0636 0.0231 2.7557 0.0059 0.0184,0.1088
Border region 0.0831 0.1719 0.4838 0.6285 -0.2537,0.4200
Border to Poland -0.2874 0.1902 -1.5104 0.1309 -0.6602,0.0855
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.1221 0.1712 0.7133 0.4757 -0.2134,0.4576
Border to Austria 0.1540 0.1818 0.8473 0.3968 -0.2023,0.5104
Border to Switzerland 0.3309 0.2179 1.5187 0.1288 -0.0962,0.7579
Border to France -0.1464 0.1801 -0.8133 0.4160 -0.4994,0.2065
Border to Belgium 0.1326 0.1995 0.6648 0.5062 -0.2583,0.5235
Border to the Netherlands 0.5152 0.1890 2.7258 0.0064 0.1447,0.8856
Border to Denmark -0.5406 0.2484 -2.1763 0.0295 -1.0275,-0.0537
Border to Luxembourg 0.0140 0.2086 0.0671 0.9465 -0.3948,0.4228
Voter turn-out (log) 0.1565 0.0275 5.6823 0.0000 0.1025,0.2105
out1 0.1503 0.0301 4.9925 0.0000 0.0913,0.2094
out2 -0.0220 0.0111 -1.9810 0.0476 -0.0437,-0.0002
lk-ref 0.1932 0.1135 1.7023 0.0887 -0.0292,0.4156
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1496 0.0796 1.8806 0.0600 -0.0063,0.3055
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4681 0.2348 -1.9935 0.0462 -0.9284,-0.0079
Avg. poulation density -0.0296 0.0329 -0.9010 0.3676 -0.0940,0.0348
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0357 0.0223 1.5978 0.1101 -0.0081,0.0794
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0923 0.0879 1.0502 0.2936 -0.0799,0.2645
Avg. young & male (log) -0.5237 0.2223 -2.3556 0.0185 -0.9594,-0.0879
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.2395 0.0506 4.7304 0.0000 0.1403,0.3387
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) 0.4208 0.0496 8.4844 0.0000 0.3236,0.5181
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.3202 0.0906 3.5344 0.0004 0.1426,0.4977
Avg. Clearance rate 0.1998 0.0820 2.4365 0.0148 0.0391,0.3605
Divorce rates 2015 -0.1067 0.0850 -1.2556 0.2093 -0.2733,0.0599
Constant 4.7026 3.8644 1.2169 0.2236 -2.8714,12.2766
Spatial lags of regressors
Unemployment (log) 0.2725 0.0324 8.4163 0.0000 0.2090,0.3359
Lag DHI p.c. 1.1371 0.2019 5.6324 0.0000 0.7414,1.5328
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1198 0.0321 -3.7333 0.0002 -0.1827,-0.0569
Voter turn-out (log) 0.2355 0.0435 5.4118 0.0000 0.1502,0.3208
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0383 0.0968 0.3961 0.6920 -0.1514,0.2281
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.1639 0.2904 -0.5643 0.5725 -0.7330,0.4053
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.2467 0.1457 -1.6938 0.0903 -0.5322,0.0388
Spatial lag of regressand
ρ 0.1431 0.0205 6.9693 0.0000 0.1029,0.1834
Table 29: Drug crime (log): SDM estimation results
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate 0.0934 0.0237 3.9421 0.0001 0.0470,0.1399
Dmg. to property (log) -0.0128 0.0320 -0.4007 0.6886 -0.0756,0.0499
State employees p.c. (log) 0.1525 0.0391 3.9048 0.0001 0.0760,0.2291
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0824 0.0367 2.2455 0.0247 0.0105,0.1544
Young & male (log) -0.3379 0.0476 -7.1014 0.0000 -0.4311,-0.2446
Divorce rates 0.3611 0.0888 4.0678 0.0000 0.1871,0.5351
Unemployment (log) 0.0523 0.0233 2.2467 0.0247 0.0067,0.0979
Tourism (log) 0.0113 0.0323 0.3516 0.7251 -0.0519,0.0746
Pop. density (log) -0.0801 0.2077 -0.3857 0.6997 -0.4872,0.3270
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0300 0.0199 1.5070 0.1318 -0.0090,0.0691
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0053 0.0215 0.2471 0.8048 -0.0369,0.0475
Lag DHI p.c. -0.0897 0.1514 -0.5928 0.5533 -0.3865,0.2070
Lag clearance rate 0.0636 0.0249 2.5580 0.0105 0.0149,0.1123
Border region 0.0674 0.1690 0.3988 0.6900 -0.2639,0.3987
Border to Poland -0.2810 0.1907 -1.4734 0.1406 -0.6549,0.0928
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.1321 0.1702 0.7758 0.4379 -0.2016,0.4657
Border to Austria 0.1687 0.1808 0.9330 0.3508 -0.1857,0.5230
Border to Switzerland 0.3561 0.2090 1.7041 0.0884 -0.0535,0.7657
Border to France -0.1341 0.1815 -0.7389 0.4600 -0.4899,0.2217
Border to Belgium 0.1401 0.2085 0.6721 0.5015 -0.2686,0.5488
Border to the Netherlands 0.5330 0.1844 2.8907 0.0038 0.1716,0.8944
Border to Denmark -0.5383 0.2466 -2.1827 0.0291 -1.0217,-0.0549
Border to Luxembourg 0.0213 0.2178 0.0977 0.9222 -0.4056,0.4482
Voter turn-out (log) -0.1624 0.0270 6.0120 0.0000 -0.1094,-0.2153
out1 0.1513 0.0315 4.8078 0.0000 0.0896,0.2130
out2 -0.0221 0.0107 -2.0693 0.0385 -0.0431,-0.0012
lk-ref 0.1928 0.1135 1.6986 0.0894 -0.0297,0.4153
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1429 0.0833 1.7162 0.0861 -0.0203,0.3061
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4801 0.2421 -1.9832 0.0473 -0.9546,-0.0056
Avg. poulation density -0.0315 0.0333 -0.9450 0.3447 -0.0967,0.0338
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0359 0.0218 1.6464 0.0997 -0.0068,0.0787
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0938 0.0878 1.0689 0.2851 -0.0782,0.2659
Avg. young & male (log) -0.5302 0.2196 -2.4139 0.0158 -0.9607,-0.0997
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.2419 0.0514 4.7031 0.0000 0.1411,0.3426
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) 0.4232 0.0490 8.6393 0.0000 0.3272,0.5193
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.3205 0.0922 3.4755 0.0005 0.1398,0.5012
Avg. Clearance rate 0.1962 0.0830 2.3655 0.0180 0.0336,0.3588
Divorce rates 2015 -0.1049 0.0904 -1.1602 0.2460 -0.2820,0.0723
Table 30: Avg. direct eﬀects: Drug crime (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate 0.0152 0.0046 3.2790 0.0010 0.0061,0.0243
Dmg. to property (log) -0.0020 0.0052 -0.3779 0.7055 -0.0122,0.0083
State employees p.c. (log) 0.0248 0.0077 3.2300 0.0012 0.0098,0.0399
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0135 0.0066 2.0283 0.0425 0.0005,0.0265
Young & male (log) -0.0549 0.0119 -4.6052 0.0000 -0.0783,-0.0315
Divorce rates 0.0586 0.0169 3.4692 0.0005 0.0255,0.0917
Unemployment (log) 0.3176 0.0367 8.6435 0.0000 0.2456,0.3896
Tourism (log) 0.0018 0.0053 0.3453 0.7299 -0.0086,0.0123
Pop. density (log) -0.0136 0.0341 -0.3978 0.6908 -0.0803,0.0532
Lag drop-out rate (log) -0.1327 0.0362 -3.6626 0.0002 -0.2038,-0.0617
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0009 0.0036 0.2387 0.8113 -0.0062,0.0080
Lag DHI p.c. 1.2768 0.2243 5.6923 0.0000 0.8372,1.7164
Lag clearance rate 0.0104 0.0045 2.2875 0.0222 0.0015,0.0193
Border region 0.0107 0.0272 0.3920 0.6950 -0.0426,0.0639
Border to Poland -0.0455 0.0317 -1.4361 0.1510 -0.1077,0.0166
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.0220 0.0280 0.7831 0.4335 -0.0330,0.0769
Border to Austria 0.0278 0.0302 0.9205 0.3573 -0.0314,0.0869
Border to Switzerland 0.0582 0.0358 1.6256 0.1040 -0.0120,0.1284
Border to France -0.0216 0.0295 -0.7309 0.4648 -0.0795,0.0363
Border to Belgium 0.0230 0.0345 0.6665 0.5051 -0.0446,0.0906
Border to the Netherlands 0.0870 0.0343 2.5359 0.0112 0.0198,0.1543
Border to Denmark -0.0873 0.0421 -2.0734 0.0381 -0.1699,-0.0048
Border to Luxembourg 0.0032 0.0358 0.0902 0.9281 -0.0669,0.0733
Voter turn-out (log) -0.2958 0.0479 6.1722 0.0000 -0.2019,-0.3898
out1 0.0247 0.0067 3.6826 0.0002 0.0115,0.0378
out2 -0.0036 0.0019 -1.9113 0.0560 -0.0073,0.0001
lk-ref 0.0311 0.0193 1.6122 0.1069 -0.0067,0.0690
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.2661 0.1603 -1.6600 0.0969 -0.5804,0.0481
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.2811 0.3387 -0.8300 0.4065 -0.9450,0.3827
Avg. poulation density -0.0052 0.0056 -0.9255 0.3547 -0.0163,0.0058
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0058 0.0037 1.5816 0.1137 -0.0014,0.0131
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0624 0.1111 0.5616 0.5744 -0.1554,0.2802
Avg. young & male (log) -0.0863 0.0390 -2.2158 0.0267 -0.1627,-0.0100
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0395 0.0112 3.5363 0.0004 0.0176,0.0614
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) 0.0691 0.0152 4.5399 0.0000 0.0393,0.0989
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.0521 0.0172 3.0266 0.0025 0.0184,0.0859
Avg. Clearance rate 0.0320 0.0148 2.1627 0.0306 0.0030,0.0610
Divorce rates 2015 -0.0169 0.0150 -1.1301 0.2584 -0.0463,0.0124
Table 31: Avg. indirect eﬀects: Drug crime (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Main
Clearance rate -0.0389 0.0091 -4.2775 0.0000 -0.0567,-0.0211
Dmg. to property (log) 0.4621 0.0121 38.3012 0.0000 0.4385,0.4858
State employees p.c. (log) 0.0111 0.0158 0.7035 0.4817 -0.0198,0.0420
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0331 0.0140 2.3664 0.0180 0.0057,0.0605
Young & male (log) -0.0236 0.0176 -1.3401 0.1802 -0.0582,0.0109
Divorce rates 0.3862 0.0334 11.5566 0.0000 0.3207,0.4517
Unemployment (log) 0.0383 0.0091 4.1908 0.0000 0.0204,0.0562
Tourism (log) -0.0750 0.0119 -6.2831 0.0000 -0.0984,-0.0516
Pop. density (log) 0.1485 0.0941 1.5776 0.1147 -0.0360,0.3329
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0036 0.0076 0.4783 0.6325 -0.0113,0.0186
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0136 0.0082 1.6451 0.1000 -0.0026,0.0297
Lag DHI p.c. 0.0347 0.0585 0.5934 0.5529 -0.0799,0.1493
Lag clearance rate -0.0857 0.0087 -9.8226 0.0000 -0.1028,-0.0686
Border region 0.0244 0.1180 0.2072 0.8359 -0.2069,0.2558
Border to Poland 0.0350 0.1306 0.2682 0.7885 -0.2209,0.2909
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.1079 0.1175 -0.9184 0.3584 -0.3382,0.1224
Border to Austria -0.0701 0.1248 -0.5614 0.5745 -0.3147,0.1746
Border to Switzerland -0.2676 0.1497 -1.7874 0.0739 -0.5610,0.0258
Border to France -0.0473 0.1236 -0.3825 0.7021 -0.2894,0.1949
Border to Belgium 0.0406 0.1369 0.2963 0.7670 -0.2278,0.3089
Border to the Netherlands 0.3148 0.1298 2.4256 0.0153 0.0604,0.5692
Border to Denmark -0.1145 0.1705 -0.6715 0.5019 -0.4488,0.2197
Border to Luxembourg -0.0610 0.1432 -0.4263 0.6699 -0.3416,0.2195
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0047 0.0113 -0.4150 0.6781 -0.0270,0.0175
out1 -0.0276 0.0116 -2.3742 0.0176 -0.0504,-0.0048
out2 -0.0090 0.0043 -2.1081 0.0350 -0.0175,-0.0006
lk-ref -0.0691 0.0531 -1.3004 0.1934 -0.1732,0.0350
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0786 0.0545 -1.4412 0.1495 -0.1855,0.0283
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.3425 0.1611 -2.1258 0.0335 -0.6583,-0.0267
Avg. poulation density 0.0076 0.0224 0.3396 0.7342 -0.0363,0.0516
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0010 0.0153 -0.0677 0.9460 -0.0310,0.0289
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.2181 0.0602 3.6236 0.0003 0.1001,0.3360
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1455 0.1526 -0.9531 0.3405 -0.4446,0.1537
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1635 0.0347 4.7090 0.0000 0.0954,0.2315
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0054 0.0340 -0.1576 0.8748 -0.0719,0.0612
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.9064 0.0622 14.5803 0.0000 0.7846,1.0282
Avg. Clearance rate -0.4990 0.0562 -8.8804 0.0000 -0.6092,-0.3889
Divorce rates 2015 0.1648 0.0583 2.8261 0.0047 0.0505,0.2790
Constant 1.9525 2.6513 0.7364 0.4615 -3.2440,7.1489
Spatial lags of regressors
Unemployment (log) 0.0627 0.0123 5.1165 0.0000 0.0387,0.0868
Lag DHI p.c. 0.3334 0.0763 4.3715 0.0000 0.1839,0.4828
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0472 0.0124 3.8184 0.0001 0.0230,0.0715
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0370 0.0177 2.0888 0.0367 0.0023,0.0717
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0164 0.0682 0.2403 0.8101 -0.1173,0.1501
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.2074 0.1998 1.0378 0.2994 -0.1843,0.5990
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.0491 0.0997 0.4922 0.6226 -0.1464,0.2445
Spatial lag of regressand
ρ 0.1035 0.0181 5.7221 0.0000 0.0680,0.1389
Table 32: Street crime (log): SDM estimation results
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Direct Eﬀects: Street crime
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0392 0.0090 -4.3797 0.0000 -0.0568,-0.0217
Dmg. to property (log) 0.4631 0.0121 38.2135 0.0000 0.4393,0.4869
State employees p.c. (log) 0.0115 0.0148 0.7823 0.4340 -0.0174,0.0405
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0327 0.0139 2.3614 0.0182 0.0056,0.0599
Young & male (log) -0.0230 0.0180 -1.2750 0.2023 -0.0582,0.0123
Divorce rates 0.3864 0.0341 11.3221 0.0000 0.3195,0.4533
Unemployment (log) 0.0399 0.0088 4.5114 0.0000 0.0226,0.0572
Tourism (log) -0.0757 0.0122 -6.1961 0.0000 -0.0997,-0.0518
Pop. density (log) 0.1476 0.0910 1.6214 0.1049 -0.0308,0.3260
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0047 0.0076 0.6213 0.5344 -0.0101,0.0196
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0135 0.0082 1.6535 0.0982 -0.0025,0.0295
Lag DHI p.c. 0.0416 0.0573 0.7265 0.4675 -0.0706,0.1538
Lag clearance rate -0.0860 0.0094 -9.1635 0.0000 -0.1044,-0.0676
Border region 0.0135 0.1159 0.1163 0.9074 -0.2136,0.2406
Border to Poland 0.0402 0.1307 0.3077 0.7583 -0.2159,0.2963
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.1016 0.1166 -0.8720 0.3832 -0.3301,0.1268
Border to Austria -0.0606 0.1239 -0.4893 0.6246 -0.3034,0.1822
Border to Switzerland -0.2518 0.1434 -1.7561 0.0791 -0.5328,0.0292
Border to France -0.0385 0.1243 -0.3097 0.7568 -0.2822,0.2052
Border to Belgium 0.0455 0.1428 0.3183 0.7503 -0.2345,0.3254
Border to the Netherlands 0.3263 0.1263 2.5834 0.0098 0.0788,0.5739
Border to Denmark -0.1116 0.1689 -0.6604 0.5090 -0.4427,0.2195
Border to Luxembourg -0.0563 0.1491 -0.3774 0.7059 -0.3486,0.2360
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0045 0.0112 -0.4047 0.6857 -0.0264,0.0174
out1 -0.0275 0.0121 -2.2719 0.0231 -0.0513,-0.0038
out2 -0.0091 0.0041 -2.2036 0.0276 -0.0172,-0.0010
lk-ref -0.0696 0.0530 -1.3143 0.1888 -0.1735,0.0342
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0780 0.0570 -1.3697 0.1708 -0.1896,0.0336
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.3431 0.1658 -2.0696 0.0385 -0.6679,-0.0182
Avg. poulation density 0.0064 0.0227 0.2821 0.7779 -0.0380,0.0508
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0010 0.0149 -0.0656 0.9477 -0.0302,0.0282
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.2190 0.0600 3.6475 0.0003 0.1013,0.3366
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1491 0.1503 -0.9916 0.3214 -0.4437,0.1456
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1648 0.0352 4.6884 0.0000 0.0959,0.2337
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0048 0.0334 -0.1440 0.8855 -0.0703,0.0607
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.9076 0.0631 14.3873 0.0000 0.7840,1.0313
Avg. Clearance rate -0.5031 0.0568 -8.8564 0.0000 -0.6145,-0.3918
Divorce rates 2015 0.1665 0.0611 2.7245 0.0064 0.0467,0.2862
Table 33: Avg. direct eﬀects: Street crime (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0045 0.0014 -3.2819 0.0010 -0.0071,-0.0018
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0527 0.0106 4.9500 0.0000 0.0318,0.0735
State employees p.c. (log) 0.0013 0.0017 0.7669 0.4431 -0.0021,0.0047
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0037 0.0018 2.0604 0.0394 0.0002,0.0073
Young & male (log) -0.0026 0.0022 -1.1993 0.2304 -0.0069,0.0017
Divorce rates 0.0438 0.0087 5.0567 0.0000 0.0268,0.0607
Unemployment (log) 0.0732 0.0134 5.4769 0.0000 0.0470,0.0994
Tourism (log) -0.0086 0.0022 -3.9166 0.0001 -0.0129,-0.0043
Pop. density (log) 0.0167 0.0109 1.5406 0.1234 -0.0046,0.0381
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0516 0.0134 3.8616 0.0001 0.0254,0.0778
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0015 0.0010 1.5104 0.1309 -0.0005,0.0035
Lag DHI p.c. 0.3696 0.0808 4.5770 0.0000 0.2113,0.5279
Lag clearance rate -0.0098 0.0023 -4.3025 0.0000 -0.0142,-0.0053
Border region 0.0014 0.0132 0.1058 0.9157 -0.0244,0.0272
Border to Poland 0.0048 0.0152 0.3135 0.7539 -0.0251,0.0346
Border to the Czech Repub. -0.0114 0.0133 -0.8592 0.3902 -0.0374,0.0146
Border to Austria -0.0067 0.0142 -0.4733 0.6360 -0.0346,0.0211
Border to Switzerland -0.0285 0.0173 -1.6522 0.0985 -0.0624,0.0053
Border to France -0.0043 0.0144 -0.3016 0.7629 -0.0325,0.0239
Border to Belgium 0.0053 0.0163 0.3272 0.7435 -0.0266,0.0373
Border to the Netherlands 0.0372 0.0167 2.2277 0.0259 0.0045,0.0699
Border to Denmark -0.0127 0.0196 -0.6456 0.5185 -0.0511,0.0258
Border to Luxembourg -0.0064 0.0172 -0.3746 0.7080 -0.0401,0.0272
Voter turn-out (log) 0.0410 0.0189 2.1714 0.0299 0.0040,0.0779
out1 -0.0031 0.0015 -2.0809 0.0374 -0.0060,-0.0002
out2 -0.0010 0.0005 -1.9436 0.0519 -0.0021,0.0000
lk-ref -0.0080 0.0065 -1.2319 0.2180 -0.0207,0.0047
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.0385 0.1057 0.3638 0.7160 -0.1687,0.2457
Avg. DHI. p.c. 0.1761 0.2251 0.7825 0.4339 -0.2650,0.6173
Avg. poulation density 0.0007 0.0026 0.2743 0.7839 -0.0044,0.0058
Avg. tourism (log) -0.0001 0.0017 -0.0643 0.9487 -0.0035,0.0033
Avg. unemployment (log) 0.0446 0.0746 0.5981 0.5498 -0.1016,0.1909
Avg. young & male (log) -0.0168 0.0175 -0.9605 0.3368 -0.0511,0.0175
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0188 0.0055 3.4220 0.0006 0.0080,0.0295
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0005 0.0039 -0.1378 0.8904 -0.0081,0.0071
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.1032 0.0217 4.7591 0.0000 0.0607,0.1458
Avg. Clearance rate -0.0572 0.0132 -4.3239 0.0000 -0.0832,-0.0313
Divorce rates 2015 0.0190 0.0082 2.3272 0.0200 0.0030,0.0350
Table 34: Avg. indirect eﬀects: Street crime (log)
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Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Main
Clearance rate -0.0783 0.0095 -8.2089 0.0000 -0.0969,-0.0596
Dmg. to property (log) 0.2791 0.0127 22.0104 0.0000 0.2542,0.3039
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0509 0.0165 -3.0762 0.0021 -0.0833,-0.0185
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0432 0.0147 2.9433 0.0032 0.0144,0.0719
Young & male (log) 0.0214 0.0185 1.1567 0.2474 -0.0149,0.0577
Divorce rates 0.1828 0.0345 5.2951 0.0000 0.1152,0.2505
Unemployment (log) 0.0016 0.0096 0.1687 0.8660 -0.0172,0.0204
Tourism (log) 0.0442 0.0125 3.5408 0.0004 0.0197,0.0686
Pop. density (log) -0.0373 0.0919 -0.4064 0.6845 -0.2174,0.1428
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0006 0.0080 0.0788 0.9372 -0.0150,0.0162
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0128 0.0086 1.4769 0.1397 -0.0042,0.0297
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1144 0.0614 -1.8628 0.0625 -0.2348,0.0060
Lag clearance rate -0.0360 0.0092 3.9264 0.0001 -0.0539,-0.0180
Border region -0.1559 0.1001 -1.5575 0.1194 -0.3521,0.0403
Border to Poland 0.0068 0.1108 0.0614 0.9511 -0.2103,0.2239
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.0832 0.0997 0.8346 0.4039 -0.1122,0.2786
Border to Austria 0.2066 0.1059 1.9508 0.0511 -0.0010,0.4141
Border to Switzerland 0.0321 0.1270 0.2529 0.8003 -0.2167,0.2810
Border to France 0.2007 0.1048 1.9148 0.0555 -0.0047,0.4061
Border to Belgium 0.2491 0.1162 2.1442 0.0320 0.0214,0.4767
Border to the Netherlands 0.1879 0.1101 1.7070 0.0878 -0.0278,0.4037
Border to Denmark 0.2934 0.1446 2.0284 0.0425 0.0099,0.5768
Border to Luxembourg -0.0054 0.1215 -0.0445 0.9645 -0.2434,0.2326
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0165 0.0116 -1.4178 0.1563 -0.0393,0.0063
out1 -0.0039 0.0121 -0.3179 0.7506 -0.0276,0.0199
out2 -0.0101 0.0045 -2.2587 0.0239 -0.0189,-0.0013
lk-ref 0.0053 0.0526 0.1012 0.9194 -0.0977,0.1083
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1471 0.0463 3.1781 0.0015 0.0564,0.2378
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4528 0.1367 -3.3125 0.0009 -0.7207,-0.1849
Avg. poulation density 0.0552 0.0190 2.8983 0.0038 0.0179,0.0925
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0083 0.0130 0.6388 0.5229 -0.0172,0.0337
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0949 0.0511 -1.8583 0.0631 -0.1950,0.0052
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1314 0.1294 -1.0153 0.3100 -0.3850,0.1222
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0998 0.0294 3.3900 0.0007 0.0421,0.1576
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.1452 0.0288 -5.0342 0.0000 -0.2017,-0.0886
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.6434 0.0528 12.1976 0.0000 0.5400,0.7468
Avg. Clearance rate -0.2666 0.0477 -5.5880 0.0000 -0.3600,-0.1731
Divorce rates 2015 -0.0216 0.0495 -0.4374 0.6618 -0.1186,0.0753
Constant 7.1482 2.2503 3.1765 0.0015 2.7377,11.5588
Spatial lags of regressors
Unemployment (log) -0.0042 0.0127 -0.3259 0.7445 -0.0291,0.0208
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1665 0.0801 -2.0787 0.0376 -0.3235,-0.0095
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0166 0.0127 1.2997 0.1937 -0.0084,0.0415
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0065 0.0183 -0.3541 0.7233 -0.0424,0.0294
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0156 0.0568 -0.2742 0.7839 -0.1269,0.0957
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.2979 0.1692 -1.7602 0.0784 -0.6296,0.0338
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0512 0.0847 -0.6043 0.5456 -0.2171,0.1148
Spatial lag of regressand
ρ 0.0399 0.0194 2.0584 0.0396 0.0019,0.0779
Table 35: Assault (log): SDM estimation results
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Direct Eﬀects: Assault
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0780 0.0094 -8.3187 0.0000 -0.0964,-0.0596,
Dmg. to property (log) 0.2792 0.0127 21.9416 0.0000 0.2542,0.3041
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0513 0.0155 -3.3226 0.0009 -0.0816,-0.0211
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0427 0.0145 2.9456 0.0032 0.0143,0.0711
Young & male (log) 0.0222 0.0188 1.1778 0.2389 -0.0147,0.0591
Divorce rates 0.1835 0.0354 5.1790 0.0000 0.1141,0.2530
Unemployment (log) 0.0019 0.0094 0.2035 0.8388 -0.0164,0.0202
Tourism (log) 0.0436 0.0128 3.4157 0.0006 0.0186,0.0686
Pop. density (log) -0.0386 0.0890 -0.4337 0.6645 -0.2131,0.1359
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0009 0.0079 0.1109 0.9117 -0.0147,0.0164
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0126 0.0085 1.4850 0.1376 -0.0040,0.0293
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1155 0.0602 -1.9191 0.0550 -0.2334,0.0025
Lag clearance rate -0.0359 0.0098 -3.6490 0.0003 -0.0551,0.0166
Border region -0.1653 0.0981 -1.6849 0.0920 -0.3576,0.0270
Border to Poland 0.0111 0.1107 0.1007 0.9198 -0.2058,0.2281
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.0887 0.0987 0.8989 0.3687 -0.1047,0.2822
Border to Austria 0.2148 0.1049 2.0474 0.0406 0.0092,0.4204
Border to Switzerland 0.0460 0.1214 0.3787 0.7049 -0.1919,0.2839
Border to France 0.2083 0.1053 1.9777 0.0480 0.0019,0.4147
Border to Belgium 0.2532 0.1210 2.0930 0.0363 0.0161,0.4903
Border to the Netherlands 0.1972 0.1070 1.8428 0.0654 -0.0125,0.4068
Border to Denmark 0.2961 0.1430 2.0701 0.0384 0.0158,0.5765
Border to Luxembourg -0.0012 0.1263 -0.0097 0.9922 -0.2488,0.2464
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0171 0.0115 -1.4952 0.1349 -0.0396,0.0053
out1 -0.0037 0.0126 -0.2949 0.7681 -0.0285,0.0210
out2 -0.0101 0.0043 -2.3597 0.0183 -0.0186,-0.0017
lk-ref 0.0048 0.0524 0.0925 0.9263 -0.0978,0.1075
Avg. drop-out rate (log) 0.1466 0.0483 3.0362 0.0024 0.0520,0.2412
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.4583 0.1404 -3.2643 0.0011 -0.7335,-0.1831
Avg. poulation density 0.0542 0.0192 2.8195 0.0048 0.0165,0.0919
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0084 0.0126 0.6612 0.5085 -0.0164,0.0331
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0950 0.0509 -1.8664 0.0620 -0.1947,0.0048
Avg. young & male (log) -0.1341 0.1273 -1.0532 0.2922 -0.3835,0.1154
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.1007 0.0298 3.3821 0.0007 0.0423,0.1591
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.1457 0.0283 -5.1392 0.0000 -0.2012,-0.0901
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.6431 0.0535 12.0273 0.0000 0.5383,0.7479
Avg. Clearance rate -0.2641 0.0481 -5.4852 0.0000 -0.3585,-0.1697
Divorce rates 2015 -0.0204 0.0522 -0.3916 0.6953 -0.1227,0.0818
Table 36: Avg. direct eﬀects: Assault (log)
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Indirect Eﬀects: Assault
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. error z-value p-value 95% Conf. Interval
Clearance rate -0.0032 0.0017 -1.8777 0.0604 -0.0066,0.0001
Dmg. to property (log) 0.0116 0.0060 1.9423 0.0521 -0.0001,0.0234
State employees p.c. (log) -0.0022 0.0014 -1.5927 0.1112 -0.0048,0.0005
Lag share of foreigners (log) 0.0018 0.0012 1.5435 0.1227 -0.0005,0.0041
Young & male (log) 0.0010 0.0010 0.9328 0.3509 -0.0011,0.0030
Divorce rates 0.0076 0.0043 1.7751 0.0759 -0.0008,0.0161
Unemployment (log) -0.0042 0.0135 -0.3136 0.7538 -0.0306,0.0222
Tourism (log) 0.0018 0.0011 1.6472 0.0995 -0.0003,0.0040
Pop. density (log) -0.0017 0.0042 -0.4141 0.6788 -0.0099,0.0064
Lag drop-out rate (log) 0.0166 0.0132 1.2596 0.2078 -0.0092,0.0423
Lag unemployment (log) 0.0005 0.0005 1.0312 0.3025 -0.0005,0.0015
Lag DHI p.c. -0.1764 0.0809 -2.1798 0.0293 -0.3351,-0.0178
Lag clearance rate -0.0015 0.0009 -1.6805 0.0929 -0.0032,0.0002
Border region -0.0070 0.0058 -1.2058 0.2279 -0.0185,0.0044
Border to Poland 0.0006 0.0051 0.1162 0.9075 -0.0094,0.0106
Border to the Czech Repub. 0.0038 0.0048 0.7908 0.4291 -0.0056,0.0132
Border to Austria 0.0091 0.0067 1.3596 0.1740 -0.0040,0.0221
Border to Switzerland 0.0019 0.0056 0.3395 0.7342 -0.0090,0.0128
Border to France 0.0088 0.0067 1.3174 0.1877 -0.0043,0.0218
Border to Belgium 0.0107 0.0078 1.3662 0.1719 -0.0046,0.0260
Border to the Netherlands 0.0083 0.0068 1.2260 0.2202 -0.0050,0.0216
Border to Denmark 0.0125 0.0096 1.3045 0.1921 -0.0063,0.0313
Border to Luxembourg -0.0001 0.0059 -0.0246 0.9804 -0.0118,0.0115
Voter turn-out (log) -0.0065 0.0185 -0.3519 0.7249 -0.0428,0.0298
out1 -0.0001 0.0006 -0.2445 0.8068 -0.0013,0.0010
out2 -0.0004 0.0003 -1.4247 0.1542 -0.0010,0.0002
lk-ref 0.0001 0.0025 0.0531 0.9577 -0.0048,0.0051
Avg. drop-out rate (log) -0.0522 0.0854 -0.6112 0.5410 -0.2196,0.1152
Avg. DHI. p.c. -0.3364 0.1798 -1.8703 0.0614 -0.6888,0.0161
Avg. poulation density 0.0022 0.0014 1.5875 0.1124 -0.0005,0.0050
Avg. tourism (log) 0.0004 0.0006 0.5728 0.5668 -0.0009,0.0016
Avg. unemployment (log) -0.0184 0.0594 -0.3090 0.7573 -0.1348,0.0981
Avg. young & male (log) -0.0056 0.0065 -0.8586 0.3906 -0.0183,0.0071
Avg. share of foreigners (log) 0.0042 0.0026 1.6515 0.0986 -0.0008,0.0093
Avg. state employees p.c. (log) -0.0061 0.0036 -1.7271 0.0841 -0.0131,0.0008
Avg. dmg. to property (log) 0.0268 0.0139 1.9336 0.0532 -0.0004,0.0539
Avg. Clearance rate -0.0110 0.0061 -1.8082 0.0706 -0.0230,0.0009
Divorce rates 2015 -0.0008 0.0024 -0.3404 0.7336 -0.0055,0.0038
Table 37: Avg. indirect eﬀects: Assault (log)
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